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Despite the proliferation of the trial consulting industry in recent years, we know virtually 
nothing about the impact that the use of a trial consultant may have on a jury.  This 
laboratory study seeks to fill some of the gaps in the trial consulting literature by using 
the principles of procedural justice to explore what, if any, impact the use of a trial 
consultant can have on the outcome of a criminal jury trial, as well as the possibility that 
perceptions of fairness mediate the relationship between the balance of trial consultants 
and juror verdicts in cases where the evidence is ambiguous.  Two hundred fifty-five 
jury-eligible individuals recruited from the participant pool of the psychology and 
management departments at Baruch College were asked to complete three questionnaires 
following the random assignment to a case summary that had been manipulated with 
respect to evidence strength (SOE) and use of a trial consultant.  Hypotheses predicted 
that (a) a trial would be perceived as being higher in neutrality and global fairness if both 
the prosecution and defense used a trial consultant than if only one party used a trial 
consultant, (b) the likelihood of conviction would be highest when the evidence favored 
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the prosecution, moderate when the evidence was ambiguous, and lowest when the 
evidence favored the defense, (c) the likelihood of conviction would be impacted by an 
interaction between SOE and balance of trial consultants such that when the evidence is 
ambiguous and both sides use a trial consultant, the likelihood of conviction would be 
higher than when the prosecution alone used a trial consultant but lower than when the 
defendant alone used a trial consultant, and (d) the relationship between the balance of 
trial consultants and likelihood of conviction would be mediated by perceptions of 
neutrality and global fairness when the evidence was ambiguous.  Results supported the 
hypothesized relationship between SOE and likelihood of conviction, but there was only 
weak to moderate support for the relationship between the balance of trial consultants and 
perceptions of fairness.  No significant interaction or mediation was found among the 
variables.  Implications for the fields of procedural justice and trial consulting are 
discussed. 
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Although the trial consulting industry has been in existence for almost four 
decades and the publication of jury selection guides by attorneys for use by other 
attorneys dates back more than 100 years (Fulero & Penrod, 1990), the widespread 
acceptance of trial consultants by many in the legal community is a relatively new 
phenomenon (“Giving Lawyers,” 2002).  Lawyers are increasingly realizing that trial 
consultants are no longer frivolous luxuries to be used only in highly publicized cases, 
but rather people who can give invaluable feedback and guidance from the standpoint of 
someone trained to think more like a juror than a lawyer (Bennett & Hirschhorn, 1993).   
Trial consultants are often called upon to assist attorneys in all aspects of a trial, ranging 
from pre-trial community surveys to jury selection and witness preparation.  Despite their 
prevalence in the modern American courtroom, however, we know very little about the 
impact that the use of a trial consultant may have on a jury.  When only one side of a case 
has access to the resources and skills of a professional consultant, the jury’s notion of a 
level playing field may be disturbed. The main purpose of the present study is to 
determine whether the use of a trial consultant by one or more opposing parties in the 
courtroom can affect a juror’s perception of fairness, ultimately influencing the verdict.   
The consulting industry has been quick to respond to the increasing demand for 
its services; the American Society of Trial Consultants (ASTC), which began in 1982 
with only a handful of members, has grown between six percent and twelve percent every 
year for two decades and now encompasses over 400 members (Myers, 2004), with an 
estimated 100 to 150 more trial consultants who do not belong to the group (Renaud, 
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2001).  Not everyone is pleased that business is booming, however.  Despite the 
increased use of trial consultants by the legal community the industry remains “a 
lightning rod for controversy” (Strier, 1999, p. 93).  One criticism is the lack of standards 
in the field.   Given the enormous potential for influence in the legal arena, it astounds 
some critics that the trial consulting industry remains largely unregulated.  At the present 
time, trial consultants can and often do come from a variety of educational and 
professional backgrounds (e.g., psychologists, sociologist, attorneys) and do not need a 
specific education or training to practice (Lane, 1999).  Furthermore, unlike in the fields 
of psychology and law, trial consultants have no licensing requirements and are not 
bound by any ethical guidelines/principles or codes of conduct.  “In fact, anyone can be a 
trial consultant because there are no qualifications or educational requirements” (Griffith, 
Hart, Kessler, & Goodling, 2007, p. 149). 
Some argue that this lack of standards is unfair.  For example, Theresa Zagnoli, a 
past president of the ASTC Foundation, states that, “‘Those of us who are leaders in this 
field and who do solid, scientific research and have years of training…want to continue 
to enhance the image of the profession…it’s very difficult to do that if you let anyone in 
your only national organization’” (Myers, 2004, p. 1).   Others (e.g., Moran, 2001) 
believe that enacting regulations and standards for those who practice trial consulting is 
unnecessary, arguing that, “jury consulting is not an established discipline with a corpus 
of knowledge prerequisite to competent performance” (p. 83).   The first ever formal 
debate over whether to accredit members of the trial consulting industry was held in 2004 
at the annual meeting of the ASTC, and the topic will most likely continue to generate 
discussion for some time to come.  In the meantime, the ASTC has established a Code of 
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Professional Standards and a formal grievance procedure (New, Schwartz, & Giewat, 
2006) to address some of the concerns that plague the field.  Essentially, the Grievance 
Committee of the board has the authority to apply sanctions ranging from written 
admonishment to suspension or expulsion from ASTC.  There is currently no formal 
professional costs associated with a violation of the code, however, since a member who 
is expelled from ASTC can continue to practice as a trial consultant (along with the many 
trial consultants who have chosen not to join the organization in the first place) 
(Lieberman & Sales, 2007). 
Not nearly as straightforward are the issues of efficacy and fairness, the two 
topics that have generated the most controversy and criticism in the trial consulting 
industry.  Some researchers have speculated that public scrutiny has increased in recent 
years due to the spate of high profile cases involving trial consultants, such as O. J. 
Simpson, Rodney King, Reginald Denny, Bernhard Goetz, William Kennedy Smith, and 
the McDonalds’ hot coffee case (Kressel & Kressel, 2002; Strier, 1999).  Most recently, 
trial consultants were used in the trials of Michael Jackson, Scott Peterson, and Martha 
Stewart (Chawkins, 2005; Dearen, 2004; “Traits of the Right Juror”, 2004).     In all of 
these cases, trial consultants were able to help obtain favorable verdicts for their clients, 
which helped to both increase the popularity of the field and draw attention to its 
perceived weaknesses.  Those in support of the field have gone so far as to speculate that, 
“there is even talk that in the future, failure to use trial scientists during trial preparation 
could amount to legal malpractice” (Gordon, 1995, p. 9).  Likewise, Atlanta criminal 
defense attorney Brian Steel says he’s “found consultants so critical to the defense team 
that he calculates their cost when he quotes clients a fee” (Renaud, 2001, p. 3).    
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Although accolades such as these abound in the legal community, it is critical to 
address the fact that many in both the legal and social scientific communities are not 
similarly impressed.  Fulero and Penrod (1990b), for example, claim that the academic 
community is not warmly receptive of the field, remaining skeptical of both the ethics 
and the efficacy involved in trial consulting.  Barber (1994) warns that the growth of jury 
science over the past decade has ramifications for the fundamental fairness of our jury 
system.  Galen (1992) sums up the feelings of many critics of the industry when he states 
that the services of a trial consultant may be “more art than science” (p. 108), a statement 
that will be examined in greater detail in the next section. 
 Although all of these issues are important, this study focuses on a neglected 
aspect of the use of trial consultants in jury trials:  whether or not the use of a trial 
consultant by one or more opposing parties in the courtroom can impact the outcome -- 
the actual determination by a juror of a defendant’s guilt or innocence -- of a trial.  An 
affiliate of the National Legal Research Group asserted that the public has come to see 
that “‘we’re not stacking juries and we’re not engaging in mind control.  We’re just 
another member of the team’” (Renaud, 2001, p. 5).  As consultants become increasingly 
visible and accepted in the courtroom, there is a need to determine if a trial consultant is 
just another member of the legal team, or if jurors may perceive the presence of a trial 
consultant in a negative light.   Stolle, Robbennolt, and Wiener (1996) found that a trial 
was perceived by participants as being more fair if both the prosecution and defense had 
access to trial consultants or neither did, particularly when the outcome favored the 
prosecution/plaintiff.  Additionally, in the only study known to examine how eligible 
jurors view trial consultants, Griffith et al. (2007) found that eighteen percent of 
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participants indicated that if they knew that one side was using a trial consultant, they 
would be biased against the side that hired the consultant. 
Research has also shown that bias tendencies decrease when people are 
confronted with clear proof of guilt or innocence, and increase when the weight of the 
evidence decreases (e.g., Baumeister & Darley, 1982; Kaplan & Miller, 1987).  It is 
therefore possible that in cases where the evidence is not clear-cut, an imbalance of trial 
consultants could impact a juror’s likelihood to convict the defendant.   The main 
objective of the present study is to investigate this and related possibilities.   
 One way of assessing the fairness of trial consulting is through the principles and 
concepts of procedural justice.  Currently, concerns about the processes through which 
decisions are made form the basis of what is referred to as procedural justice (Thibaut & 
Walker, 1975).  As Stolle et al. (1996) state, “The methodologies developed in the 
context of exploring procedural justice theory provide a suitable framework for 
operationalizing, quantifying, and measuring soft variables such as fairness.  
Consequently, procedural justice theory may act as a vehicle for systematically and 
empirically evaluating the perceived fairness of trial consulting” (p. 7).  Research in a 
variety of other legal arenas have used this framework to evaluate the perceived fairness 
and overall legitimacy of Supreme Court decision making (Tyler & Rasinski, 1991), 
alternative dispute resolution techniques (MacCoun, Lind, & Tyler, 1992), methods for 
resolving medical malpractice claims (Poythress, Schumacher, & Wiener, 1993), and 
civil tort proceedings (Lind, MacCoun, & Ebener, 1990).  Because criteria such as 
accuracy have traditionally been viewed as easier to operationalize, quantify, and 
measure than “soft” variables such as fairness (Fondacaro, 1995), empirical trial 
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consulting literature has tended to focus more on efficacy than ethicality or fairness.  
Stolle et al. (1996) emphasize, however, that the legal legitimacy of trial consulting is 
largely dependent upon the criteria of fairness presented in the social scientific procedural 
justice literature.  It is imperative, therefore, that more studies use procedural justice 
theory to investigate the perceived fairness of trial consulting. 
The purpose of this study is twofold.  First, this study seeks to fill some of the 
gaps in the trial consulting literature by exploring what, if any, impact the use of a trial 
consultant can have on the outcome of a criminal jury trial.  Second, this study explores 
the intervening mechanisms behind the trial consultant - verdict link.  Why might the 
balance of trial consultants affect the likelihood of conviction in a criminal trial?  This 
paper examines the possibility that perceptions of fairness mediate the relationship 
between the balance of trial consultants and juror verdicts in cases where the evidence is 
ambiguous.  Chapter 2 includes background information on the field of trial consulting, 
including a summary of the issues surrounding the efficacy and fairness of the industry.  
Chapter 3 provides a brief literature review on the history of procedural justice, paying 
particular attention to Lind and Tyler’s (1988) group-value model and the relational 
concerns of trust, neutrality, and status recognition.  Chapter 4 summarizes the limitations 
of the trial consulting research and presents the study’s hypotheses.  Chapter 5 provides 
an overview of the methods used to test the hypotheses in the present study.  Chapter 6 
describes the analyses and results of the pilot study.  Chapter 7 describes the analyses and 
results of the present study.  Chapter 8 details the implications and contributions of the 
present study, as well as its limitations and directions for future research.   
 




Review of the Trial Consulting Literature 
The roots of scientific jury selection are frequently cited as beginning in 1971 
with the trial of the “Harrisburg Seven,” a group of Vietnam War protestors who were 
accused of conspiring to kidnap then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (Barber, 1994; 
Stolle et al., 1996; Strier, 1999).  When sociologist Jay Schulman and his colleagues 
came to the assistance of the defense and helped to select the jury, the verdict was 10 to 2 
for acquittal and a new field had taken hold.  Prior to this time, attorneys had to rely on 
their own personal and trial experience, or seek guidance from a variety of trial 
specialists who offered conflicting guidance (Diamond, 1990).  The field has expanded 
considerably in the past 30 plus years; according to Strier (2001), a 1995 estimate of $400 
million in industry revenues “easily may now have doubled” (p. 70).  DecisionQuest, a 
California-based firm with over a dozen offices nationwide, alone grossed nearly $300 
million in revenues in 2003 (Myers, 2004).  More up to date statistics regarding typical 
fees, individual compensation, and industry revenue are not readily available.  In fact, 
Posey and Wrightsman (2005) report that a participant on the ASTC listserv tried to 
determine the current range of hourly fees, but the general reaction was a complete 
rejection of this inquiry.  
What is known is that business has been particularly brisk in the past twenty 
years.  As Bennett and Hirschhorn (1993) state, “In the age of massive TV consumption, 
‘law and order’ hysteria, the war on crime and tort reform, the need for someone to assist 
lawyers in jury selection and other emotional parts of a case has become paramount” (p. 
2).   Celebrity status trials involving O.J. Simpson, the Menendez brothers, and the Exxon 
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Valdez propelled jury consultants into the limelight (Gordon, 1995).  More recently, 
Martha Stewart’s attorneys hired a trial consultant when she was scheduled for trial in 
early 2004, as did Scott Peterson’s attorneys in mid 2004.  The use of trial consultants has 
even been glamorized in popular films such as “Runaway Jury” (Downer & Fleder, 
2003).  Although the field has garnered much of its attention from the criminal litigation 
mentioned above, it is now more common for trial consultants to be used in large-scale 
civil litigations, such as securities fraud and antitrust cases (Ellis, 2005). 
Because the field of scientific jury selection now reaches far beyond the jury 
selection phase of the trial, the term “trial consulting” is more commonly used to reflect 
the broader role played by those in the industry.  Whereas “jury selection consultants” of 
the past would construct a model of a potential juror favorable to their client’s case and 
use this knowledge to attempt to choose a jury panel to fit this characterization (Lane, 
1999), today’s trial consultants employ a variety of techniques to assist attorneys during 
all aspects of a trial.  For example, two commonly used methods are the community 
survey, which is a survey conducted to derive demographic and attitudinal profiles of 
community members most likely to appear on a jury panel, and the mock trial, which 
involves a full dress rehearsal of a case in order to assist attorneys with voir dire, opening 
arguments, witness testimony for each side, closing arguments, judge’s instructions, and 
jury deliberations.  As these and other techniques used by trial consultants have gained 
popularity, the issues of efficacy and fairness have come under increased scrutiny.   
With regard to the matter of efficacy, some researchers have asserted that trial 
consultants cannot effectively predict juror behavior (e.g., Diamond, 1990; Lane, 1999).   
Other researchers dispute this claim, arguing that there is empirical evidence linking 
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scientific jury selection with juror behaviors and verdicts (e.g., Fulero & Penrod, 1990b; 
Stolle et al., 1996).  The other issue, fairness, tends to center around two concerns:  
Whether the industry is inherently unfair because it is accessible only to the wealthy and 
privileged, and whether the use of a trial consultant violates principles of impartiality, 
judgment by peers, and democracy.  These criticisms will be discussed in greater detail in 
the next section.  
Trial Consulting:  Art or Science? 
Are the Procedures Used by Trial Consultant’s Effective? 
 Does hiring a trial consultant really improve the odds of winning a case?  Debate 
on this topic continues to rage, particularly in the academic community.  Cases such as 
the 1980 federal antitrust trial between AT&T and MCI have helped win the support of 
“some of the finest and most critical legal minds in the nation” (Stolle et al., 1996, p. 4).   
A mock trial held to pretest the arguments of MCI’s lawyers accusing AT&T of 
monopolistic practices found that when a jury heard the MCI lawyers mention lost profits 
totaling $100 million, those mock jurors decided to award exactly that amount.  When 
another mock trial was held with different jurors and MCI’s lawyers did not request any 
particular figure, the group awarded $900 million.  As a result of these findings, MCI’s 
attorneys devised strategies for jury selection and case presentation that ultimately 
resulted in a $600 million verdict against AT&T (Kressel & Kressel, 2002).   
Despite such successes, critics of the field point to the lack of empirical research 
supporting its usefulness.  Diamond (1990), for example, reminds us that despite the high 
success rates claimed by consultants in obtaining favorable verdicts for their clients, “no 
one has yet produced convincing evidence that advice on jury selection made the 
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difference.  The demands of the courtroom preclude a full controlled test of the technique 
in the courtroom setting” (p. 179).   Admittedly, researchers like Diamond (1990) and 
Strier (1999) are correct when they point out that it is impossible to assert that a 
successful verdict in an actual trial is directly and solely attributable to scientific jury 
selection.  The factors involved are too confounded:  The client who can afford a trial 
consultant is usually the same client who can afford the best attorneys, the best experts, 
and the best investigators.  However, researchers like Bornstein (1999) have shown that 
simulation studies can and do provide valid results when doing research in the legal 
arena; when Bornstein (1999) compared different trial mediums (e.g., live trial vs. brief 
written summaries in a simulation study), no effect was found in the majority of cases.   
One major problem with the empirical research supporting the use of trial 
consultants is in the way the research is interpreted.  While early research investigating 
the associations between juror characteristics and verdict tendencies found only weak to 
moderate sized relationships, Wiener and Stolle (1997) point out that more recent studies 
have found that juror characteristics account for meaningful, albeit small, percentages of 
variance (4% to 31%) in criminal verdicts (e.g., Penrod, 1990; Visher, 1987).  Fulero and 
Penrod (1990b) examined the results of empirical studies that had attempted to link 
demographic and personality variables (e.g., gender, race/ethnicity, occupation, 
demeanor/appearance, wealth and social status, religion, marital status, and age) to jury 
verdicts.  In general, Fulero and Penrod (1990b) detected modest relationships between 
demographic and personality variables and jury verdicts, with the variance explained in 
verdict preferences ranging from approximately five to fifteen percent.  Although up to 
that point in time there were a number of studies linking demographic and personality 
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variables to attitudes, there was much less support for the notion that these variables 
could be linked to juror verdicts.  The distinction is important; as Fulero and Penrod 
(1990b) make clear, this link must be established in order to show that scientific jury 
selection works.   
Similarly, Visher’s (1987) study focused on juror decision making in sexual 
assault cases.  After interviewing 331 jurors, she assessed jurors’ characteristics and 
attitudes on crime as well as defendant and victim characteristics.  An evaluation of the 
trial evidence showed modest but significant correlations between predeliberation verdict 
preferences and education (r = .15), race (r = .15), occupational status (r = .12), attitudes 
on crime (r = .16), and tendency to blame victims (r = .22).  Using a hierarchical 
regression analysis, Visher found that evidence accounted for 34% of the variance in jury 
verdicts, victim and defendant characteristics accounted for 8% of the variance, and 2% 
of the variance was accounted for by juror characteristics and attitudes.  A mock trial 
study conducted by Penrod (1990) looked at the verdicts of 367 actual jurors in four 
simulated trials in order to assess the impact of various attitudinal and demographic 
characteristics on verdicts.  When each verdict was separately regressed over 21 
attitudinal and demographic items, the overall variance explained in verdicts by these 
variables ranged between 4.9% and 14.1%  for each variable.  Penrod (1990) also found 
that no single predictor worked in more than two of the cases and the highest correlation 
between any two verdicts was only -.13.   
While some might view these relatively weak relationships as evidence of 
ineffectiveness, Fulero and Penrod (1990b) point out that a small amount of variance in 
this context is not insignificant.  As Penrod and Cutler (1985) explain, for example, an 
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attorney acting randomly on a fifty percent favorable and fifty percent unfavorable jury 
pool would correctly classify fifty percent of the jurors.  If, however, a jury survey 
detected a relationship in which five percent of the variance in verdict was accounted for 
by attitudinal and personality measures, an attorney would increase his/her performance 
to sixty-one percent correct classifications by using that information.  If fifteen percent of 
the variance was accounted for, performance would increase to sixty-nine percent correct.  
Fulero and Penrod (1990b) believe that this assistance during voir dire should not be 
minimized: “Clearly, although the percentage of variance explained may be small, the 
potential improvement in selection performance is not insignificant.  If a defendant has 
his life or millions of dollars at stake, the jury selection advantages conferred by 
scientific jury selection techniques may well be worth the investment” (pp. 
250-251).   
In an attempt to further clarify the usefulness of social science for trial 
preparation, Wiener and Stolle (1997) conducted a series of studies to investigate the 
influence of demographic and attitudinal variables on jury decision making in a capital 
murder case.  In addition, the researchers examined attorneys’ beliefs as to which 
variables they thought to be predictive of verdicts and sentence outcomes in the same 
capital murder case.  The results indicated that attorneys believed more factors to be 
influential than actually were.  For example, attorneys indicated that marital status, race, 
political ideology, and attitudes toward African Americans, handgun control, and illegal 
drugs were all influential in trying to distinguish which way jurors would vote.  In fact, 
none of these factors differentiated between jurors’ verdicts or correlated with the 
certainty of the jurors in their verdicts.  On the other hand, some of the factors that did 
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differentiate among the actual jurors’ verdicts were not chosen as significant 
demographic attributes.  For example, the status of parenthood distinguished between the 
not guilty and guilty voting jurors, but the attorneys did not recognize this variable as an 
important factor in separating life imprisonment from death sentencing jurors.  Wiener 
and Stolle (1997) speculate that without the assistance of a jury survey, it is very likely 
that the attorneys would eliminate the wrong variables and would base their selections on 
faulty assumptions.  The skills of a trial consultant would therefore prove to be useful. 
Summing up an extensive review of the research assessing the effectiveness of scientific 
jury selection, Lieberman and Sales (2007) conclude that, “determining the effectiveness 
of scientific jury selection is difficult because there are not many published studies that 
have directly examined the technique; the studies that do exist are methodologically 
flawed in a variety of ways” (p. 165).  However, they go on to state that, “if scientific 
jury selection creates even minimal improvement in an attorney’s ability to identify and 
eliminate a biased juror, then the use of this approach can be worthwhile” (p. 165). 
The studies examined by Fulero and Penrod (1990b) and the investigation by 
Wiener and Stolle (1997) illustrate one of the most glaring problems with the research 
that has been conducted on the effectiveness of the trial consulting industry:  the almost 
exclusive focus upon jury selection.  As mentioned before, jury selection is just one part 
of a trial consultant’s job.  Nevertheless, investigations into the usefulness of holding 
mock trials or assisting with voir dire, opening arguments, witness testimony for each 
side, closing arguments, judge’s instructions, or jury deliberations have been virtually 
ignored (Lieberman & Sales, 2007).  Stolle et al. (1996) believe that research that 
includes these aspects of a consultant’s job may very well impact effectiveness; as some 
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commentators have suggested, the amount of variability in juror verdicts that is 
accounted for by the trial consultant’s intervention may increase considerably if new trial 
preparation techniques are used in conjunction with scientific jury selection.  They 
lament, however, the fact that no empirical evaluations of the combined use of such 
techniques currently exist in the academic literature.  Clearly, future research on the 
effectiveness of trial consulting should include variables beyond the dimension of jury 
selection.  The next section will focus on fairness, which has received more attention than 
efficacy from researchers in the legal and psychological community. 
Are the Procedures Used by Trial Consultants Ethical and/or Fair? 
Debate in this area is focused on two separate issues:  Whether the field of trial 
consulting is inherently unfair because it is accessible only to the wealthy and privileged 
due to its high cost, and whether its use violates principles of impartiality, judgment by 
peers, and democracy.  Barber (1994) is just one of many detractors who fear that jury 
science is a “phenomenon that has ballooned over the past twenty years and threatens to 
undermine the basic values of our jury system” (p. 1226).  One problem is the escalating 
cost of trial consultants; consequently, those litigants most likely to need a consultant are 
least likely to be able to afford the steep price tag of that consultant.  Because 
corporations, governments, and wealthy people can most typically afford the service, the 
concept of a fair trial may be undermined.  When only one side can afford jury selection 
experts, it creates an imbalance similar to the imbalance that can result from a mismatch 
of other client resources (e.g., the quality of lawyer and legal resources one can afford; 
Strier, 1999).  
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Are the poor at a disadvantage?  A position often cited in the literature is that 
scientific jury selection is only a moderately successful method that is used by zealous 
attorneys advocating for their clients, and that this usually amounts to an unethical 
advantage for the rich at the expense of poorer litigants.  Furthermore, it is often argued 
that if the use of a trial consultant can provide an advantage, only large corporations and 
wealthy individuals will have access to this advantage, therefore leaving the average 
litigant with “some form of second-class justice” (Stolle et al., 1996, p. 4).  Others, on the 
other hand, argue that trial consultants continue to be unfairly plagued by 
misunderstanding and skepticism.  In the article “Tipping the scales in favor of one side” 
published in the Illinois Legal Times (1996), LaDonna Carlton of Carlton Trial 
Consulting addresses the public misconception that only people with a lot of money use 
trial consultants, and thus have the advantage over everyone else in our society.  In truth, 
she explains, trial consultants are used in civil cases as well as in criminal cases by 
people of varying means.  Although corporate defense clients far outnumber plaintiffs 
lawyers (Gordon, 1995), both plaintiff and defense attorneys use trial consultants to 
conduct jury-related research and assist in preparing for trial (Yarborough, 1996).  An 
article in The National Law Journal discusses how consultants have become fixtures at 
major trials in criminal matters and products liability cases.  Although their services are 
more likely to be found on the defense side in criminal cases, consultants say that federal 
prosecutors are making increasing use of their services (Renaud, 2001).   
Although a disparity of resources continues to exist, Stolle et al. (1996) point out 
that inequities abound in the justice system.  Research has shown, for example, that jurors 
make higher awards against corporations and government than against individuals.  They 
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conclude that the high price of trial consulting is no less fair than the high cost of 
traditional legal services.  Similarly, Tanford and Tanford (1988) argue that “the problem 
of disparity of resources, including legal talent, is not new; it has plagued our system for 
generations…the solution is not to control or ban the use of psychology, as some have 
suggested, but to continue to disseminate scientific information to all lawyers and to 
expand what is already being made available” (p. 25).  For attorneys, the practice of 
hiring consultants is legally permissible, and one could even argue inherently important, 
if clients are to be represented to the best of their abilities by using all the tools at their 
disposal (Lieberman & Sales, 2007).  Furthermore, Lieberman and Sales (2007) assert 
that “any imbalance in the courtroom created by the disparate wealth between individuals 
or corporations involved in litigation would be present regardless of whether jury 
selection consultants were used” (p. 200).  Solomon Fulero, an academic jury researcher 
and consultant, notes that the Supreme Court determined in 1963 that the assistance of 
counsel for indigent defendants is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial and 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and believes that if trial consultants truly are 
effective an attempt should be made to level the playing field in cases where it is an issue.  
This can be done by providing free trial consulting services to those who cannot afford 
them (Kressel & Kressel, 2002).    
Such efforts are being made:  Some judges have attempted to level the playing 
field by appointing consultants to assist indigent defendants.  In the Reginald Denny trial, 
for example, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge John W. Ouderkirk appointed a trial 
attorney at $175 an hour to assist the defense (Barber, 1994).  The National Jury Project 
(1999) states that it is now almost commonplace in some jurisdictions for public funds to 
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be used to enable death-penalty defendants to hire trial consultants.  An article in The 
Legal Intelligencer featured a retired judge providing free mock jury trials to area 
attorneys in order to make the service available for low-budget cases (Stewart, 2002).  
State funding of trial consultants is also a possibility and should be considered (Barber, 
1994; Stolle et al., 1996).  In addition to the question of whether the use of trial 
consultants puts the poor at a disadvantage, the issue of fairness has also centered around 
whether the use of trial consultants impacts our sense of a level playing field. 
 Does the use of trial consultants violate principles of impartiality, judgment by 
peers, and democracy in our jury system?  Of even greater concern to some are the 
questions the field of trial consulting raises with regard to these aspects of a level playing 
field.  When consultants claim that they can influence the outcome of a case, it reinforces 
the public’s belief that attorneys are capable of manipulating juries, thereby evading the 
requirement of an impartial jury as mandated by the United States Constitution.  Such 
claims also further the idea that money can buy a verdict, which undermines the public’s 
confidence in the jury’s verdict as well as the jury system and the legal profession as a 
whole (Lane, 1999).  Because the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the United States 
Constitution ensure the right to a civil or criminal trial by an impartial jury, critics 
question the ability of a jury to remain fair and impartial when one or both sides take 
advantage of trial consultants’ services.  Furthermore, Barber (1994) believes that even if 
we can ensure that the use of trial consultants are applied even-handedly, utilizing trial 
consulting techniques may still foster the negative societal perception that the jury system 
is being undermined or rigged, or that juries can be manipulated and their actions 
predicted.  One attorney stated that trial consultants “do a great job for the defense in 
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defining a profile of somebody who will help get the defendant off.  What does that have 
to do with rendering a just verdict?  Some would argue that jury consultants bastardize 
the justice system” (“Tipping the scales in favor of one side,” 1996, p. 1).  More 
specifically, Gold (1987) argues that many of the psychological techniques used by trial 
consultants are designed to influence juries subconsciously and that this “covert 
advocacy” threatens to deprive the jury of its ability to function properly.  In addition, 
there are some who believe that even if trial consultants do not influence the outcome of a 
case or unfairly manipulate juries, the field creates a public perception of the jury being 
manipulated by psychological devices (Gold, 1987).  Strier (1999) warns against 
perceptions that may detract from the legitimacy of the jury’s role, pointing out that the 
appearance of justice is just as important as the reality when striving to preserve and 
maintain public support for the legal institution.   
In response to some of these concerns, advocates of the field argue that jury 
behavior and trial process are often misunderstood, which in turn exaggerates the 
negative impact of lawyers aided by psychologists.  Tanford and Tanford (1988) claim 
that rather than arming trial lawyers with psychological weapons that can damage jurors’ 
abilities to decide cases based on evidence, trial consultants have identified a number of 
factors that, when communicated to trial lawyers, have decreased the likelihood that these 
extraneous influences will affect verdicts.  Trial consultants can help lawyers by using 
their understanding of jurors’ cognitive processes to counteract existing biases and make 
sure their clients’ sides are heard and understood.  Tanford and Tanford conclude that the 
benefits provided by trial consultants outweigh any possible abuses, and that we have no 
reason to fear scientific knowledge nor should we attempt to control its infusion into the 
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trial process.  Barber (1994) also agrees that using “jury science” helps root out bias by 
allowing attorneys to see through dishonest answers from potential jurors during voir 
dire.  In addition, he thinks that trial consultants help counter the juror misconception that 
a defendant is guilty as charged, decreases stereotypes by attorneys, and, when used by 
weaker defendants, remains a potentially powerful means for balancing inequities.  
 Drawing on personal experience, some consultants claim that the jurors 
themselves do not feel as if they are being manipulated.  In their book entitled Bennett’s 
Guide to Jury Selection and Trial Dynamics in Civil and Criminal Litigation, Bennett and 
Hirschhorn (1993) maintain that although jurors “may have felt some resentment during 
the course of jury selection, once they were sworn in they felt special because they had 
been approved by one of those ‘new-fangled things’ called a jury and trial consultant” (p. 
3).  Furthermore, the authors state that, “In hundreds of cases it has been the rare juror 
who has ever continued to hold resentment toward the lawyer for hiring a consultant” (p. 
3).  Others believe that there may be a difference in perceptions of fairness depending on 
whether the trial consultant participates in scientific jury selection or post-selection 
services.  Strier (1999), for example, hypothesizes that post-selection services (e.g., 
enhancing evidence presentation and argumentation) may seem more acceptable than 
scientific jury selection techniques that may seem to transgress the rules of what is a “fair 
trial.”  There is evidence to support this viewpoint: A research project conducted by 
members of the ASTC in 2005 polled more than 500 jury-eligible citizens throughout the 
United States.  The researchers found that 73 percent of respondents believed that 
preparing witnesses to testify is a good idea, 66 percent agreed that it is appropriate for a 
witness to practice before testifying, and less than 15 percent believed that witnesses who 
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practice their testimony have something to hide (New, Schwartz, & Giewat, 2005).  
Although not conducted with trial consultants in mind, research in the area of jury 
behavior also indicates that juries are not easy to manipulate.  Essentially, the bulk of 
studies have shown that jurors do not abdicate their responsibility as fact-finders when 
faced with expert evidence (Vidmar, 2000).   
Trial Consultants As a Source of Bias  
Despite the fact that “trial consultants are surely changing the ways in which we 
seek justice in the United States” (Kressel & Kressel, 2002), little empirical evidence 
related to the field exists.  One area that has received virtually no attention is whether 
trial consultants themselves can serve as a source of bias.  Can the use of a trial 
consultant by one or both opposing parties in the courtroom affect a juror’s perception of 
fairness, and consequently impact the outcome of a case?  As defined by McDonough 
Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood (1984, 464 U.S. 554), an impartial jury is “a jury 
capable and willing of deciding a case solely on the evidence before it.”  Does the 
presence of a trial consultant make this task more difficult?  According to Bennett and 
Hirschhorn (1993), we should not fear that jurors will resent lawyers who have jury and 
trial consultants in the courtroom; in fact, jurors interviewed post-trial have consistently 
said that they felt the need to be even more fair in looking at and verbalizing their biases 
and prejudices when a trial consultant was present.  This issue has not been investigated 
empirically, however.  
The present study will investigate whether the balance of trial consultants can 
serve as a source of bias, particularly in cases where the evidence is ambiguous.  
Research has shown that strength of evidence (SOE), a term used to refer to the quantity 
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and quality of evidence presented by the plaintiff/prosecution during a trial, influences 
jury decisions (e.g., Green, Johns, & Bowman, 1999; Kerr, Niedermeier, & Kaplan, 
1999).  After reviewing 45 years of empirical research on jury decision making, Devine, 
Clayton, Dunford, Seying, and Price (2001) concluded that research related to SOE in 
both the laboratory and the field has shown a predictable, strong positive association with 
jury verdicts of guilt/liability.  In cases where the evidence is more ambiguous, however, 
jurors tend to “liberate” themselves from the constraints of the evidence and become 
more susceptible to influence from extraneous (biasing) factors (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966).  
In other words, studies indicate that bias tendencies decrease when confronted with clear 
proof of guilt or innocence, and increase when the weight of the evidence does not clearly 
favor one side (e.g., Baumeister & Darley, 1982; Kaplan & Miller, 1978).    
Baumeister and Darley (1982), for example, investigated whether a jury’s bias in 
favor of an attractive defendant may be the result of making reasonable inferences about 
the details of the case, and whether this bias would decrease as factual information 
increases.  The authors conducted two experiments during which they presented 
undergraduates with a fictional case of a person arrested for drunk driving.  Driving 
speed and intoxication level were either made explicit or left ambiguous, and this variable 
was crossed with manipulation of the attractiveness of the defendant.  Participants 
answered questions related to sentencing and their recollection of facts.  Results indicated 
that bias of jurors in favor of an attractive defendant was significantly reduced when the 
factual material in the case was increased.    
This paper will investigate the possibility that the balance of trial consultants can 
serve as a biasing factor when SOE is ambiguous, thus influencing a juror’s 
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determination of a defendant’s guilt or innocence.  More specifically, this paper will 
examine whether a defendant’s likelihood of conviction might change as a factor of 
evidence strength and balance of trial consultants.  Jurors may perceive the party without 
the consultant as an underdog and either exonerate the defendant (in situations where the 
prosecution alone has a consultant) or compensate the prosecution with a conviction (in 
situations where the defendant alone has a consultant).  In cases where the evidence is 
ambiguous and trial consultants are not balanced between parties, perhaps perceptions of 
fairness mediate the trial consultant-verdict link.  Based on research that has shown that 
biasing factors have little to no impact on jurors when SOE is weak or very strong (e.g., 
Kerr et al., 1999), it is not predicted that the balance of trial consultants will serve as a 
biasing factor in cases where the evidence either favors the defense or prosecution.   
In order to investigate these possibilities, it is important to determine the impact 
that trial consulting procedures have on the perceived fairness of courtroom proceedings 
and the outcomes of those proceedings. As mentioned previously, the procedural justice 
framework provides us with an effective tool to assess perceived fairness in relation to 
trial consulting.  The next section will explore procedural justice theory in more detail. 




Review of the Procedural Justice Literature 
Procedural justice research evolved from two conceptual models:  Thibaut and 
Walker’s (1975) focus on dispute intervention procedures and Leventhal’s (1980) focus 
on procedures related to questions of resource allocation.  The first section of this chapter 
briefly reviews these older theories, which emphasize how procedural elements affect 
justice judgments.  The focus will then turn to Tyler’s contributions to the field, which 
target the social cognitive antecedents of procedural justice (beliefs and attitudes that 
seem to be close causes of the judgment of a fair procedure).  Specifically, the group-
value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Lind, 1992) and its three 
relational concerns will be examined.     
Procedural Justice Background 
The Beginning:  Equity Theory   
Most of the early research on fairness gave disproportionate emphasis to the study 
of distributive justice, which focuses on the fairness of rewards (or punishments). The 
first model of distributive justice, Adams’s (1965) equity theory, was originally 
developed to help explain workers’ reactions to their wages.  It has subsequently 
developed into a general theory of justice that is used to explain all types of social 
interactions, including allocation of pay and romantic relationships (Tyler et al., 1997).  
The basic underlying principle of equity theory involves the balance between 
contributions and rewards; it predicts that salaries will be perceived as fair if they are in 
proportion to the relative contributions made by workers.  Furthermore, equity theory 
predicts that when this principle is violated (people are either over benefited or under 
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benefited), people will feel upset.  When a person feels guilty over receiving too much or 
angry over receiving too little, he or she is motivated to restore a fair balance between 
inputs and outcomes.  
There are numerous studies that have supported equity theory by showing that 
people become upset when they are either over- or underpaid (e.g., Pritchard, Dunnette, 
& Jorgenson, 1972; Greenberg, 1990).  Despite the popularity of equity theory and the 
empirical support it has received, studies have suggested that most of the work conflicts 
observed involve issues other than pay and performance (e.g, Lissak & Sheppard, 1983; 
Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987).  Questions related to procedure were mentioned by subjects 
again and again, leading researchers to suggest the need for a broader justice framework 
that also paid attention to how decisions are made (Tyler et al., 1997).  Researchers are 
now beginning to recognize the critical role played by procedural justice, which focuses 
on the fairness of the rules and procedures with which the rewards are distributed.   
Thibaut and Walker’s Contribution 
The systematic study of the psychology of social decision making procedures 
began in the early 1970s with the work of John Thibaut and Laurens Walker.  In their 
1975 book entitled Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis, Thibaut and Walker 
describe a set of studies they performed on the judicial system.  According to these 
researchers, there are two distinct aspects of legal settings that have the potential to affect 
satisfaction:  (a) the outcome of a trial (the verdict or judgment given), and (b) the 
manner in which the trial is conducted.  Thibaut and Walker concentrated on the second 
aspect, which they called procedural justice, and explored the nature of the processes 
governing dispute resolutions and courtroom deliberations. 
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Thibaut and Walker’s theory, which is known as the instrumental model of 
procedural justice, united two important areas of social psychology- process and fairness- 
by hypothesizing that the process by which dispute-resolution decisions are made 
influences the satisfaction of litigants with those decisions.  According to Thibaut and 
Walker (1975), an individual’s view about the fairness of procedures is shaped mainly by 
the distribution of control between disputants and the third-party decision-maker.  They 
identified two types of control:  process control, which they refer to as “voice” and refers 
to the opportunity to present evidence to decision makers in a case, and decision control, 
which refers to the degree of control any one participant has over determining the 
outcome of the dispute.  Dispute resolution procedures will be perceived as fair to the 
extent that disputants are given an opportunity to have their say (process control) and an 
opportunity to influence the final decision (decision control).  Thibaut and Walker 
believed that because people are reluctant to give up control to a third party, the 
presentation of evidence (“voice”) is one way to maintain some degree of indirect control 
over the decisions of authorities.  Thibaut and Walker (1975; 1978) demonstrated that 
procedural effects occur independent of the outcome of the litigant’s case, and that 
providing disputants with the opportunity to state their claim is the best way to ensure 
that the process will be perceived as fair and the ultimate decision accepted as just. 
  Thibaut and Walker’s work stimulated a great deal of interest in the area of 
procedural justice, and their initial research has been confirmed in a wide variety of 
subsequent studies in many different areas: Procedural justice has been found to be 
important in citizens’ dealings with the police (e.g., Tyler & Folger, 1980), in political 
allocations (e.g., Tyler, Rasinski, & McGraw, 1985), in interpersonal contexts (e.g., 
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Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986), and in organizational settings (e.g., Greenberg, 1987; 
Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987), to name just a few.  “The general finding...has been that 
procedural justice is a remarkably potent determinant of affective reactions to decision 
making and that procedural justice has especially strong effects on attitudes about 
institutions and authorities, as opposed to attitudes about the specific outcome in 
question” (Lind & Tyler, 1988, p. 179).  Furthermore, little difference has been found in 
the importance placed upon procedural justice by various ethnic groups.  Huo and Tyler 
(2001), for example, collected data from a mail survey of Asians, Blacks, Latinos, and 
Whites working in a public sector organization.  When the authors examined the effect of 
ethnicity on how people define procedural justice, no significant differences were found 
across ethnic groups.   Similarly, Tyler (1988) also found that whites and minorities 
define procedural fairness in the same way; no differences with respect to ethnicity (or 
gender, income, or other personal characteristics) were found when citizens were asked to 
evaluate how fairly they were treated by police officers and judges.   
Research has also shown that perceptions of fairness tend to be robust across 
ideologies.  Studies have shown that people who differ in their social values and/or 
political ideologies often tend to agree on whether a particular procedure is fair.  For 
example, Tyler (1994) sampled Black and White residents of the San Francisco Bay area 
regarding the fairness of government decision-making procedures and discovered that 
respondents’ judgments about what makes a procedure fair were not affected by political 
ideology, ethnicity, gender, education, income, or age.    
These empirical findings support the importance that legal scholars attach to the 
evaluation of trials by both procedural and outcome criteria.  Furthermore, legal scholars 
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(e.g., Mashaw, 1985) have recognized that using fair procedures enhances the dignity of 
the individual and the individual’s commitment to the law.  For example, research has 
shown that the willingness of people to accept mediation decisions when pursuing 
grievances in federal court was strongly predicted by procedural justice judgments about 
the way those decisions were made (Lind et al., 1993). 
Thibaut and Walker criticism: extending the framework.  Despite the robustness 
of their findings, Thibaut and Walker did face skepticism from the legal community and 
other social scientists (Tyler & Lind, 1991).   This skepticism primarily arose because the 
conclusions reached by the two researchers ran counter to the prevailing thinking under 
the legal and economics models that dominated the study of dispute resolution during that 
time period.  Whereas the legal and economics models heavily emphasizes issues of 
outcome favorability and assumes that litigants are primarily concerned with whether or 
not they win or lose their case (Tyler & Lind, 1991), procedural justice theory asserts that 
people are willing to accept and view as fair outcomes that they regard as unfavorable 
because of the process through which those outcomes were derived.  In addition, because 
Thibaut and Walker used a similar approach with almost all of their studies (student 
subjects and simulated disputes), their conclusions were open to methodological 
criticism.  
Although Thibaut and Walker’s model has been important to generating research, 
Tyler et al. (1997) assert that it has also served to restrict discussions about the criteria of 
procedural justice to control issues alone.   In general, there are two main issues when 
examining procedural justice:  whether procedural justice matters, and the criteria that 
people use to evaluate the fairness of procedures.   The evidence discussed above seems 
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to indicate quite strongly that procedural justice does matter.  Much less is known about 
the criteria that people use to evaluate procedural fairness.  For example, what is it about 
a courtroom trial that leads people to evaluate it as fair or unfair?  Both Leventhal and 
Tyler address this issue by suggesting much broader frameworks that can be used to 
evaluate the justice of procedures.   
Leventhal’s Contribution 
Although Thibaut and Walker are recognized as being the first to systematically 
study the concept of procedural justice, their research focused on the comparison of 
various dispute resolution procedures available in legal settings.  It was not until 
Leventhal’s (1976; 1980) work that procedural justice was recognized as a concept that 
can be applied to procedures in nonlegal contexts (Folger & Greenberg, 1985).  While 
Thibaut and Walker’s (1978) model suggests that people view fair procedures as a means 
of obtaining equitable outcomes (which is the goal in cases of conflict of interest), 
Leventhal’s model recognizes that people are concerned about how decisions are made in 
addition to their concerns about what those decisions are. 
Leventhal’s six general rules of procedural justice.   In contrast to Thibaut and 
Walker’s orientation toward procedural justice as a consideration in the dispute-
resolution process, Leventhal (1976) conceived of procedural justice (what he referred to 
as “procedural fairness”) as a neglected aspect of reward allocation.  Because researchers 
and theorists had come to realize that justice in allocation is a fundamental feature of 
most social behavior, Leventhal’s argument that procedural justice is an important 
determinant of perceived fairness in the context of almost any allocation decision forged 
a link to a wide variety of social settings (Lind & Tyler, 1988).  Leventhal is also credited 
                                                                                                 Trial Consultants 
 
29 
with moving beyond Thibaut and Walker’s issues of control and offering other unrelated 
criteria as potential bases for evaluating the justice of a procedure (Tyler, 1990).  He 
presented his theory in two analyses (Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980) 
in which he identified six general procedural justice “rules” that set fairness standards to 
which the procedure in question is compared.  The six criteria are as follows:  
1. Consistency, which refers to the perceived similarity in procedures and 
outcomes across time and people.  Consistency across people generally means 
that all parties believe they have the same rights and are treated similarly, 
whereas consistency across time generally requires that the procedures follow 
the same rules and get enacted the same way each time they are used. 
2. Bias suppression, which refers to the perceived absence of prejudice or 
partiality in a procedure.  Leventhal specifically mentions two potential 
sources of bias:  procedures are unfair if the decision maker has a vested 
interest in a specific decision, and procedures are unfair if the decision maker 
is so influenced by his or her prior beliefs that he or she fails to give adequate 
and equal consideration to all points of view.   
3. Accuracy, which refers to the perceived use of correct information and honest 
efforts to maintain exactness in procedures (quality of decision).  According to 
Leventhal, the fairness of a procedure will be higher if an allocation procedure 
requires keeping thorough and accurate records of contributions. 
4. Correctability, which refers to the perceived presence of opportunities to 
amend decisions.  Leventhal specifically mentions grievance and appeals 
procedures, which must themselves meet the standards set by the other rules. 
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5. Representativeness (or “voice”), which refers to the perceived presence of 
opportunities for people to express their views and exert influence over the 
process and decision.  It is the broadest of all Leventhal’s rules and includes 
Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) process and decision control variables, as well as 
subgroup representation in the decision-making group. 
6. Ethicality, which refers to the extent to which a procedure is perceived to be 
consistent with accepted values or morals.  According to Leventhal, the use of 
deception, bribery, invasion of privacy, and spying are all examples of how a 
procedure might violate the ethicality rule. 
According to Leventhal’s analysis, the weighting of procedural rules depends on a 
goal-based analysis of the likely effects of each rule.  Greater weight is given to 
procedural rules when they are believed to promote the attainment of favorable outcomes 
for the perceiver or fair outcomes for all persons involved.  In addition, Tyler et al. 
(1997) point out that people’s ratings of the importance of the criteria vary depending 
upon the nature of the situation (e.g., Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Rasinski, 1992), 
which suggests that there is no universally fair or unfair procedure.  Barrett-Howard and 
Tyler (1996), for example, report that people linked different procedural criteria to the 
attainment of different social goals.  Whereas accuracy in decision-making was judged as 
central to economic productivity (as defined by Deutsch (1975)), the attainment of social 
welfare and harmony were more strongly associated with bias suppression and ethicality.  
Similarly, Tyler (1988) found that control was important in disputes (conflicts of 
interest), but not important in problem-solving situations (truth conflicts), where the 
procedures used for resolving disputes were more likely to be judged in terms of 
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opportunities for input and consistency of treatment.  Studies have also shown that within 
a given situation people who differ with regard to age, ethnicity, and other background 
characteristics agree about the criteria for procedural fairness (e.g., Tyler, 1988), which 
“suggests that there is considerable consensus among Americans about what constitutes a 
fair procedure within a particular setting” (Tyler et al., 1997, p. 92). 
Empirical support for Leventhal.  Leventhal’s theory stimulated a great deal of 
research in the area of procedural justice.   However, unlike the distributive justice rules 
that have been found empirically to affect allocation preferences and fairness judgments, 
critics contend that Leventhal’s procedural justice rules are “largely the result of his 
intuition and speculation about what makes a procedure fair” (Lind & Tyler, 1988, p. 
131).   Despite this contention, empirical tests of Leventhal’s model found support for 
almost all of his procedural justice rules.  Specifically, four studies have found that 
consistency is the major criterion used to assess procedural justice (Barrett-Howard & 
Tyler, 1986; Fry & Leventhal, 1979; Fry & Chaney, 1981; Greenberg, 1986).  More 
specifically, Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986) found consistency across people to be 
much more critical when judging the fairness of a procedure than consistency across time 
(as reflected by responses to a questionnaire asking subjects to evaluate the importance of 
Leventhal’s six criteria in the context of particular settings).  Accuracy also emerged as 
important in a number of studies (Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Cornelius, Kanfer, & 
Lind, 1986; Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987) as was the issue of suppressing bias (Barrett-
Howard & Tyler, 1986) and representation (e.g., Houlden, LaTour, Walker, & Thibaut, 
1978; Lind, Lissak, & Conlon, 1983; Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987; Tyler, 1987; Tyler, 
Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985).  After reviewing the research in the area, Fondacaro (1995) 
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asserted that consistency, accuracy, ethicality, and bias suppression are the dimensions 
that contribute most to judgments and perceptions of procedural fairness across different 
types of situations involving allocation decisions.  Essentially, individuals who perceived 
the decision making process to be more consistent, accurate, respectful of personal 
dignity, and impartial viewed the process as being more fair.  Interestingly, all four of 
these criteria were found to be more important than the representativeness criterion 
(ranked fifth, for example, in the Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1996) study), which includes 
the control judgments central to Thibaut and Walker’s  (1975) theory. 
Criticism of Leventhal.  Because there are six criteria that might be useful when 
evaluating the fairness of a procedure, it is critical when defining the meaning of 
procedural justice to know the weight placed on each of these criteria by those affected 
by decisions.  Many researchers, however, fail to operationalize Leventhal’s procedural 
justice rules, thereby making it difficult to identify areas of importance.   Other 
researchers (e.g., Lind and Tyler, 1988) believe that Leventhal’s procedural justice rules 
are too broad to be more than a first cut.  Studies have shown that the consistency rule 
can be broken down, showing a distinction between consistency across persons and 
consistency across time (e.g., Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986).  As discussed above, 
results of Barrett-Howard and Tyler’s (1986) study indicate that these two types of 
consistency differ substantially in their importance, with consistency across people by far 
the most important criterion for discerning a fair procedure.   
Another problem is that Leventhal’s notion that “procedural fairness is a 
necessary precondition for the establishment and maintenance of distributive fairness” 
(Leventhal, 1976, p. 230) has not been borne out by empirical research (e.g., Alexander 
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& Ruderman, 1987; Kanfer, Sawyer, Earley, & Lind, 1987).  For example, Tyler and his 
associates have conducted a number of studies investigating whether procedures can have 
an impact on perceived fairness that is independent of outcomes.  While investigating 
leadership endorsement, Tyler and Caine (1981) found that the actual grade given by a 
teacher did not significantly influence ratings of overall fairness, although the grading 
procedures did.  Another study (Tyler & Folger, 1980) examined the relationship between 
outcomes and procedures in the context of police-citizen encounters.  The authors found 
that respondents who felt that they were treated fairly by the police were more likely to 
have positive evaluations of their encounters with the police than those who felt unfairly 
treated, irrespective of the outcome (whether the police solved the problem or cited the 
respondent for a motor vehicle violation).  Tyler and Folger (1980) concluded that just as 
with fair courtroom procedures, a fair manner of treatment by the police can reduce the 
negative impact of not receiving a desired outcome.   
The first researchers to conduct research on this topic in the workplace were 
Alexander and Ruderman (1987), who looked at the influence of procedural and 
distributive fairness on important job-related attitudes (e.g., job satisfaction, turnover 
intention).  A survey consisting of 20 questions designed to assess the distributive and 
procedural aspects of various work activities and policies was administered to 
government employees at six Federal installations.  Results indicate that although both 
the procedural and distributive measures were significantly related to measures of job 
satisfaction, evaluation of supervisor, conflict/harmony, trust in management, and 
turnover intention, procedural fairness accounted for significantly more variance than 
distributive fairness in each of these criterion measures except turnover intention.    
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A study conducted by Clay-Warner, Hegtvedt, and Roman (2005a), however, 
found that Alexander and Ruderman’s (1987) conclusions may not be so clear-cut.  
Unlike Alexander and Ruderman (1987) who used a sample drawn from a single 
organization, Clay-Warner et al. (2005a) used a representative sample of workers from 
many different kinds of workplaces to study the effect of downsizing on organizational 
commitment.  They found that distributive justice was a stronger predictor than 
procedural justice of organizational commitment among victims of downsizing, while 
procedural justice was a better predictor of organizational commitment among survivors 
of downsizing as well as among those who had not recently worked in an organization 
that downsized (unaffected workers).  Specifically, procedural justice explained less than 
1% of unique variance in the model for downsizing victims and was not statistically 
significant.  Distributive justice, on the other hand, was highly significant and explained 
12% of unique variance.  In the models for unaffected workers and survivors, procedural 
justice was statistically significant as well as statistically larger (accounting for 9% of 
unique variance) than the corresponding distributive justice variable (which accounted for   
3.7% of unique variance.)  The finding that the relative importance of procedural and 
distributive justice will vary depending on one’s prior experiences with downsizing has 
been termed the psychological contract model by Clay-Warner et al. (2005a), and 
research is ongoing.  A follow-up study (Clay-Warner, Reynolds, & Roman, 2005b) 
found that procedural justice was a consistently significant predictor of job satisfaction 
among all groups of workers surveyed (reemployed victims of downsizing, downsizing 
survivors, and unaffected workers) and, contrary to the psychological contract model, it is 
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significantly more important than distributive justice in predicting job satisfaction among 
victims. 
Overall, studies in different domains have provided support for the contention that 
it is the procedures that are followed, and not the outcomes, that are more likely to 
influence overall judgments of fairness (Tyler & Blader, 2000).  Leventhal’s (1976) 
assertion that procedural justice and distributive justice do not have statistically 
independent impacts has not been supported by the research.  Consequently, “Justice 
research has followed the path outlined by this evidence because it finds that the primary 
impact on people comes from their judgments about the fairness of procedures…This 
does not mean, of course, that people no longer study distributive justice, but that there is 
a particularly strong focus in current research on issues of procedural justice” (Tyler & 
Blader, 2003, p. 350). 
Drawing the Theories Together:  Sheppard and Lewicki’s Contribution 
Some researchers have pointed out that both Thibaut and Walker and Leventhal’s 
different emphases are important; for example, Folger and Greenberg (1985) argue that 
both the Leventhal and Thibaut and Walker models are relevant in a multitude of 
managerial and human resource practices.  Both theories agree that “procedures 
providing the involved parties (be they litigants in a courtroom, or reward recipients in an 
organization) some control over the procedures affecting their outcomes are essential to 
procedural justice” (Folger & Greenberg, 1985, p. 148).  Furthermore, Leventhal and 
Thibaut and Walker’s theories do overlap in the area of representation: Leventhal states 
that all affected parties should have both process and decision control at all stages of 
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decision making, and Thibaut and Walker have a conception of control that is fairly 
equivalent (Tyler, 1990).   
 A major criticism of the two theories, however, is their failure to adequately 
describe the sorts of rules underlying perceptions of fairness.  Tyler et al. (1997), for 
example, criticize the popular frameworks, claiming that although the procedural justice 
framework of Thibaut and Walker (1975) has been the most influential, it does not define 
the concept of procedural justice broadly.  And, while Leventhal (1980) takes a broader 
theoretical approach, he does not test his ideas (particularly with regard to the weighting 
of criteria) through empirical research.  As Tyler (1988) states, “what is striking about 
these two bodies of theory is the extent to which the criteria they identify as potential 
bases for evaluating the justice of a procedure do not overlap.  The only common 
criterion is representation (Leventhal’s category for process and/or decision control” (p. 
105). 
Sheppard and Lewicki (1987) attempted to fill this void with a study designed to 
identify a more complete set of principles used to evaluate managerial actions.  Up until 
this point, the criteria used by Leventhal and Thibaut and Walker for assessing the 
fairness of a procedure had been examined separately.  This study brought them together 
by asking 44 managers and management students to describe recent fair and unfair 
treatment in seven areas of management responsibility (planning, staff development, 
delegating, motivating, coordinating, daily activities, and representing the organization to 
the public).  Using Tornow and Pinto’s (1976) taxonomy of managerial behavior as a 
basis, the authors employed a critical-incident technique to assess the factors that 
managers use for judging fairness.  Subjects were asked to describe both fair and unfair 
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behaviors for each role domain, and to identify the principle or principles violated or 
followed by that behavior.  Five hundred ten behaviors were ultimately described 
involving 747 principles.  Responses were coded to yield 16 rules guiding judgments 
about perceived managerial fairness.  When these rules were aggregated, six major 
clusters of fairness concerns emerged:  General Rules, Decision-Making Rules, Blaming 
or Credit-Giving Rules, Work Assignment Rules, Reward Allocation Rules, and Working 
Within System Rules.   
Sheppard and Lewicki (1987) concluded that their findings provide empirical 
support for several theories related to perceived fairness.  All six of Leventhal’s 
principles of fairness emerged as rules and appeared to be useful for describing subject 
responses, especially consistency, representativeness, and accuracy.  The 
representativeness and accuracy rules identified in the study were found to relate closely 
to Thibaut and Walker’s process control.  In addition, Adams’ equity theory was often 
invoked when subjects were explaining perceived unfairness.  Nine new principles of 
fairness also emerged, including reasonableness, golden rule, accountability, 
communication, information, timeliness, role description, meaningful assignment, and 
structural integrity.  The authors concluded that although the theoretical notions of 
Leventhal and Thibaut and Walker apply to subordinate perceptions of managerial 
fairness, neither the procedural nor distributive justice literatures thoroughly describe the 
basis upon which subordinates make fairness judgments.  It should be pointed out that 
Sheppard and Lewicki’s study was concerned with perceptions of managerial fairness, 
and their results cannot be assumed to relate to perceptions of fairness in other contexts 
such as jury decisions.  For example, the authors speculate that role description, 
                                                                                                 Trial Consultants 
 
38 
meaningful assignment, and structural integrity may be limited to managerial activities.  
It was not until Tom Tyler’s research that Thibaut and Walker and Leventhal’s principles 
were examined together in a non-managerial setting. 
Tyler’s Contribution 
The Chicago study.  In one of the only studies since Sheppard and Lewicki (1987) 
to combine Thibaut and Walker’s criteria for assessing the fairness of a procedure with 
those of Leventhal, Tyler (1988) tested the degree of variation in the meaning of 
procedural fairness in a non-managerial setting that stretched beyond the arena of 
disputes.  Tyler (1988) was interested in investigating what it is about a legal procedure 
that causes those involved to consider it to be fair.  Using the six criteria of fair procedure 
suggested by Leventhal to form a basis for exploring the meaning of fair process in the 
context of citizen dealings with the police and courts, Tyler examined whether the 
meaning of procedural justice varies depending upon the circumstances of an encounter 
with a legal authority.   Participants were 652 citizens of Chicago who had indicated 
during a random sample telephone interview that they had had personal experience with 
the Chicago police or courts within the past year.   
The extent to which respondents had process control was measured by asking 
them “how much opportunity” they were given to present their case to the authorities 
before a decision was reached.  Tyler (1988) measured perceived decision control by 
asking respondents how much influence they had over the decisions made by the 
authorities.  Because process and decision control were highly intercorrelated (r = .56; p 
<.001), Tyler combined them into a single measure of representation which mirrored 
Leventhal’s representativeness criterion.   
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Leventhal’s (1980) first criterion of procedural justice is consistency, and Tyler 
(1988) chose to measure four types of consistency.  Consistency across time was assessed 
by asking respondents to compare whether their current outcomes and treatment were the 
same, better, or worse than the outcomes and treatment they had received in past 
experiences; consistency across people “in similar situations” was assessed by asking 
respondents whether the outcomes and treatment they received was the same, better, or 
worse than the outcomes and treatment others have received in like circumstances; 
consistency with prior expectations was assessed by asking respondents to indicate 
whether their outcomes and treatment was the same, better, or worse than they had 
expected;  and consistency in relationships was assessed by asking respondents whether 
their outcomes and treatment was the same, better, or worse than the outcomes and 
treatment of friends, family, or neighbors.  From these, Tyler (1988) created two indices 
of consistency:  the average of respondent judgments concerning their outcome and the 
average of respondent judgments concerning their treatment. 
Tyler subdivided Leventhal’s bias suppression criteria (which Tyler refers to by 
the dimension name of “impartiality” or “neutrality”) into three subcategories consisting 
of lack of bias, honesty, and effort to be fair.  The first, lack of bias, was assessed by 
asking respondents whether their treatment or outcome was influenced by race, sex, age, 
nationality, or some other characteristics of them as a person, as well as whether the 
authorities had favored one party over another.  The second, honesty, was assessed by 
combining the responses to two questions:  (1) whether the authorities had done anything 
that was dishonest or improper, and (2) whether officials had lied to them.  The third, 
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making an effort to be fair, was assessed by asking respondents how hard the police or 
judge had tried to show fairness.   
Tyler (1988) measured the accuracy of decision making by combining responses 
to two questions:  whether the authorities involved had been provided with the 
information they needed to make good decisions about how to handle the problem, and 
whether the authorities had tried to bring the problem into the open to be solved.   
Correctability was measured by asking respondents whether they knew of any agency or 
organization to which they could have complained of fair treatment. Finally, ethicality 
was measured by combining responses to two questions:  whether the authorities had 
been polite and whether they had shown concern for their rights.   
Tyler’s (1988) key dependent variable for the analysis of the meaning of 
procedural justice was the respondents’ judgment about the fairness of the process during 
their experience with the police and/or courts.  Respondents were asked to judge “how 
fair” the procedures used by the authorities were, “how fairly” they were treated, and how 
fair the authorities were with whom they had dealt.  Six respondent characteristics were 
also measured:  sex, age, race, education, liberalism, and income.   
As previous research had found (e.g., Tyler & Folger, 1980; Alexander & 
Ruderman, 1987), outcome favorability was related to judgments of procedural and 
distributive fairness (mean r = .34), but the two were clearly distinct.  Specifically, those 
who received favorable outcomes thought that those outcomes and the procedures used to 
arrive at them were more fair.  Results of a factor analysis indicated that judgments of 
procedural justice are multidimensional, involving many issues in addition to favorability 
of outcome and control of outcome.  In fact, consistency, the criterion most closely 
                                                                                                 Trial Consultants 
 
41 
related to outcomes, was found to be of minor importance. Rather, judgments related to 
the social dimensions of the experience, such as ethicality, weighed very heavily in 
assessments of procedural justice.  Seven different aspects of procedure independently 
influenced citizen judgments regarding whether they were treated fairly by legal 
authorities:  (a) the degree to which the authorities were motivated to be fair; (b) 
judgments of their honesty (belief that decision makers should be honest and reach their 
decisions based on objective information about the case); (c) the degree to which the 
authorities followed ethical principles of conduct (treated politely and having respect 
shown for their rights and themselves as people); (d) the extent to which opportunities for 
representation were provided (belief on the part of those involved that they had an 
opportunity to take part in the decision-making process); (e) the quality of the decisions 
made (whether the procedures produce fair outcomes); (f) the opportunities for error 
correction; and (g) whether the authorities behaved in a biased fashion.    
Tyler (1988) concluded that the meaning of procedural justice varied according to 
the nature of the situation, rather than the characteristics of the people involved.  While 
this indicates it is unlikely that there are any universally fair procedures for allocation and 
dispute resolution, it also suggests that different types of people within American culture 
have a similar definition of procedural justice.  This, in turn, implies that members of our 
society share cultural beliefs regarding definitions of the meaning of justice within certain 
settings, a suggestion that has found support in ethnographic studies of the courts (e.g., 
Merry, 1985; 1986).  Tyler (1988) believes that this lack of personal differences has 
important consequences for interactions between citizens as well as for interactions 
between citizens and authorities.  Common values not only make it more likely that all 
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parties will focus on similar issues when attempting to find a process for dealing with the 
issue in question, but will also help facilitate the acceptance of decisions in disputes since 
both parties are likely to share a conception of what the authorities should be doing. 
Although most researchers have followed Thibaut and Walker’s lead and 
emphasized issues related to process and decision control (e.g., representation), results of 
Tyler’s (1988) study indicate that representation is only one of a number of important 
concerns that define fair processes.   As Tyler (1988) points out, “It is noteworthy that the 
major criteria used to assess process fairness are those aspects of procedure least linked to 
outcomes- ethicality, honesty, and the effort to be fair- rather than consistency with other 
outcomes.  This reinforces the… suggestion that procedural issues are distinct from 
concerns with outcomes” (p. 128).   Other studies conducted by Tyler and his associates 
also indicated a noninstrumental benefit of process control (e.g., Tyler et al., 1985; Tyler, 
1987; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990).  Lind et al. (1990), for example, found that people 
value voice even after the decision has been made.  People were allowed to present 
evidence either before a decision that affected them or after the decision had already been 
made.  After comparing these two conditions to a third condition in which people had no 
input into the decision, the authors found that although the magnitude of the process 
control effect diminished, it failed to disappear in the post-decision input condition.  They 
concluded that even when people can’t influence the likelihood of obtaining desired 
outcomes, a good process can still lead to satisfaction.  In contrast, the instrumental 
perspective believes that people react to their experiences depending on the favorability 
of the outcomes of the experiences.  It was this evidence indicating that the instrumental 
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perspective is inadequate to account for procedural justice findings that lead Tyler and 
Lind (1988) to propose the group-value theory of procedural justice.   
A Group-Value Theory of Procedural Justice: The Relational Model 
Lind and Tyler (1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Lind, 1992) proposed a group-value 
theory of procedural justice as an alternative explanation for procedural justice effects.  
Up until this point, there had been an almost exclusive focus on motivational 
explanations to account for how people decide whether they have received fair treatment 
from others.  The instrumental perspective believes that individuals are viewed as 
wanting to achieve desired outcomes and as judging the value of their opportunities to 
speak by the extent to which those opportunities facilitate the achievement of those 
outcomes (Tyler, 1990).   From this perspective, judgments of procedural justice are 
influenced by procedural justice issues that have little to do with outcome favorability or 
control.  Lind and Tyler’s (1988) group-value model suggests that Thibaut and Walker’s 
control theory misses important noninstrumental motives of the psychology of procedural 
justice.  Their theory was extended to the context of authority relations in the relational 
model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992).    
Although the relational model and Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) control model 
both assume that the acceptance of the decisions and policies of third-party authorities is 
linked to perceptions of procedural justice, the relational model provides a different 
explanation of why people are motivated to care about procedural fairness.  Instead of the 
instrumental motive suggested by the control theory, the relational theory is social in 
nature and believes that individuals are motivated to affiliate with groups and to view 
themselves as important members of desirable groups.  Consequently, it is assumed that 
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people are concerned about their long-term social relationship with the authorities or 
institutions acting as third parties, rather than viewing them as one-shot deals.  Lind and 
Tyler believe that people want to be treated fairly as members of a group because fair 
treatment acknowledges their membership and status within the group, as well as 
maintains the values of the group.    
Research conducted by Tyler (1989; 1994b) found that judgments about the 
quality of social relationships between individuals and decision makers had a greater 
influence on procedural justice judgments than instrumental judgments of control over 
the procedures and the favorability of outcomes resulting from the procedures.  Tyler 
(1989) built upon Leventhal’s (1976) framework when he identified three relational 
concerns that dominate judgments of procedural fairness:  the trustworthiness of the 
authorities enacting the procedures (trust), the neutrality of those authorities (neutrality), 
and information about the individual’s standing in the group (status recognition).  The 
following section explains these three relational concerns in greater detail. 
Trust.  Trust involves assessments of the motives of authorities, such as 
judgments about their benevolence and concern for the needs of those with whom they 
deal.  Trust also involves the belief that third parties desire to treat people in a fair and 
reasonable way.  Because people’s commitment to the group changes as their attributions 
about the intentions of the authorities change (Tyler, 1989), they are more likely to 
develop a long-term commitment to the group if they believe that the authorities are 
trying to be fair and equitable.    
Neutrality.  Incorporates four of Leventhal’s (1976) criteria- consistency, bias 
suppression, accuracy, and correctability.  Neutrality involves assessments of the degree 
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to which decision-making procedures are unbiased, honest, and promote decisions based 
on evidence.  Because in a long-term relationship people cannot always have what they 
want, it is not realistic to focus on outcome favorability in any specific situation.  Lind 
and Tyler (1988) suggest that people assume that everyone will benefit from fair 
decision-making procedures over the long-term.  The focus, therefore, is not on whether a 
favorable outcome is received in any situation, but rather whether the authority has 
created a neutral arena in which to resolve the conflict.  It is the “level playing field” that 
matters;  “in any particular situation people will be concerned with having an unbiased 
decision maker who is honest and who uses appropriate factual information to make 
decisions” (Tyler, 1989, p. 831). 
 Status Recognition.  Similar to Leventhal’s (1976) dimension of ethicality.  Status 
recognition, or standing, involves assessments of politeness, treatment with dignity, and 
respect for rights and entitlements due to each group member.  According to Tyler 
(1989), people care about their standing in a group, and the way a person is treated during 
social interactions gives people information about their status within the group. If people 
are not treated well, they know that the authority they are dealing with regards them as 
having a low status within the group. 
 Tyler (1989) acknowledges that merely demonstrating noncontrol effects does not 
provide adequate support of the group-value theory; rather, valid evidence for the validity 
of the group-value model must show that people care about neutrality, trust, or standing 
because they care about group status and group membership.  In order to test this theory, 
Tyler (1989) conducted telephone interviews with a random sample of 652 Chicago 
residents who had experience with the police or court system.  Subjects’ outcome 
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favorability was assessed in absolute terms by coding respondent statements indicating 
the nature of the experience’s outcome (e.g., in the case of calls to the police, respondents 
were asked if the police had solved the problem for which they had been summoned).  An 
Outcome Favorability scale was then formed by weighing these judgments of outcome 
favorability against the self-reported seriousness of the problem.  Outcome favorability 
was also assessed relative to four standards of reference (e.g., respondents were asked to 
compare their experience with experiences they have had in the past).   
Other independent variables examined included process control (assessed by 
asking how much opportunity was given to present a problem or side before a decision 
was made) and decision control (assessed by asking how much influence was given over 
the decisions made by the third party), which were averaged to form a single control 
index.  Scales were also created to reflect responses given by subjects to questions 
focusing on neutrality, trust, and standing.  Dependent variables included respondents’ 
judgment about the fairness of the procedures used during their experience with legal 
authorities, the fairness of the outcome received, affect felt toward the authorities (e.g., 
angry, frustrated, pleased) and the overall fairness of the authorities.  Tyler (1989) found 
that the variables of neutrality, trust, and standing accounted for a significantly larger 
share of the variance in procedural fairness judgments than did the control variables of 
process and decision control.  Furthermore, results of a regression analysis indicate that 
issues of trust and standing within the group are especially important in determining both 
people’s judgments about whether they have received procedural justice and their 
reactions to their experience.  When the issue of concern is outcome fairness, neutrality 
becomes the most important variable.  Tyler (1989) concluded that people care about 
                                                                                                 Trial Consultants 
 
47 
more than just the problem that brought them to a third party: the relationship to the third 
party is also important. 
Further empirical support for Tyler.  A number of subsequent studies have also 
found support for the relational model.  For example, Tyler (1994) conducted two studies 
to examine reactions and motives in relation to experiences with two types of authority- 
legal and managerial.  In the first study, survey interviews were conducted over the 
telephone with a random sample of Chicago residents who had had a personal experience 
with legal authorities.  Participants were asked to evaluate four aspects of their 
experience that were thought to reflect resource concerns (concerns over maximizing 
personal rewards when interacting with others): the favorability of the outcome of the 
experience, the outcome received relative to prior expectations, the outcome relative to 
what others would have received, and control of the decisions made (decision control).  
Respondents were also asked about their control over evidence presentation (process 
control), as well as about their experiences with the relational issues of neutrality, trust, 
and standing.  Tyler used structural equation modeling to compare the fit of various 
possible models of the dimensions of justice.  Six possible models of the justice motive 
were constructed: (a) a saturated model, in which indices of both the resource and the 
relational motives were hypothesized to influence distribute and procedural justice 
judgments; (b) a resource-dominated model, in which the influence of relational motives 
on distributive justice was removed; (c) a relation-dominated model, in which the 
influence of resource motives on procedural justice was removed; (d) a resource-only 
model which hypothesized that resource motives shape judgments of both distributive 
and procedural justice; (e) a relation-only model which hypothesized that relational 
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motives shape judgments of both distributive and procedural justice; and (f) the dual 
process model, which hypothesized that justice judgments are shaped by both distributive 
justice and its underlying resource motives and procedural justice and its underlying 
relational motives.  When the models were compared, the model that best fit the data was 
the relation-dominated model.  More specifically, Tyler found two distinct justice 
motives: distributive justice judgments were shaped by both resource and relational 
judgments, but procedural justice judgments were shaped only by the relational concerns 
of neutrality, trust, and standing.   
In the second study, Tyler examined managerial authority by drawing a random 
telephone sample of adults in the Chicago area.  Respondents were required to work at 
least 20 hours per week and to have a supervisor with whom they had had a recent 
personal experience.  Participants were asked about their satisfaction with the outcome of 
their experience and their control over the decisions that were made, as well as to 
evaluate the outcome they received relative to their expectations and the outcome relative 
to what others would have received (all reflect resource concerns).  Respondents were 
also asked about their control over evidence presentation (process control) and about their 
experiences with the relational issues of neutrality, trust, and standing.  Just as in the first 
study, results indicate that the relation-dominated model best fit the data.  The second 
study therefore successfully replicated the first study using an independent data set and a 
separate setting.   
Lind, Tyler, and Huo (1997) performed several studies to investigate how dyadic 
procedures differ from that of authoritative procedures.  In the first study, students were 
asked to recall a conflict and write a brief description of the dispute on the experimental 
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questionnaire.  In the second study, students were asked to rate third party and dyadic 
procedures as ways of resolving a hypothetical dispute.  Eight different descriptions of 
the hypothetical dispute were used, constituting manipulations of the following three 
experimental variables:  the relationship of the participant to the other person in the 
dispute (close or distant), similarity of background (similar or different), and the nature of 
the disputed issue (insult vs. money).  Measures of status recognition, trust in 
benevolence, neutrality, voice, and procedural fairness were obtained via questionnaires.   
Findings indicated that the three relational variables together consistently explained much 
of the variance in the procedural justice ratings.  Furthermore, procedural justice 
judgments during dyadic conflict resolution were primarily shaped by assessments of 
status recognition and neutrality.  Trust was the strongest influence, however, when 
people dealt with third parties and other authorities.  Lind et al. (1997) believe that their 
series of studies show evidence that voice effects are mediated by relational judgments, 
which brings together the older research of Thibaut and Walker and Leventhal (with their 
emphasis on procedural elements affecting justice judgments) and the newer research 
focusing on the social cognitive antecedents of procedural justice.   
Additional support for the relational model comes from studies that show that 
procedural justice influences individuals’ self-esteem, as well as perceptions of their 
standing within important reference groups.  For example, in an experimental study by 
Koper, Van Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, and Wilke (1993), an academic skills test 
was given to subjects who had been told that the test was accurate at diagnosing their 
level of skill.  In the unfair treatment experimental condition, a research assistant graded 
only the student’s first three answers and offered no explanation for this decision.  In the 
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fair treatment experimental condition, the entire test was graded very carefully.  The 
authors found that how subjects were treated by the research assistant significantly 
influenced their self-esteem: Those who were treated fairly had significantly higher self-
esteem scores than those who had been in the unfair treatment condition.  According to a 
relational perspective, fair treatment by authorities indicates that a person is a valuable 
group member, whereas unfair treatment indicates marginality and even exclusion (Tyler 
et al., 1997).  It follows, therefore, that the knowledge that one is valued should increase 
self-esteem, whereas the knowledge of marginality should decrease it.   In another study, 
Tyler, Degoey, and Smith (1996) found that fair and respectful treatment by authorities 
who represent important groups communicates feelings of respect and pride, which, in 
turn, are related to self-esteem, feelings of obligation to group authorities, and the desire 
to help the group beyond what is required.  Research in this area has also shown that even 
when the working context encourages short-term and instrumental goals, employees who 
identify with the company care about fair treatment because of the self-relevant 
information it communicates to them (Smith, Thomas, & Tyler, 2006).  
Recently, the impact of procedural fairness on relationships with individual group 
members other than the group leader has been investigated.  Cornelis, Van Hiel, and De 
Cremer (2006) hypothesized that even though the strongest reactions to procedural 
fairness or unfairness is supposedly directed toward the source associated with the 
authority enacting the procedures, it is not unlikely that reactions extend to other targets 
at other levels.  They provided an explicit test of the relational model of procedural 
fairness by manipulating both procedural fairness and other group members’ support for 
the leader and examining their effects on relationships between individual group 
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members.  Cornelis et al. (2006) found that when a group member indicated that he or she 
did not support the leader, procedural fairness did not influence participants’ reactions 
toward this other group member because the leader was not regarded as representative for 
the other group member.  These researchers concluded that this study provides evidence 
for one of the core assumptions of the relational model- namely, that fairness matters 
because authorities are regarded as representatives of the whole group.  
Another recent study of the group-value model used survey data from people 
attending U.S. Food and Drug Administration advisory committee meetings to examine 
the extent to which procedural justice considerations predict satisfaction and outcome 
acceptance (McComas, Tuite, Waks, & Sherman, 2007).  Specifically, the researchers 
were interested in determining whether, when facing the prospect of real or potential 
conflicts of interest among advisory committee members, believing that the conflict-of-
interest procedures are just and those wielding them are trustworthy, neutral, and 
respectful of one’s rights influence attendees’ satisfaction with the meetings and 
acceptance of meeting outcomes.   Questionnaires measured attendees’ conflict-of-
interest tolerance, procedural knowledge, perceptions of procedural fairness, relational 
judgments (the group value measure that examined the degree to which an individual 
viewed the procedures as neutral, the authorities as trustworthy, and treatment by the 
authorities as dignified and respectful), satisfaction, and willingness to accept outcomes.  
Results indicate that perceptions of procedural fairness and relational fairness 
significantly influenced satisfaction with advisory committee meetings, and relational 
fairness perceptions directly predicted outcome acceptance.  Furthermore, when attendees 
viewed meeting organizers as more trustworthy, neutral, and respectful (i.e., relational 
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fairness), they were also more tolerant of real or potential conflicts of interest among 
advisory committee members, more satisfied with the meetings and more willing to 
accept meeting outcomes.  
Extending the procedural justice framework.  In general, Tyler’s work and the 
supportive results of subsequent research suggest the need to extend the procedural 
justice framework beyond Thibaut and Walker’s control theory.  Leventhal (1980) took 
the first step when he proposed a broader framework and suggested six criteria that might 
influence judgments about the justice of a procedure.  Tyler and his associates built upon 
Leventhal’s framework when they incorporated four of his criteria- consistency, bias 
suppression, accuracy, and correctability- into the neutrality dimension of their model.   
In addition, although Leventhal does not frame his theory in terms of individual’s long-
term connections to social groups (as does the group-value model), Leventhal’s 
dimension of ethicality is similar to Tyler’s dimension of status recognition.   Although 
research related to the group-value model is still underway, the studies reviewed in the 
previous section all seem to indicate that procedural justice judgments are strongly 
affected by judgments about the quality of social relationships between individuals and 
decision makers.  The neutrality of those decision makers appears to be particularly 
critical; Tyler’s (1989) study, for example, showed that when the issue of concern is 
outcome fairness, neutrality becomes the most important variable, and Leventhal’s 
consistency dimension (incorporated into Tyler’s concept of neutrality) has been found in 
a number of studies (e.g., Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Fry & Leventhal, 1979; Fry & 
Chaney, 1981; Greenberg, 1986) to be the major criterion used to assess procedural 
justice. 
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Using the modern American courtroom as a testing ground, the present study 
seeks to further explore the role that neutrality plays in perceptions of procedural justice.  
Although the group-value model assumes people are concerned about their long-term 
social relationships and membership in a jury typically does not involve a significant 
length of time, it can be argued that people identify with a common membership when a 
legal-political system is involved.  “Although the legal system is a larger group than a 
family, friendship, or work group, people nonetheless identify strongly with the legal-
political system and feel a striking sense of personal obligation to legal and political 
authorities” (Tyler, 1989, p. 831).  In fact, a study conducted by Tyler and McGraw 
(1986) found that the tendency to focus more on procedures than outcomes when 
deciding what is fair is especially strong when the object of scrutiny is a system as 
opposed to an individual.  Research also shows that fairness is less important in settings 
(such as a family) where intense positive feelings exist that hold the relationship together, 
or when the participants feel no personal or financial ties and therefore care less about 
whether the relationship is maintained; fairness is more important in relationships of 
intermediate emotional intensity, whereby participants have no strong feelings toward 
each other but still benefit from interaction (Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986).   The next 
chapter will summarize the gaps in the literature and present the hypotheses that will be 
tested in the present study. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 Statement of the Problem and the Present Study 
The preceding reviews of both the trial consulting industry and the field of 
procedural justice suggest several needed directions for research.  Two of the most 
glaring limitations are the lack of research conducted on the perceived fairness of trial 
consulting and the potential impact that trial consultants may have on the outcome of a 
jury trial.   As the use of a trial consultant’s services become more routine, it is important 
to determine if this use can affect perceptions of procedural justice and, ultimately, juror 
verdicts.   
Unfortunately, there is little empirical research examining the perceived fairness 
of trial consulting (Strier, 1999).  One notable exception is an experimental study 
conducted by Stolle et al. (1996) which was designed to address three questions regarding 
observers’ judgments of fairness:  1) How will the prosecution/plaintiff’s or the 
defendant’s use of a psychologist trial consultant for jury selection and trial preparation 
impact the perceived fairness of trial procedures and outcomes; 2) How will differences 
in the outcome of the case impact the perceived fairness of trial procedures and 
outcomes; and 3) Will the impact of either trial consultant presence or outcome of 
judgments on fairness generalize across cases in both civil and criminal settings.  Using a 
2 x 2 x 2 x2 mixed factorial design, Stolle et al. (1996) manipulated case type (within-
subjects, criminal or civil), case outcome (between-subjects, favoring either 
prosecution/plaintiff or defendant), presence or absence of a trial consultant for the 
prosecution/plaintiff (between-subjects), and presence or absence of a trial consultant for 
the defendant (between-subjects).  One hundred thirty-two undergraduate students were 
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presented case summaries of both criminal and civil cases.  Both case studies were 
written in a manner that tilted equity in favor of the prosecution/plaintiff. The criminal 
summary briefly described a homicide case tried in a Missouri court.  The civil summary 
was based upon a wrongful death case tried in a Texas court.  In conditions involving a 
trial consultant, a one paragraph description of the trial consultant’s role (assistance with 
case presentation and jury selection through the distribution and analysis of a community 
survey) was inserted in the summary.   
Each participant was presented with a packet that included a case summary and a 
questionnaire that was comprised of 21 procedural justice items measured on Likert-type 
scales.  In conditions where a trial consultant was used, the questionnaire also included an 
additional question directly assessing the perceived fairness of the use of a consultant.  
Stolle et al.’s (1996) questionnaire included items from the theoretical justice frameworks 
of Thibaut and Walker (1975), Leventhal (1980), and Tyler (1989).    
Using the procedural justice ratings as dependent variables, a four-way 
MANOVA was conducted.  Stolle et al. (1996) found significant main effects for 
outcome and type of trial, and a significant interaction between the two on procedural 
justice ratings.  Case outcome was a major contributor to participants’ perceptions of 
procedural justice. When participants were told that the jury found in favor of the 
prosecution/plaintiff (which was in line with the expectations of participants due to the 
fact that the case studies were written in a manner that tilted equity in favor of the 
prosecution/plaintiff), they found that the procedures and the outcome were thought to be 
more fair, more consistent, less biased, accurate, easier to correct, and more ethical.   
With regard to the type of trial, the researchers found that although the court was 
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perceived to have more control over the evidence presented in the criminal case, the 
results agreed more with the expectations of the participants in the civil case.  
Furthermore, the jurors in the civil case were thought to have better received and 
understood the information needed to make a decision, and wrong decisions were thought 
to be more easily corrected in the civil case.  Stolle et al. (1996) found that participants 
thought that wrong decisions were easier to correct when the outcome favored the 
prosecution/plaintiff than they would be when the outcome favored the defendant, but 
this difference only occurred in the civil case.  Similarly, in the civil case, the rights of 
the parties were perceived to be better protected when the outcome favored the 
prosecution or plaintiff.  The results also indicated that the court was perceived to be 
more controlling of the outcome when the outcome favored the defendant than when the 
outcome favored the plaintiff.  In the criminal case, the court was perceived to be equally 
controlling regardless of outcome.   
The finding that most directly relates to the proposed study involves the impact of 
the presence of trial consultants on procedural fairness.  Multivariate analyses yielded no 
significant main effects or interaction for the presence of a trial consultant for either the 
prosecution/plaintiff or the defendant.  Consequently, Stolle et al. (1996) also analyzed 
the data using univariate analyses.1  They found only one main-effect for the presence of 
a trial consultant:  the legal authorities were perceived to have acted more ethically when 
the defendant did not have a trial consultant than when the defendant did have a trial 
consultant.  Stolle et al. (1996) found several significant interactions, however.  With 
                                                
1 While some significant findings from the univariate analyses emerged, the researchers caution that “main-
effects and interactions involving the presence of a consultant for the plaintiff or the defendant, which were 
not significant in the MANOVA analysis, must be interpreted not as conclusive results but as information 
useful in guiding future research” (p. 161). 
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respect to decision control (one of the procedural justice items taken from Thibaut and 
Walker’s (1975) theoretical framework), results indicated that when the defendant had a 
trial consultant, the parties were seen as having more opportunity to influence the court’s 
decision when the prosecution or plaintiff also had a trial consultant.  However, when it 
was the defendant who did not have a trial consultant, the parties were seen as having 
equal opportunity to influence the decision whether or not there was a prosecution or 
plaintiff trial consultant present.   
One of the four items Stolle et al. (1996) used in their questionnaire to measure 
consistency (one of the procedural justice dimensions taken from Leventhal’s (1976) 
framework) assessed participant expectations by asking them to rate the extent to which 
they believed that the results of the case agreed with their expectations.  When 
participants’ expectations were examined, a 4-way interaction was found such that when 
the defendant alone had a trial consultant and the defendant won, the result agreed more 
with participants’ expectations than either when the defendant did not have a trial 
consultant or when both sides had them.   
With regard to the perceived ethicality of the cases (one of the procedural justice 
items taken from Leventhal (1976)), Stolle et al. (1996) found that when participants 
were told that the jury had found the defendant guilty, it was perceived as more fair for 
the defendant to receive the assistance of a trial consultant.  When the defendant was on 
the winning side, however, whether or not a trial consultant had assisted him/her did not 
appear to be as highly relevant to fairness.  As the researchers noted, “This pattern of 
findings seems to suggest that future research should focus on the balance of the presence 
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of a trial consultant between the parties, which may have an important impact on 
observers’ procedural justice judgment” (p. 168).  
Stolle et al. (1996) concluded that while the lack of significant multivariate effects 
for the presence of trial consultants may suggest that consultant presence does not affect 
judgments of procedural justice, significant univariate analyses may indicate that the 
presence or absence of a trial consultant gains importance when interacting with other 
independent variables, such as the presence of a trial consultant for the other party and its 
interactions with case outcomes.   Furthermore, Stolle et al. (1996) emphasized that 
regardless of its effectiveness or legality, scientific trial consulting carries the potential to 
undermine the legitimacy of legal authorities and legal proceedings if it is perceived by 
the public as being a fundamentally unfair trial tactic.  Once trial consulting techniques 
are perceived as unfair or manipulative, both the participants and observers of a trial are 
in danger of viewing the entire jury system as unfair. 
In the only other known study to investigate this topic, Griffith et al. (2007) used 
a more diverse public sample to explore the question of how eligible jurors view trial 
consultants.  A team of six researchers approached almost 4,000 individuals in the 
terminals of two major metropolitan airports and outside of two shopping centers in two 
states (Texas and Pennsylvania).  The final sample included 1251 participants from 50 
states.  All respondents were juror eligible in the state in which they lived.  Materials 
consisted of a survey comprised of general demographic information, as well as questions 
related to the use of trial consultants.  Respondents were provided with a description of 
some of the services that may be offered by trial consultants (e.g., jury selection, witness 
preparation, trial strategy) and then asked to rate eight statements about the role of a trial 
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consultant on a five-point Likert-type scale.  Sample questions include “Trial consultants 
bias the jury,” “Trial consulting services are a waste of money for the attorneys that hire 
them,” and “Trial consultants should not be permitted in the legal system.”  In addition, 
each participant was asked, “If you were on a jury and found out that one side was using 
a trial consultant, you would: (a) be biased in favor for the side that hired the trial 
consultant, (b) be biased against the side that hired the trial consultant, or (c) not be 
biased toward either side.” 
 A correlational analysis conducted on some of the sociodemographic variables 
across the eight trial consultant questions found a distinct pattern such that those who 
believed the jury system to be fair and those with a higher earned income exhibited more 
favorable attitudes toward trial consultants.  In addition, Anglo American respondents 
were more favorable toward trial consultants on four items, and age and gender yielded 
several significant associations.  While the authors do point out that the significant 
correlations found can be largely due to the large sample size and the variance accounted 
for was minimal, Griffith et al. (2007) conclude that their results point to individual 
differences regarding how potential jurors view trial consultants, and this might be an 
important consideration when selecting jurors.  For example, in this study individuals 
who were Anglo American, earned high salaries, and believed that the judicial system 
was fair had more favorable views toward trial consultants.  
With regard to the question: “if you were on a jury and found out that one side 
was using a trial consultant, you would…,” 18% reported that they would be biased 
against the side that hired the trial consultant.  Less than 0.25% reported that they would 
be biased in favor of the side that used the trial consultant.  Based on these findings, 
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Griffith et al. (2007) recommend that trial consultants keep a low profile during legal 
proceedings, not appearing at all if possible.  On the other hand, if might be good trial 
strategy in situations where only one side uses a trial consultant for the side without the 
consultant to notify the jury of that fact at some point during the proceedings.   
Although Stolle et al.’s (1996) and Griffith et al.’s (2007) research provides some 
initial answers to the question of whether (and under what circumstances) the use of trial 
consultants is perceived as being unfair, no studies have examined whether the use of a 
trial consultant by one or more opposing parties can impact a juror’s determination of a 
defendant’s guilt or innocence.  We know virtually nothing about how the use of a trial 
consultant may violate a juror’s sense of procedural justice.  The present study explores 
the question of whether the balance of trial consultants can affect a juror’s perceptions of 
procedural justice and impact his or her verdict, particularly in cases where the evidence 
is ambiguous.  As discussed previously, research has shown that the bias tendencies of 
jurors decrease when confronted with clear proof of guilt or innocence and increase when 
the evidence is more ambiguous (e.g., Baumeister & Darley, 1982; Kaplan & Miller, 
1978).  This dissertation investigates the possibility that the balance of trial consultants 
can serve as a biasing factor when evidence strength is ambiguous, thus impacting a 
juror’s determination of a defendant’s guilt or innocence.  In this study, participants’ 
verdict determinations (both dichotomous and continuous) were assessed in conditions 
where the presence (or absence) of a trial consultant and SOE were varied.2  For the 
purposes of this study, SOE is operationalized as how strongly the evidentiary set favors 
one of the parties.  Unlike in Stolle et al.’s (1996) study where the evidence in the case 
                                                
2 Continuous juror verdicts were also included to provide a more sensitive measure (Kaplan & Miller, 
1978; Kerr et al., 1999). 
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summaries was skewed in favor of the plaintiff/prosecution, the present study uses three 
case summaries to examine participant response when the evidence favors the 
prosecution, the defense, or is ambiguous. 
As previously mentioned, Tyler (1989) identified three relational issues that 
people seem to consider most when making procedural justice judgments: (1) trust, 
which refers to inferences about the motivation of authorities, particularly the willingness 
of authorities to consider needs and make unbiased decisions; (2) neutrality, which refers 
to the belief that there is a level playing field and decisions are based on an accurate and 
full assessment of the facts; and (3) status recognition, which refers to the belief that the 
authority has treated the person with the respect and dignity that comes with full-fledged 
group membership.  The differences in procedural justice judgments that Stolle et al. 
(1996) found when there was an imbalance of trial consultants among parties can be 
viewed as a violation of Tyler’s (1989) principle of neutrality.  Numerous studies have 
found neutrality to be the major criterion used to assess procedural justice (e.g., Barrett-
Howard & Tyler, 1986; Fry & Leventhal, 1979; Fry & Chaney, 1981; Greenberg, 1986; 
Tyler, 1989).  Drawing on the group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988), the first 
hypothesis sought to determine whether a trial was perceived as more neutral if there was 
a balance of trial consultants during a trial.  If both the prosecution and defense used the 
services of a trial consultant, there is no violation of Tyler’s (1989) neutrality principle 
(notion of a level playing field) and judgments of perceived fairness were expected to be 
higher than if only one side used a trial consultant.  Thus, the following main effect for 
the use of a trial consultant was predicted: 
Hypothesis 1:  A trial will be perceived as being higher in 
neutrality if both the prosecution and defense use a trial consultant 
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than if only one party uses a trial consultant. 
 
Because previous research on the group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988) has 
assessed procedural justice using all three relational concerns, this study measured trust 
and status recognition in addition to neutrality.  For the purposes of this study, these three 
variables were combined to form a measure referred to as global fairness.  The second 
hypothesis explored whether a trial was perceived as being higher in global fairness if 
there was a balance of trial consultants during a trial.  If both the prosecution and defense 
used the services of a trial consultant, judgments of perceived fairness were expected to 
be higher than if only one side used a trial consultant.  Thus, the following main effect for 
the use of a trial consultant was predicted: 
Hypothesis 2:  A trial will be perceived as being higher in global 
fairness if both the prosecution and defense use a trial consultant 
than if only one party uses a trial consultant. 
 
The third hypothesis predicted a main effect for SOE that follows from the 
predictable, strong positive association that the empirical research (e.g., Devine et al., 
2001) has found between SOE and jury verdicts of guilt.   
Hypothesis 3:  The likelihood of conviction will be highest when 
the evidence favors the prosecution, moderate when the evidence is 
ambiguous, and lowest when the evidence favors the defense. 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that jurors would be the most likely to find the defendant guilty 
when the evidence was in favor of the prosecution and the least likely to find the 
defendant guilty when the evidence favored the defense.  When SOE was ambiguous, the 
likelihood of conviction would fall somewhere in between.   
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The fourth hypothesis predicted an interaction effect between the use of trial 
consultants and SOE on the likelihood of conviction.  Specifically, the following was 
hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 4:  a) When the evidence strongly favors the defense, 
the likelihood of conviction will be low regardless of the presence 
or absence of trial consultants; b) When the evidence strongly 
favors the prosecution, the likelihood of conviction will be high 
regardless of the presence or absence of trial consultants; and 
c) When the evidence is ambiguous, the likelihood of conviction  
will be highest when the defense uses a trial consultant, moderate 
when both sides use a trial consultant, and lowest when the 
prosecution uses a trial consultant.  
 
When the evidence strongly favored either the defense or prosecution, it was anticipated 
that the bias tendencies of jurors would decrease (e.g., Baumeister & Darley, 1982; 
Kaplan & Miller, 1978) and jurors would reach a verdict based largely on the strength of 
the evidence presented during trial.  When the evidence was ambiguous, however, it was 
predicted that jurors were more likely to be swayed by biasing factors, such as the 
presence or absence of a trial consultant.  In those conditions where the evidence was 
ambiguous and the prosecution alone used a trial consultant, it was anticipated that the 
likelihood of conviction would be lower than when both sides have a consultant.  The 
relational model (Tyler, 1989) would predict that neutrality has been violated, and jurors 
will therefore perceive the prosecution as having an unfair advantage and will 
compensate for this by being more likely to find in favor of the defense.  It was further 
predicted that the likelihood of conviction would be the highest when the evidence was 
ambiguous and the defendant alone used a trial consultant.  In those conditions, the 
relational model (Tyler, 1989) would predict that jurors will perceive the defense as 
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having an unfair advantage, and will compensate for this by being more likely to find in 
favor of the prosecution.   
Another major purpose of this dissertation was to explore for the first time the 
possibility that procedural justice, in the form of Tyler and Lind’s (1992) relational model 
of authority, mediated the relationship between the use of trial consultants and the verdict 
received in criminal trials.  The central premise of the relational model is that individuals 
obtain information regarding their standing within important reference groups from the 
way in which they interact with authorities.  As previously mentioned, research has 
shown that when the issue of concern is outcome fairness, neutrality becomes particularly 
important (Tyler, 1989).  It is often assumed that features of neutrality are built into the 
framework of legal procedures.  Tyler et al. (1997) pointed out that during trials, for 
example, a level playing field is created by giving both sides the opportunity to have an 
attorney and by giving those attorneys equal opportunities to present arguments and 
question witnesses.  What must be addressed is the fact that the level playing field is 
violated when only one side has access to the resources and skills of a professional trial 
consultant.  In fact, a number of researchers have expressed concern that the basic 
fairness of our justice system seems to be undermined when one side possesses 
“scientific methods of persuasion” and the other side does not (Kressel & Kressel, 2002).    
This study investigated whether judgments about neutrality acted as a mediator 
between the balance of trial consultants and juror verdicts in cases where the evidence 
was ambiguous.  It was anticipated that when only one party has a trial consultant, juror 
perceptions of fairness decrease, which subsequently causes the likeliness of a guilty 
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verdict to either increase or decrease (depending on which side the inequity lies).  The 
following prediction was therefore advanced: 
Hypothesis 5:  The relationship between the balance of trial  
consultants and likelihood of conviction will be mediated 
by perceptions of neutrality (ambiguous evidence only). 
 
In addition, the present study also investigated whether the relationship between 
the balance of trial consultants and likelihood of conviction was mediated by judgments 
about global fairness.  It was predicted that the three relational concerns of trust, 
neutrality, and status recognition together contribute to explaining why the use of trial 
consultants may affect juror verdicts in cases where the evidence is ambiguous.  
Hypothesis 6 looked at this possibility: 
Hypothesis 6:  The relationship between the balance of trial 
consultants and likelihood of conviction will be mediated 
by perceptions of global fairness (ambiguous evidence only). 
 
The next chapter will describe the participants, design, materials, measures and 
procedures used to test the six hypotheses.   
 
 






Participants consisted of 255 jury-eligible individuals (120 females, 135 males) 
recruited from the participant pool of the psychology and management departments at 
Baruch College.  Participation in this experiment fulfilled partial course credit.  Four 
additional participants took part in the study, but failed to complete all of the items in the 
questionnaire and were excluded from the analyses.  The ages of the participants ranged 
from 18 to 37, with a mean age of 19.96 years and a standard deviation of 2.77 years.  
Most subjects were White (32.9%) or Asian American/Asian (27.1%).  Hispanics/Latinos 
represented 20.0% of the sample, Black/African Americans represented 9.0%, self-
categorized “others” represented 7.5%, and 9 participants (3.5%) choose not to answer 
this question. 
Design 
The study was a 3 x 3 factorial with Use of a Trial Consultant (Prosecution vs. 
Defense vs. Both) and SOE (Advantage Defense vs. Ambiguous vs. Advantage 
Prosecution) as between-subjects factors.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the nine possible experimental conditions.  Table 1 presents a breakdown of participants 
by cells.   




Participants by Experimental Condition 
 
Use of trial consultant 
 
SOE                             Prosecution                 Defense                  Both                  Total 
 
 
Advantage        28                             28                           29                        85 
defense 
 
Ambiguous           28                 29                           30                        87 
 
 
Advantage         28                             27                           28                        83 
prosecution 
 
Total          84                             84                           87                      255 
 
Materials 
Evidence strength was manipulated by presenting participants with three different 
versions of a criminal case summary.  Use of a trial consultant was manipulated by 
inserting a one paragraph description into each case summary that allowed the 
experimenter to vary the presence of a trial consultant.   
Manipulation of strength of evidence.  The criminal case summaries used in this 
study were based upon an aggravated sexual assault case that was tried in a Texas court.  
The summaries briefly describe the facts, which involve a man by the name of Jasper 
Brennan who was accused in 1987 of assaulting and raping a 45 year-old woman in her 
home.3  Jasper Brennan was charged with the crime after the victim positively identified 
                                                
3 Case summaries were based on the trial of Brandon Moon.  Retrieved January 7, 2005, from 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/display_profile.php?id=162.  The names and many of the facts 
were altered for the purpose of providing a brief and straightforward summary of the relevant 
circumstances of the case. 
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him in police photographs and a live lineup.  Two other victims who had been attacked in 
a similar fashion also positively identified Jasper Brennan during the live lineup.    
By varying some of the facts presented as well as the presence and testimony of 
witnesses, three versions of the case summary were created:  The Ambiguous Evidence 
condition, the Advantage Prosecution condition, and the Advantage Defense condition  
(See Appendix A).  The Ambiguous Evidence condition was written so that the evidence 
against the defendant is substantial but not conclusive.  The summary states the facts of 
the crime and then describes how the victim was called into the police station within the 
next few days to assist in creating a composite sketch of the perpetrator, to look at 
photographs of potential suspects, and to view a live lineup in the hopes of identifying 
her attacker.  The summary in the Ambiguous Evidence condition states that the victim 
identified Jasper Brennan as her assailant, but that she could not be certain.  Brennan, a 
college sophomore, was arrested and charged with three counts of aggravated sexual 
assault.  During the trial, the victim testified that she was very confident in her ability to 
clearly recall details of her attacker, but was then forced to admit that she did not know 
certain facts, such as whether or not he had a moustache.   
The Ambiguous Evidence condition also includes testimony from the serologist 
assigned to the case.  The serologist testified that the semen found on the bedding was 
produced by a non-secretor, and therefore Jasper Brennan (a non-secretor) was a possible 
contributor.  Semen samples from the victim’s husband and son were not obtained.  The 
serologist also testified upon cross-examination that no sperm samples were retrieved 
from the other two victims.  The defense produced two witnesses that corroborated 
Brennan’s alibi:  Brennan’s girlfriend, who claimed to have called him on the telephone 
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at his home less than an hour before the crime occurred and then saw him in the campus 
library shortly after the crime occurred, and a second witness who testified that he had 
seen Jasper Brennan studying in the campus library right before the crime occurred.  
Furthermore, the defense also argued that since Jasper Brennan did not have a car, he did 
not have an opportunity to commit the rape.   
In the Advantage Prosecution condition, the case summary was manipulated to 
create evidence favorable to the prosecution.  This time, for example, when the victim is 
called into the police station in the week following the attack, she immediately picked out 
the picture of Jasper Brennan and declared that he looked exactly like the perpetrator.  
Two other victims of similar crimes also identified Brennan in the lineup.  During the 
trial, the victim testified that due to the ample light in her bedroom, she was very 
confident in her ability to clearly recall details of her attacker.  She also testified that as 
soon as she saw Jasper Brennan in both the photographs at the police station and in the 
live lineup, she knew that he was the man who had raped her.   
The Advantage Prosecution condition also alters the testimony from the serologist 
assigned to the case.  The serologist testified that a blood sample taken from Jasper 
Brennan put him among just five percent of the population who could possibly have been 
the source of the semen stains.  Furthermore, the semen could not have belonged to the 
victim’s husband or son.   The defense produced only one witness, a girlfriend who 
admitted during cross-examination that she has a car that the defendant drove on 
occasion.  
Lastly, in the Advantage Defense condition, the case summary was manipulated to 
create evidence favorable to the defense.   In this condition, the victim was not asked to 
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return to the police station to view photographs of potential suspects until five months 
after the crime occurred.  Although she identified Jasper Brennan as a possible suspect, 
the case summary states that he was the only blue-eyed white male in the police 
photographs.  The live lineup was also conducted five months after the crime occurred.  
The summary states that Brennan was again the only blue-eyed white male, as well as the 
only person the police had placed in both the photographs and live lineup.  During the 
trial, the victim testified that she was very confident in her ability to remember details of 
her attacker, and yet was forced to admit during questioning that this was untrue (for 
example, she could not recall his eye color).   
The Advantage Defense condition also alters the testimony from the serologist, 
stating that Jasper Brennan, as well as the victim’s husband and son, was a possible 
contributor of the semen.  Furthermore, the summary introduces more doubt into the 
prosecution’s case by stating that the serologist admitted that forensic tests had shown 
that all other trace evidence analysis found at the crime scene, including pubic hairs, 
excluded Jasper Brennan as a source.   The defense witnesses and alibis were the same as 
in the Ambiguous Evidence condition: a girlfriend and co-student who testified that they 
saw Brennan in the library around the time that the crime was committed.   
Manipulation of use of a trial consultant.  The second manipulation in this study 
was a one paragraph description that was inserted into each case summary to allow the 
experimenter to vary the presence of a trial consultant.  There were three different 
paragraphs reflecting the three possible experimental conditions for this variable (See 
Appendix B).   In those conditions when only the defense used a trial consultant, the 
paragraph described how the defense hired a consultant to help with jury selection and 
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case presentation.  It detailed how the consultant paid citizens to complete a survey, and 
how important information gleaned from this survey was passed along to the defense who 
used this information when planning case strategy and selecting a jury.  The paragraph 
also gave a brief description of a mock trial that was conducted and the benefits this 
afforded the defense in preparing for trial.  
In those conditions when only the prosecution used a trial consultant, the identical 
paragraph was inserted, except the word “defense” was replaced with “prosecution.”  The 
third paragraph was inserted for those participants assigned to the condition where both 
the prosecution and defense used a trial consultant.  The paragraph in this condition 
begins by stating that both the defense and prosecution hired consultants to help with jury 
selection and case presentation.  It then goes on to describe the assistance provided by 
trial consultants for both sides in the same language used in the first two paragraphs.  The 
total summary (including inserted paragraph) was approximately two single spaced typed 
pages in length.   
Measures  
Procedural justice.  Neutrality, trust, and status recognition (Tyler, 1989) were 
assessed using the Relational Theory measure, which was a questionnaire that consisted 
of 14 procedural justice items adapted from questionnaires used by Tyler (1989) and 
Stolle et al. (1996) (see Appendix D for a list of questionnaire items).  Together, these 
three variables comprised the global fairness dimension of this study (Hypotheses 2 and 
6).  Below is a detailed description of the variables that were measured and how the 
neutrality and global fairness scores were calculated. 
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Neutrality.   As in previous research (e.g., Tyler, 1989; Tyler, 1994b), neutrality 
was operationalized for the purposes of this study as (a) proper behavior, (b) factual 
decision making, and (c) a lack of bias.  Questions 1-9 were combined to form a 
neutrality scale that measured participants’ perceptions of neutrality (Hypotheses 1 and 
5).  The neutrality questionnaire was modeled after Tyler (1989), who created subscales 
to reflect each of the three dimensions of neutrality.    
The first subscale, impropriety of behavior (Tyler [1989] labels “proper behavior” 
as such), was measured with four items (see Appendix D).  Participants rated each 
statement on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly agree” (1) to “strongly 
disagree” (7).  Open-ended questions (e.g., “If you thought the use of a trial consultant 
was dishonest or improper, please explain briefly in the space below”) were used to 
supplement Likert-type responses for each item in order to provide a greater depth of 
opinion.  One exception to this was the second item, whereby participants were asked, “If 
you thought the witness did something dishonest or improper, please explain briefly in 
the space below.”  This question was really serving as a decoy.  Because the researcher 
did not want participants to know the true focus of the study, this open-ended question 
was inserted into the questionnaire between questions asking for more information about 
perceived impropriety on the part of either the attorneys or trial consultants.  The 
impropriety of behavior subscale score was calculated by summing the ratings of these 
four items, with a high score indicating a high level of improper behavior.  The internal 
consistency reliability (coefficient !) for the score on the impropriety of behavior 
subscale in the current study was .60, which did not meet the criterion of .70 that had 
                                                                                                 Trial Consultants 
 
73 
been set for the minimally acceptable level of internal consistency (Nunnally, 1978). 4 
The removal of the fourth item increased the coefficient ! for the subscale score to .67, 
so for the current study the subscale score for impropriety of behavior was recalculated 
after eliminating item four.  Item four was also removed from all subsequent calculations.  
The second subscale, factual decision making, was assessed by two items (Tyler, 
1989).  (See Appendix D.)  Participants rated each statement on a 7-point Likert scale, 
ranging from “strongly agree” (1) to “strongly disagree” (7).   An open-ended question 
(“If you thought the jury was not given all of the information needed to render a verdict, 
please explain briefly in the space below what information you thought was missing”) 
was used to provide a greater depth of opinion.  The factual decision making subscale 
score was calculated by summing the ratings of these two items, with a high score 
indicating a high level factual decision making.  The coefficient ! for the score on the 
subscale was .71.  
Lack of bias, the third subscale, was measured by three items (see Appendix D).   
Participants rated each statement on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly agree” 
(1) to “strongly disagree” (7).   An open-ended question (“If you thought the legal 
authorities involved favored one party over another, please explain briefly in the space 
below”) was used to provide a greater depth of opinion.  The lack of bias subscale score 
was calculated by summing the ratings of these three items, with a high score indicating 
less bias.  The coefficient ! for the subscale score was .76.   
A neutrality scale score was calculated for each participant by reverse scoring the 
negative subscale items (items 5 and 6) and then summing the ratings of the eight 
                                                
4 This was not unexpectedly low, however, as Tyler’s (1989) study had found an alpha level of .61 for the 
same subscale.  
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procedural justice items discussed above, with a high score indicating a high level of 
neutrality.  Neutrality was calculated in this way to better reflect the method used by 
many researchers when developing a total score for a scale that is comprised of multiple 
subscales (e.g., Minnesota Job Satisfaction Questionnaire (MSQ), 1967; Job Satisfaction 
Survey (JSS), Spector, 1985; Self-Compassion Scale, Neff, 2003).   The coefficient ! for 
the score on the neutrality scale was .75.  
Trust.  For the purposes of this study, trust was operationalized as the 
trustworthiness of the motives of the jury system.  Since trust involves the belief that 
third parties desire to treat people in ways that are fair and reasonable (Tyler, 1989), this 
dimension was assessed using a 2-item scale modeled after Tyler (1989).  (See Appendix 
D.)  Participants rated each statement on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly 
agree” (1) to “strongly disagree” (7).   The trust scale was calculated by summing the 
ratings of these two items, with a high score indicating a high level of trust.  The 
coefficient ! for the score on the trust scale was .85.  
Status recognition.  The third relational concern, status recognition, was 
operationalized as politeness, treatment with dignity, and respect for rights due to each 
group member.  Status recognition was assessed using a 3-item scale modeled after Tyler 
(1989).  (See Appendix D.)  The status recognition scale was calculated by summing the 
ratings of these three items, with a high score indicating a high level of status recognition.  
The coefficient ! for the score on the status recognition scale was .89.  
Global fairness.  A global fairness score was calculated for each participant by 
reverse scoring the negative subscale items (items 5, 6, 10, and 11) and then summing the 
ratings of the 13 remaining procedural justice items in the Relational Theory measure, 
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with a high score indicating a high level of global fairness.  The coefficient ! for global 
fairness was .85.  
Table 2 presents a summary of the Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities for all scores on 
the subscales and scales.  With the exception of the impropriety of behavior subscale, all 
subscales and scales meet the criterion for the acceptable level of internal consistency 
(Nunnally, 1978).   
Table 2 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha Reliabilities for Scores on Scales and Subscales 
 
Scale                   Number of items       Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
 
Neutrality      8          .75  
 
 Impropriety of behavior   3          .67 
 
 Factual decision making   2          .71 
 
 Lack of bias     3          .76 
 
Trust       2          .85 
 
Status recognition     3          .89 
 
Global fairness               13                                        .85 
 
 
Likelihood of conviction.  The second measure of the questionnaire (see Appendix 
E) assessed participants’ likelihood of convicting the defendant (Hypotheses 3 and 4).  
Both dichotomous (e.g., guilty vs. not guilty) and continuous (e.g., rating confidence in 
the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt) verdict determinations were measured in an effort 
to tap both proportional and mean differences in guilt ratings.  Question 1 of this measure 
asked participants to make a dichotomous determination of the defendant’s guilt (guilty 
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or not guilty).  Question 2 asked participants to make a continuous determination of 
Jasper Brennan’s guilt on a scale from 1 to 7 (e.g., 1 is “I am positive Brennan is not 
guilty” and 7 is “I am positive Brennan is guilty”).  Hypotheses 3 and 4 were each tested 
twice:  once using the dichotomous verdict measure from Question 1, and then again 
using the continuous verdict measure from Question 2.  In order to get a better sense of 
the factors influencing their decision, Question 3 asked participants to identify which (if 
any) factors influenced their determination of guilt or innocence.   Answers from 
Question 3 were not used to test the hypotheses, but rather provided exploratory 
qualitative data.  Question 4 asked participants who answered “guilty” to Question 1 to 
recommend a prison term between 5 and 20 years or more. 5  Question 4 was also 
included for exploratory purposes.6    
Manipulation checks.  Additional items were included at the end of the 
questionnaire in order to ensure that the experimenter achieved the desired experimental 
SOE conditions (Ambiguous Evidence condition, Advantage Prosecution condition, and 
Advantage Defense condition). Questions 5 and 6 (see Appendix E) asked participants to 
separately rate the strength of both the defense and prosecution’s evidence (taking into 
account factual presentation and witness credibility) on a scale from 1 (very weak) to 7 
(very strong).  Question 7 asked participants to rate the strength of the evidence on a 
scale from 1 (the evidence strongly favored the defense) to 7 (the evidence strongly 
favored the prosecution). To check on the manipulation of the use of a trial consultant, 
Question 8 asked participants which party (or parties) received assistance from a trial 
consultant.   
                                                
5 Questions 1, 2, and 4 were based on similar items used by Kerr et al., 1999. 
6 Although no formal predictions were made, it was expected that as perceptions of fairness increased, 
recommended jail terms would lengthen. 
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Demographic and background information.  The last measure, Demographic and 
Background Information, was collected in order to determine if there were differences in 
the results based on age, gender, or ethnic origin (See Appendix F).  Participants were 
also asked if they or anyone they are close to have ever been the victim of a violent 
crime, and/or if they or anyone they are close to have ever been accused of a violent 
crime.  This information was analyzed to determine if the results of those participants 
who answered affirmatively to either of those questions differed significantly from the 
results of other participants.   
Procedures 
The participants were told that the researcher was studying how people make use 
of partial or “summary trials,” a quicker and less expensive alternative to conducting full 
trials, that are being used more frequently in some states (e.g., New Jersey).  No oral 
evidence is given in summary trials; instead, evidence is presented to the judge in the 
form of written affidavits.  Although judgments in summary trials are not binding, they 
often lead to negotiated settlements prior to jury trials (Cooper & Neuhaus, 2000).  
Participants were told that the researcher’s interest was in understanding how jurors make 
decisions in these summary trials.   Informed consent was obtained from all student 
participants.  Although participants were informed at the time of signing up through the 
on-line Participant Pool that the material in this study involved a rape trial, they were 
reminded again before the experiment began and given an opportunity to withdraw 
without penalty at that time if uncomfortable. 
The condition received by each participant was randomly assigned.  Each 
participant received a packet containing one criminal case summary and a questionnaire 
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comprised of the four measures discussed above.  Participants were instructed to read one 
of the nine sets of materials as if they were a potential juror, paying close attention to the 
facts of the case and the arguments presented by both parties.  Next, participants were 
instructed to read standard judge’s instructions, which included a description of the 
presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard of proof (see Appendix C).  
Participants were asked to work through the questionnaire packet in the order in which 
the materials were presented, beginning with the Relational Theory measure (see 
Appendix D), followed by the Likelihood of Conviction measure and Manipulation 
Check items (see Appendix E), and concluding with the demographic form (see 
Appendix F).   Participants were given one hour to complete the experiment. 




Pretest of Materials:  The Pilot Study 
To ensure that subjects were distinguishing among the three evidentiary 
conditions as well as noticing the use of a trial consultant, a pilot study was conducted on 
a separate group of participants who were randomly assigned to one of the nine 
conditions.  This chapter begins with basic descriptive statistics that describe the sample, 
followed by the results of the manipulation checks.   
Descriptive Statistics 
Participants consisted of 50 jury-eligible individuals (25 females, 25 males) who 
were personal acquaintances of the experimenter (n = 25) or recruited from the 
participant pool of the psychology and management departments at Baruch College (n = 
25).  For the participant pool participants, partaking in this experiment fulfilled partial 
course credit at Baruch College.   
For the pilot sample of 50 individuals, the ages of the participants ranged from 18 
to 64, with a mean age of 24.36 years and a standard deviation of 10.77 years.  Eighteen 
subjects (36%) were White, 18 (36.0%) were Asian American/Asian, 6 (12.0%) were 
Hispanic/Latino, 5 (10.0%) were Black/African American, and 3 (6.0%) were Native 
American.  Forty-eight subjects indicated that they had not been victims of violent crimes 
and two subjects chose not to answer this question.  Five subjects (10.0%) indicated that 
someone they are close to has been the victim of a violent crime, and 43 did not.  Again, 
two subjects chose not to answer this question.  Forty-eight subjects indicated that they 
have never been accused of committing a violent crime, and two subjects did not respond 
to this question.  Three subjects (6.0%) indicated that someone they are close to was 
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accused of a violent crime, and 45 did not.  Two subjects did not respond.  Given the high 
number of participants who indicated that neither they nor someone they are close to had 
been the victim of a violent crime or accused of committing a violent crime, no 
participants were excluded from the analyses.  
Manipulation Checks 
 The two manipulation checks examined in this study are strength of evidence 
(SOE) and use of a trial consultant.  The findings on these manipulation checks are 
presented next.   
SOE.  The first manipulation check focuses on the SOE manipulation.  The 
relationship between the SOE condition presented in the case and the participants ratings 
of the strength of evidence presented in the trial on a scale from 1 (the evidence strongly 
favored the defense) to 7 (the evidence strongly favored the prosecution), where 4 was 
inconclusive (favored both parties equally) was examined.  This item is Question 7 of the 
LCM.  A one-way ANOVA indicated that there was a significant relationship between 
the strength of evidence presented in the case and the participants’ rating of the strength 
of the evidence presented in the trial, F (2, 47) = 15.68, p = .001, partial "! = .40.  The 
partial eta-squared indicated a large effect size. Follow-up tests were conducted to 
evaluate pairwise differences among the means. Simple planned contrasts indicated 
significant differences in the means between the ambiguous condition (M = 4.11, SD = 
1.19) and the means in both the “favors prosecution” (M = 5.44, SD = 1.59) and “favors 
defense” conditions (M = 2.67, SD = 1.34), p < .05.  This pattern of findings indicates 
that the manipulation successfully moved the means in both directions.  Participants in 
the ambiguous condition tended to give ratings that indicated that the evidence was either 
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weak or inconclusive.  Those whose case favored the prosecution tended to give ratings 
that favored the prosecution and not the defense, and those whose case favored the 
defense tended to give ratings that favored the defense and not the prosecution.   
Use of a trial consultant.  The second manipulation check focuses on the use of a 
trial consultant manipulation.  To examine this manipulation, participant ratings of the 
use of a trial consultant were measured using Question 8 of the LCM.  This manipulation 
check focused on the relationship between participants’ ability to distinguish, among the 
cases, which parties had used a trial consultant (either the prosecution, the defense, or 
both) and the actual use of trial consultants in the trial.  A chi-square analysis was used to 
examine this relationship.  For use of a trial consultant, prosecution was coded 1, defense 
was coded 2, and both were coded 3.  A significant relationship was found between the 
participants’ ability to distinguish which party had used a trial consultant in the case and 
the actual use of trial consultants in the case, x2(4, N=50) = 54.18, p=.001, V = .73.   See 
Table 3 for a breakdown of the proportion of participants who identified the use of a trial 
consultant in each condition. 
Table 3 
Proportion of Participants Identifying Use of Trial Consultants Per Condition (Pilot) 
 
Reported use        
of trial consultant             Actual use of trial consultant 
 
 
    Prosecution   Defense  Both 
 
Prosecution        .87          .15     .13 
 
Defense         .0         .80                .07 
 
Both         .13         .05                .80 
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Taken together, the results indicate that the use of a trial consultant was in general 
successfully manipulated in the study. 





The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the empirical study.  First, 
the results of the study are described, beginning with basic descriptive statistics that 
describe the sample.  Manipulation checks are then presented, followed by the results of 
hypothesis testing.  Hypotheses were primarily tested through a series of analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), logistic regression, chi-square, and correlation tests.  For all 
comparisons, p < .05 was adopted as the criterion for establishing statistical significance.  
In addition, judgments regarding the magnitude of effect size follow Cohen’s (1988) 
suggestions for “small,” “medium,” and “large” effect sizes.  The chapter concludes with 
a look at the responses to the open ended questions that were asked throughout the 
questionnaire. 
The Present Study 
Descriptive Statistics 
Several data checks were conducted on the 255 participants in the sample to 
determine if the demographics had an impact on key variables in this study.  They are 
listed below.  For other details on the sample, please refer to the “Participants” section of 
Chapter 5. 
 Age.  A t-test was conducted to determine if a relationship exists between age and 
verdict.  The mean age of individuals who chose guilty did not differ significantly from 
the mean age of individuals who chose not guilty, t (252) = .95, ns, d = .12.   In addition, 
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed between age and the ratings for neutrality 
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and global fairness.  No significant relationships were found in either case (neutrality, r = 
-.07, ns; global fairness, r = -.07, ns).   
 Gender.  A chi-square analysis was conducted to determine if a relationship  
exists between gender and verdict.  No significant results were found, x2(1, N=254) = 
1.17, ns, V = .06.  In addition, t-tests were conducted to determine if female and male 
subjects differed on ratings of neutrality and global fairness.  No significant differences 
were found between females and males on neutrality ratings, t (253) = -.64, ns, d = .07 or 
on global fairness ratings, t (253) = -.48, ns, d = .05.  
 Ethnicity.  A chi-square analysis was conducted to determine if a relationship 
exists between ethnicity and verdict.  No significant results were found, x2(5, N=255) = 
2.94, ns, V = .10.  In addition, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if 
significant differences exist between the ethnicities on ratings of neutrality and global 
fairness.  No significant differences were found between the ethnicities on neutrality 
ratings, F (5, 249) = 1.54, ns, partial "! = .03 or global fairness ratings, F (5, 249) = 1.60, 
ns, partial "! = .03.   
 Experiences.   Multiple analyses were conducted to determine if relationships 
existed between variables based on the participants’ personal experiences with violent 
crimes or the experiences that close friends or family members have had with violent 
crimes.  Participants were compared on questions 1 through 14 of the Relational Theory 
Measure (RTM), verdict determination, and scores on the neutrality and global fairness 
scales.  There were almost no significant differences in participant responses between 
those participants who indicated that they had close friends or family members who had 
experienced violent crimes (n = 56) or were accused of committing a violent crime (n = 
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28) and those who had not.  While there were a few significant differences in participant 
responses between those participants who indicated that they had personally been the 
victim of a violent crime (n = 17) or had personally been accused of committing a violent 
crime (n = 4) and those who had not, these results can be attributed to chance or a small 
sample size.  The decision was therefore made not to exclude any participants based on 
the responses to the demographic variables.  Thus, all manipulation checks presented 
below were conducted on the total sample (N = 255).   
Manipulation Checks 
 As noted in the pilot study, the two manipulation checks examined in this study 
are SOE and use of a trial consultant.  The findings on these manipulation checks are 
presented next.    
 SOE.  The first manipulation check focuses on the SOE manipulation.  The 
relationship between the SOE condition presented in the case and the participants ratings 
of the strength of evidence presented in the trial on a scale from 1 (the evidence strongly 
favored the defense) to 7 (the evidence strongly favored the prosecution), where 4 was 
inconclusive (favored both parties equally) was examined.  This item is Question 7 of the 
LCM.  A one-way ANOVA indicated that there was a significant relationship between 
the strength of evidence presented in the case and the participants’ rating of the strength 
of the evidence presented in the trial, F (2,252) = 57.03, p = .001, partial "! = .31.  The 
partial eta-squared indicated a large effect size. Follow-up tests were conducted to 
evaluate pairwise differences among the means. Simple planned contrasts indicated 
significant differences in the means between the ambiguous condition (M = 3.87, SD = 
1.57) and the means in both the “favors prosecution” (M = 5.33, SD = 1.27) and “favors 
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defense” conditions (M = 3.09, SD = 1.25), p < .001.  This pattern of findings indicates 
that the manipulation successfully moved the means in both directions.  Those in the 
ambiguous condition tended to give ratings that indicated that the evidence was either 
weak or inconclusive.  Participants whose case favored the prosecution tended to give 
ratings that favored the prosecution and not the defense, and participants whose case 
favored the defense tended to give ratings that favored the defense and not the 
prosecution.  These results closely match what had been found in the pilot study 
discussed earlier. 
Use of a trial consultant.  The second manipulation check focuses on the use of a 
trial consultant manipulation.  To examine this manipulation, participant ratings of the 
use of a trial consultant were measured using Question 8 of the LCM, just as had been 
done in the pilot study described earlier.  This manipulation check focused on the 
relationship between participants’ ability to distinguish, among the cases, which parties 
had used a trial consultant (either the prosecution, the defense, or both) and the actual use 
of trial consultants in the trial.  A chi-square analysis was used to examine this 
relationship.  For use of a trial consultant, prosecution was coded 1, defense was coded 2, 
and both were coded 3.  A statistically significant and strong association was found 
between the participants’ ability to distinguish which party had used a trial consultant in 
the case and the actual use of trial consultants in the case, x2(4, N=255) = 195.78, p=.001, 
V = .61.  See Table 4 for a breakdown of the proportion of participants who identified the 
use of a trial consultant in each condition. 
 
 




Proportion of Participants Identifying Use of Trial Consultants Per Condition 
 
Reported use        
of trial consultant             Actual use of trial consultant 
 
 
    Prosecution   Defense  Both 
 
Prosecution        .77          .13     .13 
 
Defense        .10         .68                .09 
 
Both         .13         .19                .78 
 
The results indicate that the use of a trial consultant was in general successfully 
manipulated in the study. 
Hypothesis Tests 
Hypotheses regarding the effects of the balance of trial consultants on perceptions 
of neutrality and global fairness (Hypotheses 1 and 2) were tested through Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA).  ANOVA tests consisted of an overall test of differences in group 
means along with planned contrasts corresponding to the hypotheses.  If the overall F test 
was significant, then post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test were conducted to 
further explore significant differences in group means.  The effect of SOE on the 
likelihood of conviction (Hypothesis 3) and the impact that SOE and balance of trial 
consultants have on the likelihood of conviction (Hypothesis 4) were tested using logistic 
regression analysis (for dichotomous verdict measures) and ANOVA (for continuous 
verdict measures).   
 Hypothesis 1.  A main effect for the use of a trial consultant was predicted, such 
that perceptions of neutrality were expected to be higher when both the prosecution and 
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defense used a trial consultant than when only one side used a trial consultant.  A one-
way ANOVA indicated that the neutrality scores of participants did not differ 
significantly as a function of the balance of trial consultants between parties, F (2, 252) = 
2.78, p = .06, partial "! = .02.  Because the results approached significance, post hoc 
comparisons using Tukey’s HSD were conducted to evaluate pairwise differences among 
the means.  No significant differences between the three conditions were found.  The 
difference between the neutrality measure when both sides used a trial consultant (M = 
4.99, SD = .99) and when the prosecution alone used a trial consultant (M = 4.65, SD = 
1.14) approached significance (p = .08).  Comparisons between the neutrality measure 
when the defense alone used a trial consultant (M = 4.97, SD = 1.01) and the other two 
conditions were not statistically significant at p < .05 (nor did they approach 
significance).  
Because Tukey results indicated that the defense only use of trial consultants was 
perceived as equally neutral as when both sides used a trial consultant, a planned contrast 
ANOVA was conducted collapsing across these two conditions and comparing it to the 
condition where the prosecution alone used a trial consultant.  Results indicated a 
significant difference between the neutrality score of participants when the prosecution 
alone used a trial consultant when compared to the neutrality scores of participants in the 
other two collapsed conditions, F (1, 253) = 5.54, p = .02, partial "! = .02. In addition, a 
planned contrast ANOVA was conducted collapsing across the conditions where the 
prosecution only and both sides used a trial consultant and comparing it to the condition 
where the defense alone used a trial consultant.  No significant difference was found, F 
(1, 253) = .69, p = .40, partial "! = .01.  Overall, Hypothesis 1 was not supported.  
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 Hypothesis 2.  A main effect for the use of a trial consultant was predicted, such 
that perceptions of global fairness were expected to be higher when both the prosecution 
and defense used a trial consultant than when only one side used a trial consultant.  A 
one-way ANOVA indicated that there were significant differences in perceptions of 
global fairness when the prosecution, the defense, or both used a trial consultant, F (2, 
252) = 4.21, p = .02, partial "! = .03.  The partial eta-squared indicated a small effect 
size.  Tukey post-hoc comparisons of the three conditions indicated that perceptions of 
global fairness were lowest when the prosecution only used a trial consultant.   When the 
prosecution alone used a trial consultant, the mean global fairness measure was 
significantly lower (M = 4.57, SD = 1.03) than the mean global fairness measure when 
both parties used a trial consultant (M = 4.96, SD = .89), p = .02, thus supporting 
Hypothesis 2.   Comparisons between the mean global fairness measure when the defense 
alone used a trial consultant (M = 4.91, SD = .96) and the other two conditions were not 
statistically significant at p < .05.  This finding did not support Hypothesis 2, which 
predicted that perceptions of global fairness would be higher when both the prosecution 
and defense used a trial consultant than when only one side used a trial consultant.   
Because Tukey results indicated that the defense only use of trial consultants was 
perceived as equally fair as when both sides used a trial consultant, a planned contrast 
ANOVA was conducted collapsing across these two conditions and comparing it to the 
condition where the prosecution alone used a trial consultant.  Results indicated a 
significant difference between the global fairness score of participants when the 
prosecution alone used a trial consultant when compared to the global fairness scores of 
participants in the other two collapsed conditions, F (1, 253) = 8.31, p = .01, partial "! = 
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.03. In addition, a planned contrast ANOVA was conducted collapsing across the 
conditions where the prosecution only and both sides used a trial consultant and 
comparing it to the condition where the defense alone used a trial consultant.  No 
significant difference was found, F (1, 253) = .84, p = .36, partial "! = .01.  Overall, 
Hypothesis 2 was partially supported.  Results indicated that perceptions of global 
fairness were significantly higher when both the prosecution and defense used a trial 
consultant than when only the prosecution used a trial consultant, but that perceptions of 
global fairness were not significantly higher when both sides used a trial consultant if it 
was the defense alone using a trial consultant.   
 Hypothesis 3.  A main effect for SOE was predicted, such that the likelihood of 
conviction was expected to be highest when the evidence favored the prosecution, 
moderate when the evidence was ambiguous, and lowest when the evidence favored the 
defense.  This hypothesis was tested in two different ways.  In the first analysis, 
participants’ dichotomous verdict measure (guilty vs. not guilty) was used as the 
likelihood of conviction measure.  A logistic regression analysis indicated a significant 
relationship between SOE and likelihood of conviction.  Table 5 presents a summary of 
the logistic regression analysis.  Dummy codes were used to code the predictors such that 
the first variable listed in Table 5, SOE advantage prosecution, represents “advantage 
prosecution vs. everyone else,” and the second variable listed, SOE advantage defense, 
represents “advantage defense vs. everyone else.”  The constant represents the condition 
where SOE is ambiguous. 
 
 




Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for SOE Predicting Likelihood of Conviction 
(N = 255) 
 
Predictor       !  SE !  Wald’s  Exp (!) 
                     X! 
 
SOE advantage    1.84** .35  28.45  6.32 
prosecution                                
          
SOE advantage                          -.99*             .45                    4.77                  .37 
defense  
 
Constant              -1.28**            .26                   24.14                .28 
 
X!               64.28** 
 
Df    2 
                        
Note.  Likelihood of conviction predictors coded as 1 for guilty and 0 for not guilty. 
*p < .05.  **p < .001. 
 
Nagelkerke R" for the overall prediction model was .31, which suggests that SOE 
contributed an estimated 31% of the variance in likelihood of conviction scores among 
participants.  The odds ratio indicates that if SOE favored the defense, participants were 
37% less likely to convict the defendant than if SOE was ambiguous (p < .01).  The odds 
were six times greater that a participant in the condition where SOE favored the 
prosecution would convict the defendant than a participant in the condition where SOE 
was ambiguous (p <.001).  The overall classification accuracy was 77.6%, which is better 
than the proportional by chance accuracy rate which was calculated to be .57.  Table 6 
presents the classification outcome table of observed versus predicted results for 
likelihood of conviction.    
 




Classification Outcome Table of Observed Versus Predicted Results for Likelihood of 
Conviction 
 
Observed             Predicted 
    _____________________________ 
    Not Guilty   Guilty 
 
 
Not Guilty                                   145       30    
                   
Guilty          27       53 
Note.  The cut value is .50                               
 
Table 7 presents a breakdown of the proportion of verdicts per experimental 
condition. 
Table 7 
Proportion of Verdicts Per Condition (N = 255) 
 
SOE                              Verdict 
                                                            _____________________________ 
     Not Guilty       Guilty 
 
Advantage defense         .91                                        .09        
       
Ambiguous          .78       .22 
 
Advantage prosecution        .36       .64                      
 
 As Table 7 shows, when the evidence was clearly presented to participants as either 
favoring one side or another, participants tended to provide a verdict as expected. 
What was unexpected, however, was the small difference in the proportion of “not 
guilty” verdict determinations for those participants whose evidence favored the defense 
(.91) and those participants whose evidence was ambiguous (.78).  Twenty-two percent 
of the 87 participants whose case was ambiguous chose guilty, while 78% of the  
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participants whose case was ambiguous chose not guilty.  A relatively even split between 
guilty and non-guilty verdicts had been expected in the ambiguous evidence condition.   
In the second analysis, participants’ continuous verdict measure (on a scale from 
1 to 7 where 1 was “I am positive Brennan is not guilty” and 7 was “I am positive 
Brennan is guilty”) was used as the likelihood of conviction measure.  Analysis of 
variance indicated that there was a significant relationship between the verdict chosen 
and the strength of evidence, F (2, 252) = 59.67, p = .001, partial "! = .32.  Tukey post-
hoc comparisons of the three conditions indicated results similar to the first analysis.  The 
likelihood of conviction mean when the evidence favored the prosecution (M = 5.20, SD 
=1.75) was significantly higher than the likelihood of conviction mean when the evidence 
was ambiguous (M = 3.54, SD =1.77), p = .001 or when the evidence favored the defense 
(M = 2.42, SD =1.42), p = .001.  In addition, the likelihood of conviction mean when the 
evidence was ambiguous was significantly higher than the likelihood of conviction mean 
when the evidence favored the defense (M = 2.42, SD =1.42), p = .001.  
Overall, Hypothesis 3 was supported.  Results indicated that the likelihood of 
conviction for both dichotomous and continuous verdict measures was highest when the 
evidence favored the prosecution, moderate when the evidence was ambiguous, and 
lowest when the evidence favored the defense.  When the evidence was clearly presented 
to participants as either favoring the prosecution or defense, participants tended to 
provide a verdict as expected.  However, when those participants in the ambiguous 
evidence condition were forced into a dichotomous verdict decision, the expected even 
split between guilty and non-guilty verdicts was not found.  Rather, many more 
participants chose a non-guilty verdict.   
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Hypothesis 4.  It was predicted that likelihood of conviction would be impacted 
by an interaction between SOE and balance of trial consultants.   More specifically, it 
was expected that (a) the likelihood of conviction would be low regardless of the 
presence or absence of trial consultants when the evidence strongly favored the defense, 
and (b) the likelihood of conviction would be high regardless of the presence or absence 
of trial consultants when the evidence strongly favored the prosecution.  When the 
evidence was ambiguous, however, it was expected that (c) the likelihood of conviction 
would be highest when the defense used a trial consultant, moderate when both sides 
used a trial consultant, and lowest when the prosecution used a trial consultant.  This 
hypothesis was tested using both the dichotomous and continuous verdict measures.  In 
the first analysis, participants’ dichotomous verdict measure (guilty vs. not guilty) was 
used as the likelihood of conviction measure.  A logistic regression analysis indicated no 
significant interaction between SOE and balance of trial consultants.  Table 8 presents a 
summary of the logistic regression analysis.  Two separate dummy coded variables were 
created for both SOE and use of a trial consultant in order to look at the main effects for 
these variables.  The predictors were coded such that the first variable listed in Table 8, 
SOE advantage prosecution, represents “favors prosecution vs. everyone else,” and the 
second variable listed, SOE advantage defense, represents “favors defense vs. everyone 
else.” The third variable listed, TC prosecution, represents “use of TC by prosecution vs. 
everyone else,” and the fourth variable listed, TC defense, represents “use of TC by 
defense vs. everyone else.”  The last four variables are the interactions terms, which 
represent the product of all of the dummy code combinations.  Thus, the fifth variable 
listed, Interaction 1, represents SOE favors defense X TC defense.  The sixth variable 
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listed, Interaction 2, represents SOE favors prosecution X TC prosecution.  The seventh 
variable listed, Interaction 3, represents SOE favors defense X TC prosecution, and the 
eighth variable listed, Interaction 4, represents SOE favors prosecution X TC defense.  
Since the constant represents the condition where all of the predictor variables equal zero 
and zero is not a realistic value for the variables to take, it is not valuable to interpret it in 
this instance. 
Table 8 
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for SOE/TC Interaction Predicting Likelihood 
of Conviction (N = 255) 
 
Predictor       !  SE !  Wald’s  Exp (!) 
                     X! 
 
SOE advantage   -2.02** .60            11.39      .13 
prosecution 
 
SOE advantage    1.94            1.11   3.04    7.00 
defense 
 
TC prosecution    1.22            1.41     .74    3.38 
 
TC defense     .30   .74     .16    1.35 
 
Interaction 1    -.31            1.39     .05                    .73 
 
Interaction 2     .58                  .84                     .48                  1.79 
   
Interaction 3                       -1.71            1.30   1.74      .18 
 
Interaction 4      .01   .84     .00    1.01 
  
Constant             -1.30                1.18                   1.22                    .27 
 
X!               69.59** 
Df    8 
                        
Note.  Likelihood of conviction predictors coded as 1 for guilty and 0 for not guilty. 
*p < .05.  **p < .001. 
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Nagelkerke R" for the overall prediction model was .33, which suggests that the 
interaction between SOE and the balance of trial consultants contributed an estimated 
33% of the variance in likelihood of conviction scores among participants.  This is almost 
the same percentage of variance predicted by SOE alone, as indicated by the results 
reported for Hypothesis 3.  The odds ratios for all of the interaction variables indicate that 
the likelihood of conviction was not impacted by an interaction between SOE and 
balance of trial consultants.  The overall classification accuracy was 77.6%, which is 
better than the proportional by chance accuracy rate which was calculated to be .57.  This 
was, however, the same classification accuracy reported for Hypothesis 3, suggesting that 
the interaction variables added nothing to the model.   
Table 9 presents a breakdown of the proportion of verdicts per experimental 
condition. 
Table 9 
Proportion of Verdicts Per All Conditions (N = 255) 
 
SOE                                           Use of trial consultant  
             ____________________________________________ 
    Prosecution     Defense        Both 
 
           Guilty   Not guilty      Guilty   Not guilty     Guilty   Not guilty 
 
Advantage defense          .18  .82           .07  .93          .03           .97 
              
Ambiguous           .21  .79                .24  .76          .20           .80 
 
Advantage prosecution        .54  .46           .74  .26          .64  .36 
 
As Table 9 shows, when the evidence favored the defense, participants tended to provide 
a not guilty verdict regardless of the use of trial consultants.  When the evidence favored 
the prosecution, however, Hypothesis 4 predicted that participants would provide a guilty 
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verdict regardless of the use of trial consultants.  While the majority of participants in this 
condition did convict the defendant, the effect was not as strong as had been anticipated.  
For example, when the prosecution alone used a trial consultant, only 54% of participants 
in the condition where SOE favors prosecution voted to convict the defendant.  Finally, 
Table 9 shows that when SOE was ambiguous, participants tended to provide a not guilty 
verdict regardless of the use of trial consultants.  
In the second analysis, participants’ continuous verdict measure (on a scale from 
1 to 7 where 1 was “I am positive Brennan is not guilty” and 7 was “I am positive 
Brennan is guilty”) was used as the likelihood of conviction measure.  Analysis of 
variance indicated that there was a significant difference between the verdict chosen and 
the strength of evidence, F (2, 252) = 59.67, p = .001, partial "! = .32.  The likelihood of 
conviction mean when the evidence favored the prosecution (M = 5.20, SD =1.75) was 
significantly higher than the likelihood of conviction mean when the evidence was 
ambiguous (M = 3.54, SD =1.77), p = .001 or when the evidence favored the defense (M 
= 2.42, SD =1.42), p = .001.  In addition, the likelihood of conviction mean when the 
evidence was ambiguous was significantly higher than the likelihood of conviction mean 
when the evidence favored the defense (M = 2.42, SD =1.42), p = .001.  No significant 
differences were found, however, for the main effect of use of a trial consultant, F (2, 
252) = .40, ns, partial "! = .003 or for the interaction of use of a trial consultant and SOE, 
F (4, 252) = 1.17, ns, partial "! = .01.  These results support parts (a) and (b) of 
Hypothesis 4, and further supports the significant main effect for SOE found in 
Hypothesis 3.   Table 10 presents a breakdown of the mean continuous verdict measure 
scores across all conditions. 




Mean Continuous Verdict Measure Scores Across Conditions (N = 255) 
 
Use of trial consultant 
 
SOE                              Prosecution                  Defense                      Both                   
 
 
Advantage defense        2.68                           2.50                          2.10                         
 
Ambiguous                 3.54                           3.55                          3.53                        
 
Advantage prosecution        4.71                           5.52                          5.39                        
 
 
Because Hypothesis 4 makes a specific prediction for the effects of the use of trial 
consultants on verdicts only in the ambiguous condition, a planned contrast ANOVA was 
conducted using the data from those in the ambiguous condition only (n = 87).  The data 
was collapsed across the conditions where the defense only and both sides used a trial 
consultant and compared to the condition where the prosecution alone used a trial 
consultant.  Results indicated no significant difference in likelihood of conviction scores 
as a function of use of trial consultants in the ambiguous evidence condition, F (1, 87) = 
.00, ns. 
Overall, analyses found no significant interaction between SOE and balance of 
trial consultants using either dichotomous or continuous verdict measures.  Hypothesis 4 
was therefore not supported.   Results indicated that the likelihood of conviction was low 
regardless of the presence or absence of trial consultants when the evidence strongly 
favored the defense, and the likelihood of conviction was high regardless of the presence 
or absence of trial consultants when the evidence strongly favored the prosecution.  The 
likelihood of conviction was moderate when the evidence was ambiguous.  No effect was 
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found to indicate that the use of a trial consultant by one or both sides impacted the 
likelihood of conviction for those participants in the ambiguous condition. 
Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6.    It was predicted that the relationship between 
the balance of trial consultants and likelihood of conviction would be mediated by 
perceptions of neutrality (Hypothesis 5) and global fairness (Hypothesis 6) in the 
ambiguous evidence condition.  No support was found for Hypothesis 4, which had 
predicted that the use of a trial consultant by one or both sides would impact the 
likelihood of conviction for those participants in the ambiguous condition.  Because 
results from the previous analyses indicated no support for the expected pattern of data in 
the ambiguous evidence condition, no further testing was conducted.   
Open-Ended Questions 
Open-ended questions were used to supplement Likert-type responses throughout 
the questionnaire in order to provide a greater depth of opinion.  They were not used for 
the purposes of hypothesis testing.  The first three open-ended questions correspond to 
the three items of the Relational Theory measure that comprise the subscale score for 
impropriety of behavior.  After asking participants to rate whether “the attorneys in this 
case acted in a manner that was dishonest or improper,” they were asked to provide more 
information: “If you thought the attorneys did something dishonest or improper, please 
explain briefly in the space below.” Of greatest interest was whether or not participants 
would mention the use of trial consultants when not directly prompted to respond to the 
fairness of their use during the trial.  Two hundred and five of the 255 participants did not 
respond (81.3%).  Of the 50 participants who provided more information, 39 (78%) 
mentioned the use of trial consultants (e.g., “I’m not too familiar with how the system 
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works but I don’t think it’s fair to have a full mock trial and pick favorable jurors to 
choose the verdict”).  While 43.6% of the participants who responded affirmatively and 
mentioned the use of a trial consultant were in the condition where the prosecution only 
used a trial consultant, 38.5% were in the condition where both the prosecution and 
defense used a trial consultant.  Only 17.9% of participants from the condition where 
only the defense used a trial consultant described the use of a trial consultant as being 
dishonest or improper.  Possible reasons for this will be discussed in the next chapter. 
In the third item to comprise the subscale score for impropriety of behavior, 
participants were first asked to rate whether “The use of a trial consultant was dishonest 
or improper” and then asked “If you thought the use of a trial consultant was dishonest or 
improper, please explain briefly in the space below.”  The comments of the 53 
participants who responded to this item tended to cluster into four major categories: 
concern over use of a paid survey (e.g., “A trial consultant is improper because consultant 
paid people to fill out a survey”), concern over the use of the mock trial (e.g., “I thought 
it was improper because the defense attorneys were getting a chance to refine their case 
and arguments for a man who quite possibly could be guilty and walk free as a result of 
the work of the consultant”), concern over the selection of a “favorable jury” (e.g.,  
“I thought it was dishonest because the consultant chose individuals who would most 
likely agree with the arguments of the prosecution and that isn’t right.  The people chosen 
should be neutral”), and a general sense that the use of a trial consultant was not ethical 
(e.g., “They should be preparing their case based on raw data to genuinely prove Jasper’s 
innocence, not asking a consultant just so that they win their case”).  Twenty-six of the 53 
participants (49.1%) who commented that the use of trial consultant was dishonest or 
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improper were in the condition where the prosecution only used a trial consultant, 12 
(22.6%) were in the condition where both the prosecution and defense used a trial 
consultant, and 15 (28.3%) were in the condition where only the defense used a trial 
consultant.  The impact of assigned condition on the comments made will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
The fourth open-ended question corresponds to the second subscale, factual 
decision making, of the Relational Theory measure.  This subscale was assessed by two 
items (Tyler, 1989), one of which asked participants to rate whether the jury was given 
all of the information needed to render a verdict.  Participants were then asked to explain 
briefly what information they thought was missing if they thought the jury was not given 
all of the information needed to render a verdict.   The purpose of this question was to 
provide supplemental information regarding the SOE manipulation check.  Comments 
such as, “The victim couldn’t identify the attacked (sic).  She picked up the man out of 
the line but she couldn’t even remember the man’s eye color” and “Why was Jasper 
repeatedly the only blue-eyed white man?  Perhaps if there were other white, blue eyed 
men in the line up, they would have a different suspect” were made by participants in the 
Advantage Defense condition and supported the success of the SOE manipulation.  
Participants in the Advantage Prosecution condition did not have these concerns, since 
their case summary differed with regard to these facts.  In another example, some 
participants in the Advantage Prosecution and Ambiguous Evidence conditions expressed 
frustration over the failure to obtain semen samples from the husband and/or son of the 
victim.  Comments such as, “The jury needed more evidence from the prosecution side 
(i.e., semen samples from family members)” also supported the success of the SOE 
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manipulation.  Participants in the Advantage Defense condition did not have these 
concerns, since their case summary reported that semen samples were obtained from the 
husband and son. 
The fifth open-ended question corresponds to the third subscale, lack of bias, of 
the Relational Theory measure.  This subscale was assessed by three items, one of which 
asked participants if they thought that the legal authorities involved favored one party 
over another.  Participants were then asked to briefly explain why they thought the legal 
authorities involved favored one party over another.  Of greatest interest was whether or 
not participants would mention the use of trial consultants when not directly prompted to 
respond to the fairness of their use during the trial.  One hundred eighty-six of the 255 
participants did not respond (73.0%).  Of the 69 participants who provided more 
information, 9 (13.0%) mentioned the use of trial consultants (e.g., “the use of a mock 
trial to find a favorable jury”).  Four participants who responded affirmatively and 
mentioned the use of a trial consultant were in the condition where the prosecution only 
used a trial consultant and two were in each of the other conditions.  The most universal 
response (25 out of 69, or 36.2%) made reference to the opinion that the victim is often 
favored over the accused in criminal cases (e.g.,“I think that the defendant is always seen 
as the non-favored one” and “society thinks women are angels in such situations.”  This 
response occurred across all conditions, regardless of the evidence strength manipulation.   
Possible reasons for this will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 The sixth and final open-ended question asked participants to list all pieces of 
evidence or other aspects of the trial that influenced their verdict determination.  
Responses to this question provided a greater depth of opinion than what could be gained 
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from a Likert scale rating of guilt or innocence, particularly with regard to what specific 
factors appeared to be the most influential in the decision.  Also of interest was whether 
participants would mention the use of a trial consultant as a factor in their verdict 
determination.  The responses that appeared repeatedly across all nine conditions could 
be grouped into the following seven categories (listed in descending order of frequency): 
semen analysis, alibi, victim ID of Jasper Brennan, ID of Jasper Brennan by other 
victims, witnesses at library, use of car, and a general “lack of evidence.” 
Evidence related to semen analysis was mentioned 150 times across all nine 
conditions (e.g., “the semen didn’t match 100%”), Jasper Brennan’s alibi was mentioned 
92 times across all nine conditions (e.g., “the fact that two witnesses saw him studying 
when crime occurred”), evidence related to the rape victim’s identification of Jasper 
Brennan was mentioned 92 times (e.g., “the victim was not sure it was really him”),   
evidence related to the identification of Jasper Brennan by the other two rape victims 
mentioned in the case study appeared 81 times (e.g., “he was identified by 2 other 
women”), the witnesses at the library were mentioned 59 times (e.g., “ he had 2 witnesses 
stating his presence at the library”), evidence related to the role that the car played in the 
crime was mentioned 37 times across all nine conditions (e.g., “he did not have a car”), 
and lack of evidence was only mentioned 29 times across all nine conditions as an aspect 
of the trial that influenced verdict determination (e.g., “There’s no actual proof really”).   
 Only two participants in the entire sample mentioned the use of a trial consultant 
as a factor in their verdict determination.  One commented that, “…the prosecutors 
picked the jury whose to say if they also got the witness also to be on their side,” and the 
other simply mentioned “the trial consultant.” Both of these participants were in the 
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condition where only the prosecution used a trial consultant and where the evidence 
strength favored the prosecution.  Both verdicts were not guilty.  Possible reasons for the 
lack of importance placed on the use of trial consultants when making verdict 
determinations will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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 CHAPTER 8 
Discussion 
This chapter discusses the results obtained in the empirical study.  The purpose of 
this dissertation was to fill some of the gaps in the trial consultant literature by using the 
principles of procedural justice to explore what, if any, impact the use of a trial consultant 
can have on the outcome of a criminal jury trial, as well as the possibility that perceptions 
of fairness mediate the relationship between the balance of trial consultants and juror 
verdicts in cases where the evidence is ambiguous.  The findings regarding the 
hypothesized relationships and questions of interest are discussed first, followed by 
implications for the fields of psychology and trial consulting.  The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the limitations of the current study, suggestions for future research, and 
concluding remarks regarding the present study.   
Balance of Trial Consultants 
Balance of trial consultants and neutrality.  Drawing on the group-value model 
(Lind & Tyler, 1988), the first hypothesis focused on whether a trial was perceived as 
being more neutral if there was a balance of trial consultants during a trial.  If both the 
prosecution and defense used the services of a trial consultant, it was hypothesized that 
there would be no violation of Tyler’s (1989) neutrality principle (notion of a level 
playing field) and judgments of perceived fairness were expected to be higher than if only 
one side used a trial consultant.  Results indicated that there were no significant 
differences in neutrality scores between participants who were told that only the plaintiff 
or only the defense utilized a trial consultant and those participants told that both sides 
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used a trial consultant.  While Hypothesis 1 was not supported, further analyses did 
reveal some interesting trends. 
Because the results did approach significance (p = .06), the results were examined 
more closely.  While post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD found no significant 
differences between the three conditions, simple planned contrasts indicated a significant 
difference between the neutrality score of participants when the prosecution alone used a 
trial consultant when compared to the neutrality scores of participants in the other two 
collapsed conditions.  No significant difference was found between the neutrality score of 
participants when the defense alone used a trial consultant when compared to the 
neutrality scores of participants in the other two collapsed conditions.  Thus, there is 
some evidence to indicate that it was perceived as more fair for the defense alone to use a 
trial consultant than for the prosecution alone to use a trial consultant.  Perceptions of 
neutrality when both sides used a trial consultant were the same as when only the defense 
used a trial consultant.   
Balance of trial consultants and global fairness.  The second hypothesis 
examined whether a trial was perceived as being higher in global fairness if there was a 
balance of trial consultants during a trial.  In addition to neutrality, the group-value model 
(Lind & Tyler, 1988) identified two other relational concerns that dominate judgments of 
procedural fairness:  the trustworthiness of the authorities enacting the procedures (trust), 
and information about the individual’s standing in the group (status recognition).  While 
numerous studies have found neutrality to be the major criterion used to assess 
procedural justice (e.g., Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Fry & Leventhal, 1979; Fry & 
Chaney, 1981; Greenberg, 1986; Tyler, 1989), other studies have shown that these three 
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relational concerns together affect procedural justice judgments (Tyler, 1994; Lind et al., 
1997).  The global fairness measure is comprised of all three of the group-value model’s 
relational concerns (Lind & Tyler, 1988).   
Hypothesis 2 was partially supported.  Results indicated that there were 
significant differences in perceptions of global fairness when the prosecution, the 
defense, or both used a trial consultant, although the effect size was small.  More 
specifically, Tukey post hoc comparisons and simple planned contrasts indicated that 
perceptions of global fairness were higher when both the prosecution and defense used a 
trial consultant than when only the prosecution used a trial consultant, but that 
perceptions of global fairness were not significantly higher when both sides used a trial 
consultant if it was the defense alone using a trial consultant.  Results indicate that the 
use of a trial consultant significantly impacted perceptions of global fairness only when 
the prosecution alone used a trial consultant.   
“Benefit of the doubt” effect.  Tukey post hoc comparisons found that the mean 
neutrality and global fairness scores when the defense alone used a trial consultant were 
nearly identical to the mean neutrality scores when both sides used a trial consultant, and 
simple planned contrasts indicated a significant difference between the neutrality and 
global fairness scores of participants when the prosecution alone used a trial consultant 
when compared to the global fairness scores of participants in the other two collapsed 
conditions.  This pattern of results could be a reflection of a “benefit of the doubt” effect, 
which refers to the tendency of jurors to presuppose that the defendant is innocent until 
proven guilty.  The assumption of innocence is rooted in our legal system, which imposed 
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a reasonable doubt standard in 1970 that declared it essential to due process and fair 
treatment.   
The reasonable doubt standard “is bottomed on the fundamental value 
determination that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go 
free” (Armour, 2008).  As such, the Due Process Clause “protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged” (Armour, 2008).  According to legal 
scholars, mandated use of this standard in all criminal proceedings is critical to a free 
society because it maintains the confidence of community members in the court’s ability 
to sufficiently protect the innocent (Armour, 2008).  Beyond the legal import that the 
presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard of proof impose, the 
tendency of jurors to give the defendant the benefit of the doubt is also rooted in human 
nature.  As one legal commentator stated, “Jurors are not legal experts…they are there as 
the accused person’s peers, with comparable life experience, insight and knowledge of 
human relationships…It is the duty of the jurors, above all else, to put themselves in the 
shoes of the defendant” (Power, 2008).   The presumption of innocence is a natural 
human tendency when jurors place themselves in the shoes of the defendant and think 
about how they would think, behave, or react in similar circumstances (Power, 2008).  
 It is possible that these legal and moral leanings are responsible for the results of 
Hypotheses 1 and 2.  When the playing field was equal and both sides utilized the 
services of a trial consultant, the mean neutrality and global fairness scores were nearly 
identical to the mean neutrality and global fairness scores of participants when the 
defense alone used a trial consultant.  In other words, perceptions of neutrality and global 
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fairness were not affected when extra assistance was provided to the defense by a trial 
consultant.  Perhaps participants still thought the trial was fair because they were giving 
the benefit of the doubt to the defendant.  When the extra assistance was provided to the 
prosecution, however, perceptions of neutrality and global fairness lowered significantly.  
If participants were giving the benefit of the doubt to the defendant, it would follow that 
they would think it was okay for the defense to benefit from a perceived advantage but 
that it would be perceived as less fair when the prosecution was the sole beneficiary of a 
perceived advantage.   
Strength of Evidence 
The third hypothesis predicted that jurors would be most likely to find the 
defendant guilty when the evidence was in favor of the prosecution and least likely to 
find the defendant guilty when the evidence favored the defense.  When SOE was 
ambiguous, the likelihood of conviction would fall somewhere in between.  This 
prediction of a main effect for SOE was based on experiments conducted in both the 
laboratory and the field that have shown a strong positive association between SOE and 
jury verdicts of guilt (Devine et al., 2001).   
Hypothesis 3 was supported for both dichotomous and continuous verdict 
measures.  A logistic regression analysis using the dichotomous verdict measure 
indicated a significant relationship between SOE and likelihood of conviction.  
Furthermore, as predicted, the number of participants whose verdict determination was 
“guilty” was highest when the evidence favored the prosecution, moderate when the 
evidence was ambiguous, and lowest when the evidence favored the defense.  Analysis of 
variance using the continuous verdict measure found a significant relationship and large 
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effect size between the verdict chosen and the strength of evidence.  The strong positive 
association between SOE and juror verdicts of guilt found in numerous other studies 
(Devine et al., 2001) received further support from the current research.   
The dichotomous verdict results of Hypothesis 3 also provide some information 
that further supports the “benefit of the doubt” theory.  Results from the analyses indicate 
that when the evidence was clearly presented to participants as either favoring one side or 
another, participants tended to provide a verdict as expected.  What was not expected, 
however, was the large majority of participants in the ambiguous condition who chose 
“not guilty” when forced into making a decision by the dichotomous verdict option.  
Twenty-two percent of the participants whose case was ambiguous chose guilty, while 
78% of participants whose case was ambiguous chose not guilty.  Thus, the expected 
even split between guilty and non-guilty verdicts was not found for participants in the 
ambiguous evidence condition who were forced into a dichotomous verdict decision.  
Rather, many more participants in the ambiguous condition chose a non-guilty verdict, 
indicating that the defense appears to receive the benefit of the doubt when participants 
are forced to choose guilty or not guilty.  This is an interesting finding, particularly in 
light of the fact that if participants had only been required to make a continuous verdict 
determination, this effect would have gone undetected. 
The results of the first three hypotheses are similar to those reported by Stolle et 
al. (1996) in their study.  These researchers found a significant interaction such that when 
the outcome favored the defendant, the use of a trial consultant was thought to be equally 
fair whether or not the defendant had a trial consultant.  When the outcome favored the 
prosecution/plaintiff, however, the use of a trial consultant was thought to be more fair 
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when the defendant had a trial consultant than when he did not.  Taken together, this 
pattern of results can be interpreted as a reflection of the philosophy of the American jury 
system and its emphasis on the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt 
standard.  Just as the participants in this study received a Juror Instruction form prior to 
coming to any conclusions regarding the facts of the case, jurors in the American legal 
system are provided with instructions prior to deliberation that seek to educate them on 
the fundamental principles of our law that apply in all criminal trials- the presumption of 
innocence, the burden of proof, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The pattern of results seen in the first three hypotheses could be interpreted as supporting 
the successful application of these standards in a trial situation.  
Interaction Between Balance of Trial Consultants and SOE 
 The fourth hypothesis predicted that the likelihood of conviction would be 
impacted by an interaction between SOE and the balance of trial consultants.  More 
specifically, it was expected that when the evidence was ambiguous, the likelihood of 
conviction would be highest when the defense used a trial consultant, moderate when 
both sides used a trial consultant, and lowest when the prosecution used a trial consultant.  
Research has shown that when the evidence strongly favored either the defense or the 
prosecution, the bias tendencies of jurors decreased (e.g., Baumeister & Darley, 1982; 
Kaplan & Miller, 1978) and jurors reached a verdict based largely on the strength of the 
evidence presented during trial.  When the evidence was not clear, however, it was 
predicted that jurors would be more likely swayed by biasing factors, such as the 
presence or absence of a trial consultant.   
                                                                                                 Trial Consultants 
 
112 
Analyses using both the dichotomous and continuous verdict measures were 
conducted.  Hypothesis 4 was not supported.  While analyses showed a significant 
difference for the main effect of SOE when comparing SOE favors prosecution to the 
other two conditions, no significant differences were found for the main effect of use of a 
trial consultant or for the interaction of use of a trial consultant and SOE.  As expected, 
when SOE strongly favored the defense, the likelihood of conviction was low and when 
SOE strongly favored the prosecution, the likelihood of conviction was high.  However, 
contrary to predictions, the balance of trial consults did not impact the likelihood of 
conviction in the present study.  It had been predicted that when the evidence was 
ambiguous, the likelihood of conviction would be the highest when the defendant alone 
used a trial consultant.  In those conditions, the relational model (Tyler, 1989) would 
predict that jurors would perceive the defense as having an unfair advantage and would 
compensate for this by being more likely to find in favor of the prosecution. The results 
of the present study indicate that participants perceived no such disadvantage. 
Based on the clear “benefit of the doubt” effect found in the results of the first 
three hypotheses, however, it is possible that the prediction made was incorrect.  It was 
originally expected that when the evidence was ambiguous, the likelihood of conviction 
would be highest when the defense used a trial consultant, moderate when both sides 
used a trial consultant, and lowest when the prosecution used a trial consultant.  Using the 
“benefit of the doubt” theory as a basis for prediction, however, it would be expected that 
when the evidence was ambiguous, the likelihood of conviction when the defense used a 
trial consultant would be fairly similar to the likelihood of conviction when both sides 
used a trial consultant.  Based on the pattern of findings seen thus far, no unfair 
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advantage would be perceived when the defense alone used a trial consultant.  When the 
prosecution alone used a trial consultant, however, the “benefit of the doubt” pattern 
would predict that an unfair advantage would be perceived, causing participants to be less 
likely to convict the defendant than they would under normal circumstances.  Thus, using 
the “benefit of the doubt” theory as a basis for prediction, it would be expected that when 
the evidence was ambiguous the likelihood of conviction would be lower when the 
prosecution alone used a trial consultant than when the defense alone used a trial 
consultant or both sides used a trial consultant.  
In order to test this new prediction as guided by the “benefit of the doubt” 
premise, a post hoc analysis was performed using the ambiguous condition only (n = 87) 
after collapsing across the conditions where the defense only and both sides used a trial 
consultant and comparing it to the condition where the prosecution only used a trial 
consultant.   No significant results were found.  Thus, Hypothesis 4 continued to find no 
support even when restricted to the ambiguous condition subsample and altered to take 
into account the “benefit of the doubt” effect.    
The lack of a significant interaction in Hypothesis 4 indicates that the balance of 
trial consultants did not impact verdict determination in the present study.  If only one 
party in the trial used the services of a trial consultant, it did not have a statistically 
significant impact on participants’ likelihood to convict or acquit the defendant.  Results 
show that evidence strength was the strongest predictor of likelihood of conviction.  One 
of the major purposes of this study was to explore for the first time whether the balance 
of trial consultants can affect a juror’s perceptions of procedural justice and impact his or 
her verdict, particularly in cases where the evidence is ambiguous.  Although research 
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has shown that the bias tendencies of jurors decrease when confronted with clear proof of 
guilt or innocence and increase when the evidence is more ambiguous (e.g., Baumeister 
& Darley, 1982; Kaplan & Miller, 1978), the results of this study do not indicate that 
participants viewed the presence or absence of a trial consultant in the ambiguous 
condition as an influential factor when making verdict decisions.  In the current study, 
use of a trial consultant did not serve as a biasing factor.   
Mediation: Relationship Between Balance of Trial Consultants and Verdict 
  Another purpose of this study was to examine why the balance of trial 
consultants, particularly in cases where the use of a trial consultant between parties was 
uneven, would increase or decrease the likelihood that a juror would convict a defendant.  
It was hypothesized that perceptions of neutrality and/or global fairness would mediate 
the relationship between the balance of trial consultants and juror verdicts when the 
evidence was ambiguous.  The present study found that the balance of trial consultants 
had no impact on the likelihood of conviction across any SOE conditions (Hypothesis 4).   
As discussed above, results show that evidence strength was the strongest predictor of 
likelihood of conviction.  There was no statistically significant impact on participants’ 
likelihood to convict or acquit the defendant as a function of one or both sides using the 
services of a trial consultant.   
The failure of the trial consultant manipulation to produce a biasing effect, 
particularly in the ambiguous condition, rendered the question of a mediating variable 
moot.  Since the balance of trial consultants did not increase or decrease the likelihood 
that a juror would convict a defendant, there was no relationship for neutrality and/or 
global fairness to mediate.   Mediation analyses were initiated, but correlations showed 
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that the use of a trial consultant was unrelated to the likelihood of conviction in the 
ambiguous condition.  Correlations also showed that the likelihood of conviction was 
unrelated to neutrality and global fairness scores in the ambiguous condition.  Perhaps if 
the evidence did not strongly favor either the defense or prosecution, it was difficult for a 
relationship to exist between perceptions of neutrality and/or fairness and the likelihood 
of conviction.  Because a precondition for finding significant mediation is that all three 
correlations among the three variables must be statistically significant (Baron & Kenny, 
1986), further analyses were not conducted.   
Open Ended Questions 
 Throughout the questionnaire, open-ended questions were used to supplement 
Likert-type responses.  While the responses to these questions were not used for the 
purposes of hypothesis testing, a closer examination of some of the informal findings 
provided some interesting information that would have been impossible to detect from a 
rated response.  In most cases, the pattern of responses reflected the “benefit of the 
doubt” effect found throughout hypotheses testing.   
The first open-ended question asked participants to explain why they thought the 
attorneys in the case had done something that was dishonest or improper.  More than 
three-quarters of the participants who provided more information mentioned the use of 
trial consultants, although participants had not been prompted to respond to the fairness 
of their use during the trial.  More specifically, less than one-fifth of the participants who 
described the use of a trial consultant as being dishonest or improper were from the 
condition where only the defense used a trial consultant.  This pattern of responses 
supports the “benefit of the doubt” theory discussed earlier in this section.  It is possible 
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that the attorneys in the case were less likely to be perceived as acting dishonestly or 
improperly when the defense alone used a trial consultant because the participants were 
already giving the benefit of the doubt to the defendant.  More than twice as many 
participants from the condition where only the prosecution used a trial consultant as well 
as more than twice as many participants from the condition where both sides used a trial 
consultant described the use of a trial consultant as being dishonest or improper.   
 The third open-ended question asked participants to explain why they thought the 
use of a trial consultant was dishonest or improper.  Four major categories emerged: 
concern over the use of a paid survey, concern over the use of the mock trial, concern 
over the selection of a “favorable jury,” and a general sense that the use of a trial 
consultant was not moral/ethical.  Based on the literature related to the field of trial 
consulting that was discussed earlier, these concerns were all logical.  The first three 
comprise the core of the job performed by a trial consultant.  The fourth is a reflection of 
one of the major issues in the trial consulting industry.  Responses also provided 
additional support for the “benefit of the doubt” theory.  Approximately half of the 
participants who commented that the use of a trial consultant was dishonest or improper 
were in the condition where the prosecution only used a trial consultant.  Once again, it 
appears that it was considered less fair for the prosecution to have a perceived advantage, 
so more participants in that condition viewed the use of a trial consultant as improper.  
When the defense had the perceived advantage, fewer participants viewed this as 
improper because the defense was arguably given the benefit of the doubt.    
 The fourth open-ended question asked participants to explain what information 
they thought was missing if they thought the jury was not given all of the information 
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needed to render a verdict.   This question served two purposes: it provided supplemental 
information regarding the SOE manipulation check, and it provided important 
information that could be used to strengthen or weaken the SOE manipulation in future 
studies.  As discussed in Chapter 7, participant responses supported the success of the 
SOE manipulation.  The second purpose of this question was to help strengthen the SOE 
manipulation in future studies.  While some of the comments made by participants were 
the result of a deliberate manipulation by the researcher, other responses were not and 
could therefore be used to further strengthen or weaken the cases in future studies.  
Participant responses that did not directly relate to an intended manipulation tended to 
cluster into four categories:  The lack of serology evidence from the other two rape 
victims discussed in the case, an expressed wish for a phone bill or phone records to 
verify Jasper’s alibi, lack of gun evidence, and lack of DNA evidence.  Although DNA 
evidence was not available at the time the crime in question was committed, it is 
understandable that some participants would not be aware of this fact and would question 
its absence in the case.  Future studies may want to consider including some or all of 
these factors when manipulating evidence among conditions. 
The fifth open-ended question asked participants to explain why they thought the 
legal authorities involved favored one party over another.  Of greatest interest was 
whether or not participants would mention the use of trial consultants when not directly 
prompted to respond to the fairness of their use during the trial.  Over one-third of the 
respondents made reference to the opinion that the victim is often favored over the 
accused in criminal cases.  This response occurred across all conditions, regardless of the 
evidence strength manipulation.  Once again, these responses can be viewed as support 
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for the “benefit of the doubt” theory; when the participants sensed inequity, they were 
quick to blame it on a tendency to favor the victim (thus showing support for the 
defense).  Very few respondents mentioned the use of trial consultants (e.g., use of a 
mock trial, survey, etc.) as a factor in their belief that the legal authorities involved 
favored one party over another.  This failure to single out the use of trial consultants as a 
source of bias or unfairness during the trial should be viewed as a positive sign from the 
perspective of those in the trial consulting industry.  Their presence during a trial did not 
appear to have a strong effect on perceptions of fairness in the present study. 
Finally, the sixth open-ended question asked participants to list all pieces of 
evidence or other aspects of the trial that influenced their verdict determination.  The 
most frequently mentioned variables were semen analysis, the alibi of the accused, the 
rape victim’s identification of the accused, and evidence related to the identification of 
the accused by two other rape victims.  Each of these was mentioned more than 80 times.  
In contrast, only two participants in the entire sample mentioned the use of a trial 
consultant as a factor in their verdict determination.  The failure to single out the use of 
trial consultants as a contributing factor in verdict determination supports the lack of 
significant findings for Hypothesis 4, which found that the balance of trial consultants did 
not impact verdict determination across any SOE conditions in the present study.  Results 
showed that evidence strength was the strongest predictor of likelihood of conviction, and 
responses to the open-ended question also show that the most frequently cited reasons for 
verdict determination were evidence based.      
In general, responses to the open-ended questions tended to provide further 
support for the “benefit of the doubt” theory.   When participants were asked to explain 
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why they thought the legal authorities involved favored one party over another, more than 
one third of the responses made reference to the belief that the victim is often favored 
over the accused in criminal cases.  Furthermore, half of the participants who commented 
that the use of trial consultant was dishonest or improper were in the condition where the 
prosecution only used a trial consultant.  The remaining half was split almost evenly 
between the condition where both the prosecution and defense used a trial consultant and 
the condition where only the defense used a trial consultant.  Perhaps when the defense 
had the perceived advantage rather than the prosecution, fewer participants viewed this as 
improper because the defense was being given the benefit of the doubt.  The results from 
the present study are perhaps an indication of just how deeply rooted the belief in the 
presumption of innocence has become for jurors in our legal system.   
Contributions to the Literature 
This dissertation makes several contributions to both the procedural justice and 
trial consulting literatures.  Despite the prevalence of trial consultants in the American 
courtroom, the role that perceptions of procedural justice play in relation to the use of 
consultants is an area of critical importance that has gone largely unexplored.  
Implications for the Field of Psychology.  The present study offers a unique 
contribution to the procedural justice literature.  Because variables such as fairness are 
more difficult to operationalize, quantify, or measure (Fondacaro, 1995), empirical 
academic literature related to scientific trial consulting has tended to focus more on the 
objective notion of efficacy (Stolle et al., 1996).  The perceived fairness of trial 
consulting is of vital importance, however.  As researchers have pointed out, the 
perception that procedures are unfair or unethical can undermine the legitimacy of our 
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entire legal system (MacCoun et al., 1992).  Although procedural justice has been 
confirmed in a wide variety of settings including citizens’ dealings with the police (e.g., 
Tyler & Folger, 1980), political allocations (e.g., Tyler et al., 1985), interpersonal 
contexts (e.g., Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986), and within organizations (e.g., Greenberg, 
1987; Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987), there has been very limited application of its 
principles to the field of trial consulting.    
This dissertation expands our knowledge of procedural justice by providing one 
of the only empirical studies to use Tyler and Lind’s (1992) relational model of authority 
to investigate the impact that trial consulting procedures have on the perceived fairness of 
courtroom proceedings and the outcomes of these proceedings.  Tyler (1989) built upon 
Leventhal’s (1976) framework when he identified three relational concerns that dominate 
judgments of procedural fairness:  the trustworthiness of the authorities enacting the 
procedures (trust), the neutrality of those authorities (neutrality), and information about 
the individual’s standing in the group (status recognition).  As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, results indicated that the balance of trial consultants did affect perceptions of 
global fairness (a combination of all three relational concerns), and, to a lesser extent, 
perceptions of neutrality when the prosecution alone used the services of a trial 
consultant.  The partial support for the main effect of trial consultants is the first time 
such an effect has been found.   
In the present study, results were stronger when perceptions of global fairness 
were examined than when perceptions of neutrality were examined.  One possible 
explanation for this difference is that all three dimensions of Tyler’s (1989) relational 
model are needed to fully capture perceptions of fairness.  It is also possible that the 
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different results found when examining neutrality and global fairness scores is a result of 
participants’ failure to recognize the role played by trial consultants.  In order to 
investigate this possibility, all analyses were repeated using only the sample for which the 
trial consultant manipulation was successful (n = 190).  The results did not differ 
significantly from the results obtained when using the full sample (N = 255).   
The present study found marginal support for the critical importance of neutrality 
as it relates to the use of trial consultants in a courtroom setting.  Leventhal’s consistency 
dimension (incorporated into Tyler’s concept of neutrality) has been found in a number 
of studies (e.g., Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Fry & Leventhal, 1979; Fry & Chaney, 
1981; Greenberg, 1986) to be the major criterion used to assess procedural justice, and 
Tyler’s (1989) study showed that when the issue of concern was outcome fairness, 
neutrality became the most important variable.  In the present study, the use of a trial 
consultant by the prosecution alone impacted both neutrality and global fairness scores.  
This indicates that the dimension of neutrality is capable of affecting participants’ 
perceptions of fairness when isolated from trust and status recognition, although the 
effect was stronger when global fairness scores were used.   
In addition to applying the relational model of authority to investigate the 
perceived fairness of trial consulting procedures in a courtroom setting, the present study 
also examined the impact that perceptions of fairness had on the outcomes of these 
proceedings.  Results indicated that while the use of a trial consultant can affect 
perceptions of neutrality and global fairness, no support was found for the position that 
the use of trial consultants impacts the outcomes of these proceedings.  Although 
procedural justice in the present study was affected when the prosecution alone used a 
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trial consultant, results did not show that verdict determination was affected.  The strong 
positive association between SOE and juror verdicts of guilt found in numerous other 
studies (Devine et al., 2001) received further support from the current research. 
Furthermore, in the course of investigating whether the balance of trial consultants 
influenced juror verdicts when SOE was ambiguous, this study was unique in its 
investigation of whether perceptions of fairness mediated this relationship.  Because the 
relationship between trial consultant balance and juror verdicts was untested prior to this 
study, the lack of significant findings was informative.   
Implications for the Field of Trial Consulting.  One of the main purposes of this 
dissertation was to examine whether the balance of trial consultants during a trial could 
affect a juror’s perceptions of fairness.  Stolle et al. (1996) and Griffith et al. (2007) 
conducted the only other known studies that have attempted to link the balance of trial 
consultants to measures of procedural justice, and virtually nothing is known with regard 
to whether trial consultants themselves can serve as a source of bias.  Stolle et al. (1996) 
found a lack of significant multivariate effects for the presence of trial consultants, which 
led them to suggest that “consultant presence may not affect judgments of procedural 
justice at all” (p. 168).  The results of the current study indicate that the use of a trial 
consultant can impact perceptions of fairness under certain conditions.  When the 
prosecution alone used a trial consultant, it was perceived as less fair than when the 
defense alone used a trial consultant or when both sides used a trial consultant.  Attorneys 
might want to consider the negative impact on a juror’s perceptions of fairness when 
using a trial consultant if the defense is not also using the services of a trial consultant.  
This finding provides support to those who advocate leveling the playing field during 
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jury trials.  This can be accomplished by using public funds to enable defendants to hire 
trial consultants (National Jury Project, 1999).  State funding of trial consultants is also a 
possibility and should be considered (Barber, 1994; Stolle et al., 1996), as is encouraging 
more pro bono assistance (Stewart, 2002).   Lieberman and Sales (2007) suggest that, “In 
addition to the financial needs of a defendant, the seriousness of charges brought against 
a defendant provides a criterion that could be used for determining whether courts should 
grant requests for court-appointed scientific jury selection consultants” (p. 197).  This is 
an interesting approach worthy of future attention.  
While the importance of a balance of trial consultants between parties had been 
expected, no support was found for the position that perceptions of fairness were affected 
when extra assistance was provided to the defense by a trial consultant.  In the current 
study, the benefit of the doubt appeared to go to the defendant such that even when the 
defense received a perceived advantage, participants still thought that the trial was fair.  
The results of the present study suggest that while juror knowledge of the use of a trial 
consultant for the defense may not have any bearing on the perceived fairness of a trial, 
juror knowledge of the use of a trial consultant by the prosecution alone may affect the 
perceived fairness of a trial.  At the very least, the evidence suggests that in situations 
where only the prosecution utilizes a trial consultant, trial consultants should follow the 
recommendation made by some researchers (e.g., Griffith et al., 2007) and remain outside 
the jury’s awareness.  While trial consultants can assist lawyers in such matters as case 
analysis, voire dire questions and presentation, surveys, witness preparation, and mock 
trials without stepping foot into a courtroom, a major disadvantage of this approach is 
that the consultant cannot offer his/her expertise as far as evaluating potential jurors or 
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comparing in-court perceptions against the pre-trial research that has been compiled 
(Bennett & Hirschhorn, 1993).   Therefore, in situations where there is a balance between 
trial consultants, it may still be best for the trial consultant to be present in the courtroom. 
 Another major purpose of the present study was to investigate whether 
perceptions of fairness were partially responsible for increasing (or decreasing) the 
likelihood that a juror would convict a defendant when SOE was ambiguous and the 
balance of trial consultants between parties was uneven.  Some researchers have warned 
that the presence of trial consultants can foster the negative societal perception that the 
jury system is being undermined or rigged, or that juries can be manipulated and their 
actions predicted (e.g., Barber, 1994).   As Posey and Wrightsman (2005) point out, the 
first book that systematically examined the field of trial consulting is entitled “Stack and 
Sway” (Kressel & Kressel, 2002), a title that conjures up images of influence and 
manipulation.  Other researchers in the field have insisted that we should not fear that 
jurors will resent lawyers who have jury and trial consultants in the courtroom.  Jurors 
interviewed post-trial, for example, have consistently said that they felt the need to be 
even more fair in looking at and verbalizing their biases and prejudices when a trial 
consultant was present (Bennett and Hirschhorn, 1993).  The present study failed to find  
evidence supporting the position that the use of a trial consultant served as a biasing 
factor by impacting the verdict determination of jurors.  Although the use of a trial 
consultant was found to affect perceptions of neutrality and global fairness under certain 
conditions, these perceptions of fairness did not appear to translate into a bias when 
determining verdicts.  Results indicated that the use of a trial consultant was unrelated to 
the likelihood of conviction in the ambiguous condition.  Results did find a significant 
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and strong association between the verdict chosen and the strength of evidence, however, 
which supports the outcome found in numerous other studies (Devine et al., 2001). 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
While this study made some unique and potentially important contributions to the 
trial consulting and procedural justice literatures, the conclusions may be limited by 
several factors.  One potential limitation of this study is the reliability and validity of the 
scores on the Relational Theory measure.  Due to the lack of established neutrality, trust, 
and status recognition scales, the questionnaire that was used to measure neutrality and 
global fairness was created by combining items adapted from questionnaires used by 
other researchers (e.g., Stolle et al., 1996; Tyler, 1989).  Future research should replicate 
this study with the new measure to provide further proof of the reliability and validity of 
the scores on the items.   
In the present study, a potential limitation was the low reliability observed for the 
impropriety of behavior subscale of the neutrality scale.  The removal of the fourth item 
increased the ! reliability for the subscale to .67 (from .60), but this level is still below 
the criterion of .70 that had been set for the minimally acceptable level of internal 
consistency (Nunnally, 1978).  In addition, removing this fourth item potentially reduced 
the construct validity of the measure.  Another potential limitation was that the factual 
decision making subscale and the trust scale both contained only two items.  While this is 
not unusual with scales in the literature (e.g., Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980; Tyler, 
1989), it does raise concerns about subscale and scale reliability (Nunnally, 1978).  
Future research should consider lengthening this subscale and scale.  The reliability of the 
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subscales and scales should be further developed before using them to examine 
perceptions of neutrality and global fairness in future research. 
In addition, although the lack of significant correlations among variables in this 
study prevented mediation analyses, it should be pointed out that some researchers (e.g., 
James, Mulaik, & Brett, 1982) caution that causal inferences are weakened when using 
concurrent data with mediators.  Because mediation implies that the independent variable 
affects the mediator and then the mediator affects the dependent variable, mediation 
should not technically be performed on concurrent data.  It is impossible to show that the 
independent variable caused a change in the mediator rather than vice versa when the 
data is collected at one time of measurement.  Future studies examining the potential 
mediating role of procedural justice should consider collecting longitudinal data to more 
accurately determine true mediation. 
This study is also potentially limited by the fact that the trial consultant 
manipulation did not work for a number of participants.  While the success of the trial 
consultant manipulation was statistically significant, 65 participants (25%) did not 
accurately identify the use of a trial consultant in the case summary.  It is not clear why 
this was the case.  Stolle et al. (1996) did not report any problems when using the same 
trial consultant manipulation in their study.  Thus, it may be useful for future research to 
focus on strengthening the trial consultant manipulation.  Perhaps mentioning once again 
the use of a trial consultant for one or both sides at the end of the case summary or 
prompting participants to refer back to the case summary if they are unsure of an answer 
would help to increase reporting accuracy in the future.  
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 Another potential limitation is the concern that the external validity of the results 
may be lowered as a result of using a student sample (as opposed to a sample comprised 
of real jurors) and/or a written case summary (as opposed to a more realistic simulation).  
Most of the studies conducted in the legal field use simulations due to the complications 
(both legally and logistically) when conducting jury research on actual cases.  According 
to Bornstein (1999), this practice has raised a number of ecological validity concerns with 
regard to such issues as the mock juror sample (e.g., undergraduates vs. adults in the 
community), the research setting (e.g., laboratory vs. courtroom), the trial medium (e.g., 
written summaries vs. realistic simulations), and the consequences associated with the 
task (e.g., making a hypothetical vs. a real decision).   
In order to address some of these concerns, Bornstein (1999) compared different 
samples of mock jurors as well as research manipulating the medium of trial presentation.  
After reviewing 26 studies that have looked at the effect of student status on mock jurors’ 
judgments, only five studies were found to have a main effect of sample on participants’ 
verdicts.   Similarly, Bornstein found few differences when he looked at studies that 
allowed for indirect comparison between students and nonstudents by performing 
multiple experiments in which a particular finding is replicated using a different sample.  
Trial medium was also examined (e.g., live trial vs. brief written summaries) and not 
found to have an effect in the majority of cases, with only 3 of 11 studies exerting a main 
effect on mock jurors’ verdicts.  Bornstein (1999) concluded that few differences have 
been found with regard to either who the mock jurors are or how the mock trial is 
presented.  
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Further support is provided by Zickafoose and Bornstein (1999), who conducted a 
couple of experiments in order to determine the effects of comparative negligence on 
damage awards.  In addition to discovering that damage awards were doubly discounted 
for partially negligent plaintiffs, they also found that the responses of college students did 
not differ from the responses of those called for jury duty.  Thus, although the choice of 
sample (students) and/or medium (presenting the summary trial in written form) may 
have potentially limited the external validity of the present study, there is research to 
suggest that this may not have been the case.   
This dissertation exposes many needed directions for future research within the 
field of trial consulting.  As was mentioned earlier, there is a lack of empirical research in 
general regarding the usefulness of trial consultants.  In addition, of the relatively small 
number of studies that have been conducted to examine the efficacy of trial consultants, 
the sole focus has been upon jury selection at the expense of investigating other salient 
aspects of a trial consultant’s job (e.g., assisting with voire dire, opening arguments, 
witness testimony for each side, closing arguments, mock trials, judge’s instructions, or 
jury deliberations).   A survey conducted by Posey and Wrightsman (1995) found that 
only 12% of a trial consultant’s time was spent on jury selection.  Future research should 
begin to explore the usefulness of all aspects of a trial consultant’s job.  Ideally, this 
research should consist of conducting mock trials (using both civil and criminal cases) 
with the participation of practicing attorneys, an actual judge, and mock jurors who 
accurately resemble the characteristics of the juror pool.  While conducting a study like 
this would be expensive, “the cost would be trivial compared with the total amount of 
money that attorneys (through their clients) spend on consultants each year in the absence 
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of certainty regarding the effectiveness of this approach” (Lieberman & Sales, 2007, p. 
206). 
Another important focus of future research should be to examine the “benefit of 
the doubt” theory more thoroughly.  In the present study, a pattern emerged in many of 
the findings that could be interpreted as a byproduct of our jury system’s emphasis on the 
presumption of innocence and use of a reasonable doubt standard.  Perceptions of 
neutrality and global fairness were not affected when extra assistance was provided to the 
defense by a trial consultant, but they were significantly lower when the extra assistance 
was provided to the prosecution.  Furthermore, when participants in the ambiguous 
evidence condition were forced into a dichotomous verdict decision, many more 
participants than expected chose a non-guilty verdict.  This pattern should be tested 
experimentally.  Rather than using the “benefit of the doubt” theory to explain findings 
post hoc, future studies may want to hypothesize the effect and test whether it can be 
replicated in a similar study and/or whether the benefit of the doubt continues to go to the 
defense when circumstances are varied (e.g., extra assistance is provided to one party in 
the form of a more expensive or experienced attorney).    
Future studies may also want to examine the impact that party imbalance may 
have on the verdict in civil cases, including the potential to affect damage awards.   For 
example, in cases where the evidence is ambiguous and trial consultants are not balanced 
between parties, might jurors perceive the party without the consultant as an underdog 
and either exonerate the defendant (in situations where the plaintiff alone has a 
consultant) or compensate the plaintiff with a conviction and the award of larger damages 
(in situations where the defendant alone has a consultant)?  Or will the “benefit of the 
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doubt” theory apply to this situation as well, causing the plaintiff to receive less 
compensation even if the defendant alone uses a trial consultant?  Future research should 
explore these and related possibilities. 
Finally, recent research in the field of social justice has demonstrated that 
procedural fairness effects are often moderated by individual differences and motivations 
(De Cremer & Tyler, 2005).  Given that procedural fairness conveys information relevant 
to the level of inclusiveness and status that one has within the group (e.g., Tyler & Lind, 
1992), it is very possible that the extent to which people attend to procedures and how 
much they are affected by these procedures may depend on the degree to which they 
value their inclusion and belonging in a group (e.g., De Cremer & Blader, 2006).  Need 
to Belong is inherently associated with fairness because of its relational implications, and 
has frequently been shown to moderate people’s interest in and reactions toward 
procedural fairness (De Cremer & Blader, 2006; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005).  
Specifically, De Cremer and Blader’s (2006) study has shown that people with a stronger 
Need to Belong are more attentive to procedural fairness information than individuals 
with a weaker Need to Belong, and that these differences in belongingness needs have 
effects on perceived procedural fairness.  Perhaps future research should include Need to 
Belong items to see if there is a difference in perceptions of fairness for individuals along 
this dimension.   
Conclusions 
 While some attention has been focused on investigating whether the procedures 
used by trial consultants are ethical and/or fair, this study explored for the first time if 
(and under what conditions) the use of trial consultants themselves can be perceived as 
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unfair.  It is unique in that it is the first to investigate whether SOE and the balance of 
trial consultants can influence juror verdicts, and it is the first to use the relational model 
(Tyler & Lind, 1992) in general, and the concept of neutrality (Tyler, 1989) in particular, 
as a framework from which to examine this relationship.  In addition to examining 
whether the use of trial consultants could affect juror verdicts, an intention of this study 
was to explore the intervening mechanisms behind the trial consultant - verdict link.  
However, because results did not find that the balance of trial consultants affected the 
proportion of guilty verdicts in a criminal trial, it was not possible to examine perceptions 
of neutrality and global fairness as mediating variables.    
  As Stolle et al. (1996) warned, perceptions of fairness are important if our justice 
system is to work properly.  If the use of trial consultants is perceived as unfair or 
manipulative, both the participants and observers of a trial are in danger of viewing the 
entire jury system as rigged or unfair.   During trials, a level playing field is created by 
giving both sides the opportunity to have an attorney and by giving those attorneys equal 
opportunities to present arguments and question witnesses (Tyler, 1997).  This study 
found that the level playing field is violated when only the prosecution has access to the 
resources and skills of a professional trial consultant.   
The law with regard to the use of trial consultants in the courtroom is in its 
nascent stage.  The 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled (In re Cendant Corp. 
Securities Litigation, 2003) that the work product (i.e., documents and other items, either 
tangible or intangible, prepared in anticipation of litigation) of a trial consultant is 
protected by the attorney work-product privilege.  The court also ruled that 
communications at the core of the work-product doctrine are only discoverable “on a 
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showing of rare and exceptional circumstances,” such as when there is a charge of 
falsified testimony.  While this means that attorneys are not permitted to ask witnesses to 
divulge a trial consultant’s mental impressions, opinions, legal theories, and conclusions 
about the upcoming litigation, it does allow an attorney to ask witnesses whether he/she 
met with a trial consultant, the date and duration of any meetings, who was present and 
the purpose of the meeting(s).  The degree of disclosure currently permitted highlights the 
importance of investigating whether trial consultants themselves can serve as a source of 
perceived bias and consequently affect the outcome of a case.  This study did not find 
evidence that the balance of trial consultants directly impacted verdicts.  However, the 
balance of trial consultants did impact perceptions of fairness under certain conditions. 
Consequently, until we have a better understanding of the circumstances under which 
procedural justice can impact the perceptions of jurors and the potential consequences of 
these perceptions of fairness, every effort should be made to level the playing field in the 
courtroom, including the playing field as it pertains to the use of trial consultants. 










Prosecution:  the State as the party that represents the victim and conducts criminal 
proceedings in court against a person  
Defense:  the party responsible for defending the person accused of a crime 
 
 
On the morning of March 24, 1987, a 45 year-old woman in El Paso, Texas, was 
assaulted in her home.  A man wearing a stocking mask and carrying a gun broke into the 
residence and attacked the woman in the hallway of her home.  He then forced her onto a 
bed in a bedroom and threatened to kill her.  Although the assailant then claimed he only 
wanted to rob her, he fondled and raped her before fleeing out the back door.  
 
Frozen with fear, the victim waited nearly an hour before she managed to put on her 
son’s bathrobe and drive herself to a local store.  She asked the staff there to contact the 
police.  Once the police arrived, they escorted her to the hospital where a rape kit was 
collected.  The examining physician found sperm present on slides prepared from the 
vaginal washings. 
 
One day after the attack, on March 25, the victim was asked to come to the police station 
to help them create a composite sketch of her assailant.  On March 26 she again returned 
to the police station to view photographs of multiple men in the hope of identifying her 
attacker.  After searching through all of the potential suspects, she picked out the picture 
of a man named Jasper Brennan and stated that he looked like the perpetrator but that she 
could not be sure.  The police obtained an arrest warrant for Jasper Brennan, a sophomore 
at the University of Texas at El Paso.  Jasper Brennan was arrested on March 28, 1987.   
 
The following day, on March 29, 1987, the woman viewed a live lineup at the police 
station.  After all the subjects put on a hat similar to the one worn by the perpetrator, the 
victim identified Jasper Brennan as the assailant.  The police also contacted two other 
women who had been attacked in a similar fashion.  They both identified Brennan in the 
lineup, but stated that they could not be sure.  Jasper Brennan was charged with three 
counts of aggravated sexual assault. 
 
(Insert applicable paragraphs here- see Appendix B) 
 
Jasper Brennan’s trial began in November 1987.  When the victim of the March 24, 1987, 
assault took the stand, she testified that she was very confident in her ability to remember 
the structure of the assailant’s face, his physique, body size, nose, complexion, and the 
size and shape of his hands.  When asked if the perpetrator had a moustache, however, 
she admitted that she did not know because it was too dark in the hallway where she was 
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accosted.  She also acknowledged that she did not know what color her attacker’s eyes 
were since she only viewed her assailant for “a short period of time.”   
 
Aside from the victim herself, the prosecution relied on the testimony of a serologist from 
the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) by the name of Norbert Brown.  Mr. 
Brown was the person responsible for testing the rape kit and bedding taken from the 
crime scene.  Mr. Brown testified that he tested the items and compared the results to 
samples taken from Jasper Brennan and the victim.   Based on the evidence, Mr. Brown 
testified that the semen was deposited by a non-secretor- a person whose blood type 
antigens are not found in other body fluids.  Mr. Brown concluded that Jasper Brennan, 
who is a non-secretor, was a possible contributor of the semen.  Semen samples from the 
victim’s husband and son were not obtained.  On cross-examination, Mr. Brown 
acknowledged that no sperm samples had been retrieved from the other two women 
attacked in a similar fashion. 
 
The prosecution was permitted to introduce the testimony of one of the other rape victims 
who had identified Jasper Brennan.  The crimes were similar and distinctive enough in 
nature for the prosecution to argue that the same man- Jasper Brennan- must have 
perpetrated both crimes.   
 
The defense claimed that Jasper Brennan was misidentified.   The defense produced two 
witnesses who corroborated his alibi, which was that he was studying for an exam on the 
campus of his college at the time the crime occurred around 9:00 AM.  Brennan’s 
girlfriend, Tracy Reynolds, testified that she had called him on the telephone at his home 
less than an hour before the crime occurred and had met him shortly after 9:15AM in the 
campus library.  A second witness, Mark Grotty, testified that he had seen Jasper 
Brennan studying in the campus library sometime before 9:00AM.  Furthermore, the 
defense also argued that since Jasper Brennan did not have a car, he did not have an 
opportunity to commit the rape.   
 
The jury deliberated for 6 hours before returning a verdict. 
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Prosecution:  the State as the party that represents the victim and conducts criminal 
proceedings in court against a person  
Defense:  the party responsible for defending the person accused of a crime 
 
 
On the morning of March 24, 1987, a 45 year-old woman in El Paso, Texas, was 
assaulted in her home.  A man wearing a stocking mask and carrying a gun broke into the 
residence and attacked the woman in the hallway of her home.  He then forced her onto a 
bed in a bedroom and threatened to kill her.  Although the assailant then claimed he only 
wanted to rob her, he fondled and raped her before fleeing out the back door.  
 
Frozen with fear, the victim waited nearly an hour before she managed to put on her 
son’s bathrobe and drive herself to a local store.  She asked the staff there to contact the 
police.  Once the police arrived, they escorted her to the hospital where a rape kit was 
collected.  The examining physician found sperm present on slides prepared from the 
vaginal washings. 
 
One day after the attack, on March 25, the victim was asked to come to the police station 
to help them create a composite sketch of her assailant.  On March 26 she again returned 
to the police station to view photographs of multiple men in the hope of identifying her 
attacker.  After searching through pictures of potential suspects, she immediately picked 
out the picture of a man named Jasper Brennan and stated that he looked exactly like the 
perpetrator.  The police obtained an arrest warrant for Jasper Brennan, a sophomore at the 
University of Texas at El Paso.  Jasper Brennan was arrested on March 28, 1987. 
 
The following day, on March 29, 1987, the woman viewed a live lineup at the police 
station.  After all the subjects put on a hat similar to the one worn by the perpetrator, the 
victim positively identified Jasper Brennan as the assailant.  The police also contacted 
two other women who had been attacked in a similar fashion.  They both identified 
Brennan in the lineup.  Jasper Brennan was charged with three counts of aggravated 
sexual assault. 
 
(Insert applicable paragraphs here- see Appendix B) 
 
Jasper Brennan’s trial began in November 1987.  When the victim took the stand, she 
testified that she was very confident in her ability to remember the structure of the 
assailant’s face, his physique, body size, nose, eye color, complexion, and the size and 
shape of his hands.  She stated that although the hallway where the initial attack took 
place was dark, there was ample light in the bedroom to get a good view of her attacker.  
She also testified that as soon as she saw Jasper Brennan in both the photographs at the 
police station and in the live lineup, she knew that he was the man who had attacked her. 
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Aside from the victim herself, the prosecution relied on the testimony of a serologist from 
the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) by the name of Norbert Brown.  Mr. 
Brown was the person responsible for testing the rape kit and bedding taken from the 
crime scene.  Mr. Brown testified that he tested the items and compared the results to 
samples taken from Jasper Brennan, the victim, the victim’s husband, and the victim’s 
son.   Based on the evidence, Mr. Brown testified that the semen was deposited by a non-
secretor- a person whose blood type antigens are not found in other body fluids.  
Furthermore, Mr. Brown’s serology analysis concluded that a blood sample taken from 
Jasper Brennan put him among just 5 percent of the population who could possibly have 
been the source of the semen stains.  Mr. Brown concluded that Jasper Brennan, who is a 
non-secretor, was a likely contributor of the semen.  The victim’s husband and son, who 
are secretors, were excluded as possible contributors of the semen. 
 
The prosecution was permitted to introduce the testimony of one of the other rape victims 
who had identified Jasper Brennan.  The crimes were similar and distinctive enough in 
nature for the prosecution to argue that the same man- Jasper Brennan- must have 
perpetrated both crimes.   
 
The defense claimed that Jasper Brennan was misidentified.  The defense produced one 
witness who corroborated his alibi, which was that he was still sleeping in the home of 
his girlfriend at the time the crime occurred around 9:00 AM.  Brennan’s girlfriend, 
Tracy Reynolds, testified that was with him the entire morning of March 24, 1987.    
Furthermore, the defense also argued that since Jasper Brennan did not have a car, he did 
not have an opportunity to commit the rape.  On cross-examination, however, Tracy 
Reynolds admitted that she had a car that Jasper Brennan drove on occasion. 
 
The jury deliberated for 6 hours before returning a verdict. 
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Prosecution:  the State as the party that represents the victim and conducts criminal 
proceedings in court against a person  
Defense:  the party responsible for defending the person accused of a crime 
 
 
On the morning of March 24, 1987, a 45 year-old woman in El Paso, Texas, was 
assaulted in her home.  A man wearing a stocking mask and carrying a gun broke into the 
residence and attacked the woman in the hallway of her home.  He then forced her onto a 
bed in a bedroom and threatened to kill her.  Although the assailant then claimed he only 
wanted to rob her, he fondled and raped her before fleeing out the back door.  
 
Frozen with fear, the victim waited nearly an hour before she managed to put on her 
son’s bathrobe and drive herself to a local store.  She asked the staff there to contact the 
police.  Once the police arrived, they escorted her to the hospital where a rape kit was 
collected.  The examining physician found sperm present on slides prepared from the 
vaginal washings. 
 
One day after the attack, on March 25, the victim was asked to come to the police station 
to help them create a composite sketch of her assailant.  Almost five months later, on 
August 21, she was again asked to return to the police station to view photographs of 
multiple men in the hope of identifying her attacker.  After searching through all of the 
potential suspects, she picked out the picture of a man named Jasper Brennan and stated 
that he looked like the perpetrator but that she could not be sure.  Jasper Brennan was the 
only blue-eyed white male in the police photographs.  The police obtained an arrest 
warrant for Jasper Brennan, a sophomore at the University of Texas at El Paso.  Jasper 
Brennan was arrested on August 22, 1987. 
 
The following day, on August 23, 1987, the woman viewed a live lineup at the police 
station.  Again, Jasper Brennan was the only blue-eyed white male.  In addition, he was 
the only person the police had placed in both the photographs and live lineup.  After all 
the subjects put on a hat similar to the one worn by the perpetrator, the victim identified 
Jasper Brennan as the assailant.  The police also contacted two other women who had 
been attacked in a similar fashion.  They both identified Brennan in the lineup, but stated 
that they could not be sure.  Jasper Brennan was charged with three counts of aggravated 
sexual assault. 
 
(Insert applicable paragraphs here- see Appendix B) 
 
Jasper Brennan’s trial began in November 1987.  When the victim took the stand, she 
testified that she was very confident in her ability to remember the structure of the 
assailant’s face, his physique, body size, nose, complexion, and the size and shape of his 
hands.  When asked if the perpetrator had a moustache, however, she admitted that she 
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did not know because it was too dark in the hallway where she was accosted.  She also 
acknowledged that she did not know what color her attacker’s eyes were since she only 
viewed her assailant for “a short period of time.”   
 
Aside from the victim herself, the prosecution relied on the testimony of a serologist from 
the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) by the name of Norbert Brown.  Mr. 
Brown was the person responsible for testing the rape kit and bedding taken from the 
crime scene.  Mr. Brown testified that he tested the items and compared the results to 
samples taken from Jasper Brennan, the victim, the victim’s husband, and the victim’s 
son.   Based on the evidence, Mr. Brown testified that the semen was deposited by a non-
secretor- a person whose blood type antigens are not found in other body fluids.  Mr. 
Brown concluded that Jasper Brennan, who is a non-secretor, was a possible contributor 
of the semen.  The victim’s husband and son were also found to be non-secretors, and 
thus could not be excluded as potential contributors of the semen. 
 
The prosecution was permitted to introduce the testimony of one of the other rape victims 
who had identified Jasper Brennan.  The crimes were similar and distinctive enough in 
nature for the prosecution to argue that the same man- Jasper Brennan- must have 
perpetrated both crimes.   
 
The defense claimed that Jasper Brennan was misidentified.   Norbert Brown was called 
to testify again, and this time admitted that forensic tests had shown that all other trace 
evidence analysis found at the crime scene, including pubic hairs, excluded Jasper 
Brennan as a source.  The defense produced two witnesses who corroborated his alibi, 
which was that he was studying for an exam on the campus of his college at the time the 
crime occurred around 9:00 AM.  Brennan’s girlfriend, Tracy Reynolds, testified that she 
had called him on the telephone at his home less than an hour before the crime occurred 
and had met him shortly after 9:15AM in the campus library.  A second witness, Mark 
Grotty, testified that he had seen Jasper Brennan studying in the campus library sometime 
before 9:00AM.  Furthermore, the defense also argued that since Jasper Brennan did not 
have a car, he did not have an opportunity to commit the rape.   
 














For conditions where there was no TC for prosecution and there was a TC for defense 
the following paragraph was inserted: 
 
The defense hired a consultant to help with jury selection and case presentation.  The 
consultant approached the case by first distributing a survey to citizens living in the 
jurisdiction of the crime, and paid the citizens to complete the survey.  From the survey 
results the defense’s consultant found several facts which people reading this case 
considered most important, and he determined which personal characteristics are highly 
correlated with an individual’s likelihood to agree with the arguments of the defense.  
The consultant then informed the defense attorneys of this information, and the defense 
attorneys used this information in planning a case strategy and in questioning and 
selecting a favorable jury.  Next, the consultant conducted a mock trial.  This consisted of 
a full dress rehearsal of the case using mock jurors during which the attorneys for the 
defense were given an opportunity to practice and refine their opening and closing 
arguments, prepare witnesses for trial, and listen in on jury deliberations.  As a result of 
feedback provided by the mock jurors during the mock trial, the defense attorneys were 
able to refine their case before the real trial actually began.  During the trial, the 
consultant sat with the defense attorneys to provide further assistance if needed. 
 
                                                
7 Some of the details of these paragraphs have been taken from Stolle et al. (1996) 
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For conditions where there was a TC for prosecution and there was no TC for defense 




The prosecution hired a consultant to help with jury selection and case presentation.  The 
consultant approached the case by first distributing a survey to citizens living in the 
jurisdiction of the crime, and paid the citizens to complete the survey.  From the survey 
results the prosecution’s consultant found several facts which people reading this case 
considered most important, and he determined which personal characteristics are highly 
correlated with an individual’s likelihood to agree with the arguments of the prosecution.  
The consultant then informed the prosecution’s attorneys of this information, and the 
prosecution attorneys used this information in planning a case strategy and in questioning 
and selecting a favorable jury.  Next, the consultant conducted a mock trial.  This 
consisted of a full dress rehearsal of the case using mock jurors during which the 
attorneys for the prosecution were given an opportunity to practice and refine their 
opening and closing arguments, prepare witnesses for trial, and listen in on jury 
deliberations.  As a result of feedback provided by the mock jurors during the mock trial, 
the prosecution attorneys were able to refine their case before the real trial actually 
began.  During the trial, the consultant sat with the prosecution attorneys to provide 
further assistance if needed. 
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For conditions where there was a TC for defense and a TC for prosecution the following 
paragraph was inserted: 
 
 
Both the defense and prosecution hired consultants to help with jury selection and case 
presentation.  The defense’s consultant approached the case by first distributing a survey 
to citizens living in the jurisdiction of the crime, and paid the citizens to complete the 
survey.  From the survey results the defense’s consultant found several facts which 
people reading this case considered most important, and he determined which personal 
characteristics are highly correlated with an individual’s likelihood to agree with the 
arguments of the defense.  The consultant then informed the defense attorneys of this 
information, and the defense attorneys used this information in planning a case strategy 
and in questioning and selecting a favorable jury.  Next, the consultant conducted a mock 
trial.  This consisted of a full dress rehearsal of the case using mock jurors during which 
the attorneys for the defense were given an opportunity to practice and refine their 
opening and closing arguments, prepare witnesses for trial, and listen in on jury 
deliberations.  As a result of feedback provided by the mock jurors during the mock trial, 
the defense attorneys were able to refine their case before the real trial actually began.  
The prosecution’s consultant used a similar approach as the defense’s consultant, 
whereby he paid citizens living in the jurisdiction of the crime to complete a survey.  The 
survey results allowed the prosecution’s consultant to find several facts which people 
reading this case considered most important, and he determined which personal 
characteristics are highly correlated with an individual’s likelihood to agree with the 
arguments of the prosecution.  The consultant then informed the prosecution attorneys of 
this information, and the prosecution attorneys used this information in planning a case 
strategy and in questioning and selecting a favorable jury.  The prosecution’s consultant 
also conducted a mock trial, which consisted of a full dress rehearsal of the case using 
mock jurors during which the attorneys for the prosecution were given an opportunity to 
practice and refine their opening and closing arguments, prepare witnesses for trial, and 
listen in on jury deliberations.  As a result of feedback provided by the mock jurors 
during the mock trial, the prosecution attorneys were able to refine their case before the 
real trial actually began.  During the trial, the prosecution’s consultant sat with the 
prosecution attorneys and the defense’s consultant sat with the defense attorneys to 














We now turn to the fundamental principles of our law that apply in all criminal trials- the 
presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Throughout these proceedings, the defendant is presumed to be 
innocent.  As a result, you must find the defendant not guilty, unless, on the evidence 
presented at this trial, you conclude that the People have proven the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 
In determining whether the People have satisfied their burden of proving the defendant’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you may consider all the evidence presented, whether by 
the People or by the defendant.  In doing so, however, remember that, even though the 
defendant introduced evidence, the burden of proof remains on the People. 
 
The defendant is not required to prove that he/she is not guilty.  In fact, the defendant is 
not required to prove or disprove anything.  To the contrary, the People have the burden 
of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  That means, before you can 
find the defendant guilty of a crime, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
every element of the crime including that the defendant is the person who committed that 
crime.  The burden of proof never shifts from the People to the defendant.  If the People 
fail to satisfy their burden of proof, you must find the defendant not guilty.  If the People 
satisfy their burden of proof, you must find the defendant guilty. 
 
What does our law mean when it requires proof of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt”?  
The law uses the term, “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” to tell you how convincing the 
evidence of guilt must be to permit a verdict of guilty.  The law recognizes that, in 
dealing with human affairs, there are very few things in this world that we know with 
absolute certainty.  Therefore, the law does not require the People to prove a defendant 
guilty beyond all possible doubt.  On the other hand, it is not sufficient to prove that the 
defendant is probably guilty.  In a criminal case, the proof of guilt must be stronger than 
that.  It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.     
 
A reasonable doubt is an honest doubt of the defendant’s guilty for which a reason exists 
based upon the nature and quality of the evidence.  It is an actual doubt, not an imaginary 
doubt.  It is a doubt that a reasonable person, acting in a matter of this importance, would 
be likely to entertain because of the evidence that was presented or because of the lack of 
convincing evidence.  
 
                                                
8 Taken from http:///www.nycourts.gov/cji/1-General/cjigc.html#PRESUMPTION 
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Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you so firmly convinced of 
the defendant’s guilt that you have no reasonable doubt of the existence of any element of 
the crime or of the defendant’s identity as the person who committed the crime.  
 
In determining whether or not the People have proven the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you should be guided solely by a full and fair evaluation of the 
evidence.  After carefully evaluating the evidence, each of you must decide whether or 
not that evidence convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. 
 
Whatever your verdict may be, it must not rest upon baseless speculations.  Nor may it be 
influenced in any way by bias, prejudice, sympathy, or by a desire to bring an end to your 
deliberations or to avoid an unpleasant duty.   
 
If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a 
charged crime, you must find the defendant not guilty of that crime.  If you are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a charged crime, you must find 




































Relational Theory Measure 
 
 
The following scale was used for all items: 
 
 
   strongly     moderately    slightly      neutral     slightly     moderately   strongly 





Impropriety of behavior: 
1. The attorneys in this case acted in a manner that was dishonest or improper. 
2. The witnesses in this case acted in a manner that was dishonest or improper. 
3. The use of a trial consultant was dishonest or improper. 
4. The procedures followed in this case are similar to those followed in most other 
cases. (reverse-scored) 
 
Factual decision making: 
5. The jury was given all of the information needed to render a verdict. (reverse-
scored) 
6. The jurors in this case received and understood the information needed to make a 
good decision. (reverse-scored) 
 
Lack of bias: 
7. The treatment of the prosecution or defense was influenced by the characteristics 
(sex, race, age, education, income, status) of the parties in the case. 
8. The outcome of the trial will be influenced by the characteristics (sex, race, age, 
education, income, status) of the parties in the case. 




10.  The jury system tried to be fair to Jasper Brennan. 
11.  The jury system treated Jasper Brennan in a reasonable manner. 
 
Status Recognition Items 
 
12.  Jasper Brennan was treated politely in this case. 
13.  Jasper Brennan was treated with respect in this case. 
14.  Jasper Brennan was treated with dignity in this case. 
 






Likelihood of Conviction Measure: 
Verdict Determinations and Manipulation Check Items 
 
 
1.  a) What would your verdict be if you were a juror in this case?  (please circle 
one) 
 
Not Guilty                          Guilty    
 
   
2. Rate the guilt of Jasper Brennan on a scale from 1 to 7 using the following 
guidelines:  (Please circle the number that best describes how you feel)   
 
 
 1= I am positive Brennan is not guilty 
 2= I think Brennan is not guilty, but I have some doubt 
 3= I think Brennan is not guilty, but I have a lot of doubt 
 4= I can not decide if Brennan is guilty or not guilty 
 5= I think Brennan is guilty, but I have a lot of doubt 
 6= I think Brennan is guilty, but I have some doubt 
 7= I am positive Brennan is guilty 
  
              
3. In the space below, please list all pieces of evidence or other aspects of the trial 






4. If you circled “Guilty” to Question 1, please continue.  Otherwise, please skip this 
question and go to Question 5. 
 
What would be your recommended prison term for Jasper Brennan? (Please circle 
the appropriate number, keeping in mind that 5 years is generally the minimum 
sentence in sexual assault cases) 
 
5 years    9 years  13 years  17 years 
6 years   10 years  14 years  18 years 
7 years   11 years  15 years  19 years  
8 years   12 years  16 years  20 years 
                  >20 years 
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5. Rate the strength of the prosecution’s evidence (taking into account such factors 
as factual presentation and witness credibility) on a scale from 1 to 7 using the 
following guidelines: (Please circle the number that best describes how you feel)   
 
 
 1= The prosecution’s evidence was very weak 
 2= The prosecution’s evidence was moderately weak 
 3= The prosecution’s evidence was slightly weak 
 4= The prosecution’s evidence was inconclusive (favored both parties equally) 
 5= The prosecution’s evidence was slightly strong 
 6= The prosecution’s evidence was moderately strong 
 7= The prosecution’s evidence was very strong 
 
 
6. Rate the strength of the defense’s evidence (taking into account such factors as 
factual presentation and witness credibility) on a scale from 1 to 7 using the 
following guidelines: (Please circle the number that best describes how you feel)   
 
 
 1= The defense’s evidence was very weak 
 2= The defense’s evidence was moderately weak 
 3= The defense’s evidence was slightly weak 
 4= The defense’s evidence was inconclusive (favored both parties equally) 
 5= The defense’s evidence was slightly strong 
 6= The defense’s evidence was moderately strong 
     7= The defense’s evidence was very strong 
 
 
7. Rate the strength of the evidence presented in the trial: 
 
1= The evidence strongly favored the defense 
2= The evidence favored the defense 
3= The evidence slightly favored the defense 
4= The evidence was inconclusive (favored both parties equally) 
5= The evidence slightly favored the prosecution 
6= The evidence favored the prosecution 
7= The evidence strongly favored the prosecution 
 
 
8. In this trial, which party received assistance from a trial consultant?  (Please circle 




3= Both prosecution and defense  






Demographic and Background Information  
 
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.  Do NOT put your name 
on this questionnaire.  
 
1.  Age   ___________ 
   
 
2.  Gender  ___________ 
 
 
3.  Ethnic origin (please circle) White/Caucasian 
     Black/African American 
     Hispanic/Latino 
     Asian American/Asian 
     Native American 
     Other 
     Prefer Not To Answer 
 
 
4.  Have you ever been the victim of a violent crime? 
 
  
If yes, please describe briefly in the space below. 
 
 
5.   Has anyone you are close to ever been the victim of a violent crime? 
 
  
If yes, please describe briefly in the space below. 
 
 
6.  Have you ever been accused of a violent crime? 
 
 
If yes, please describe briefly in the space below. 
 
 
7.  Has anyone you are close to ever been accused of a violent crime? 
 
 
If yes, please describe briefly in the space below. 
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